ernment of the United States. The Iraqi Government is exceedingly anxious that American-Iraqi relations shall be developed in an atmosphere fraught with sincere friendship and mutual confidence, and it is feared that such resolutions and events might affect the situation and disturb the calm, all of which is not desirable to anyone.

"The Ministry wishes to state that it may be remembered that there are still many people in the world who are interested in creating difficulties and disturbances among the members of the United Nations and that the propaganda of the Axis powers is persisting in a fiendish effort to affect the unity of the United Nations by taking advantage of the Palestine question; this behooves us to avoid giving such opportunities to the enemy.

"The position of the Iraqi Government is rendered more difficult when the committees of such important institutions as Congress make such recommendations. The Iraqi Government cannot remain as a spectator of the tragedy which the Zionists wish to enact on the stage of the world.

"The resolution for the adoption of such a decision is directly opposed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and violates all the lofty principles of humanity. It undoubtedly arises from the effect of Zionist propaganda on the statesmen in America which leaves no scope for many of them to study, to investigate the justice of the case, and freely to hear the opposite point of view. The principle of interference in the destiny of the countries of others is an extremely dangerous one. This war is raging to exterminate that principle and to bring about justice among the peace-loving nations. It is not reasonable for a power permeated with the spirit of justice to give Arab Palestine away to the Jews in contravention of these lofty principles. This reassures us that the Palestine cause would inevitably and ultimately be solved in the interest of its Arab inhabitants.

"All the Arabs are completely confident of the justice of their cause in Palestine and of the transgression resulting from Zionist interference therein. Nothing shall, therefore, prevent them from fighting in defense of their legitimate right in Palestine regardless of costs. The Arabs appeal to the leaders of America to weigh the Zionist cause and the benefits which may result from supporting it against the sacrifices and efforts which America has made in the Arab and Islamic countries and the firm traditional friendship and material and moral interests which these sacrifices and efforts have created now and will create in the future in the Arab countries, and also against America's reputation for upholding justice and right. Only then will appear the wide difference between the profit and loss which America will experience in the event she supports the unjust Zionist policy.

"The Iraqi Government is fully cognizant of the fact that the Constitution of the United States of America imposes the principle of the division of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches. It, therefore, hopes that the American Government will, in its Executive capacity, make the viewpoint of the Iraqi Government known to the Legislative authority. It must be stated in this connection that the statement which Mr. Stettinius has recently sent to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has more or less alleviated the crisis which has arisen in the hearts of the Iraqi people. But we wish to be reassured that the American Government will not be affected by Zionist

attempts which are undoubtedly contrary to the principles of right and justice. We likewise wish to reiterate here that the continued application by the Zionists of their plans for the realization of their unlimited ambitions will inevitably lead to the occurence of unrest and disturbances and the shedding of blood in this part of the world. We do not believe that this will gain the support of the American nation which is famed for its adherence to the principles of justice and peace.

"The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and respect."

HENDERSON

867N.01/12-2244

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 80

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1944. We have sent you considerable material in recent weeks bearing upon the reaction of the Arab statesmen and politicians in the Near East to pro-Zionist pronouncements in this country. In this connection I think that you will be interested in noting the following extract from a letter to a member of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs from an official of the OWI who had occasion to discuss various matters with the Iraqi delegation to the International Business Conference:

"Every member of the Delegation gave me to understand in no uncertain terms that the fair settlement of the Palestine issue is the most important condition for creating and building up any friendly relations between the Arab people of Iraq and those of the United States. They said heretofore the contributions of such institutions as the American University of Beirut, as well as the friendly feelings. brought back by Iraqi students who had studied in the United States, were very instrumental in creating in Iraq a friendly disposition towards this country. The recent actions of various groups and legislative bodies in America regarding Palestine, however, have counteracted this friendly orientation to a large measure. Every member of the group assured me that this feeling was shared by every Arab citizen of Iraq and that the feeling on this question was very intense."

I think this statement is of considerable significance, coming as it does not from any official source or from any political group in the Near East, but from a representative group of Iraqi business men. It shows that the anti-Zionist sentiment is not confined to the political leaders in the Near East, but is a universal feeling which we must constantly take into consideration.

WALLACE MURRAY

80 Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary (Grew), and the Assistant Secretary (Dunn).

867N.01/12-2344

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1944.

MR. MURRAY: I had the memorandum you prepared on Palestine with me when I saw the President yesterday. When I mentioned the subject, he complimented us on the fine manner in which this problem had been handled in his absence and then expressed the hope that he would not have to get into it again for some time. It therefore seemed inappropriate for me to bring up your memorandum and I think we should not send it over for the time being. It can be worked into our general preparation for what is ahead which we shall be undertaking on a broad scale in the Department in the next few weeks.

[Annex]

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 81

WASHINGTON [undated].

I believe the time has come when we should decide upon the next step to be taken with respect to the Palestine problem. After consultation within the Department, I submit herewith, for your consideration, a course of action in regard to Palestine in view of the projected meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.82

[Subannex]

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE REGARDING THE PALESTINE QUESTION 83

In determining what action should be taken in regard to the Palestine question, the following are the principal factors to be considered:

1. The Department's policy up to the present time has been directed primarily at forestalling any action which would be likely to create a situation in the Near East that would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in that area.

This preventive policy cannot be continued indefinitely. The adoption of a more positive policy is clearly desirable. The coming meeting would seem to be the appropriate time to initiate such a policy.

81

Marginal notation on the original: "Held for preparation. Not sent."

82 A reference to the forthcoming Conference at Yalta, February 4-11, 1945.. Documentation on this Conference is printed in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945; no record has been found of discussion regarding Palestine at the Conference.

83 Marginal notation on the original: "Not sent."

2. Ibn Saud and the heads of other Governments in the Near East have been informed, with the President's concurrence, that it is the view of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be made without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

3. The British Government has officially stated that it will not enter into commitments regarding the future of Palestine without prior consultations with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom it may judge to be concerned.

4. Soviet officials have stated recently that the Soviet Government does not favor the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

In view of the foregoing factors, it would be inadvisable for the United States at the present time to take a definite attitude toward the future of Palestine. It also follows that it would be inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to undertake any long-range settlement for Palestine without the approval of the Soviet Government. We should not give the Soviet Government an opportunity to augment its influence in the Near East by championing the cause of the Arabs at the expense of the United States or at the expense of both the United States and Great Britain.

It would be inadvisable, also, to discuss, or for any of the three great powers to formulate, a Palestine settlement until there has been full consultation with both Arabs and Jews in accordance with commitments made both by us and the British. It is therefore suggested that the President might raise at the forthcoming meeting the question of initiating consultations with Arabs and Jews and representatives of the three religions interested in Palestine. Specifically it is proposed that the British Government be asked to take steps to implement its commitment to consult Arabs and Jews and other interested parties by inviting them to present their views regarding a Palestine settlement in writing to the British Government.

The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposal for a Palestine settlement, which would have concurrence of the three great powers. This body of material might be presented, at an appropriate time after the cessation of hostilities, to any future international conference at which a Palestine settlement was under consideration.

It is thought that the present unprofitable and increasingly dangerous activities of both Arab and Jewish pressure groups would in part be checked, if all the interested groups were to occupy themselves with the organization and presentation of proposals to the British Government with respect to the post-war settlement for Palestine.

It is thought, also, that this procedure would give the more moderate and less vociferous groups among both Arabs and Jews, who now lack

the means to present their views, an opportunity to do so officially. It would also make it possible for ecclesiastical organizations with important interests in the Palestine settlement to give expression to their views in regard to the future of the Holy Land.

In view of the widespread humanitarian interest in the fate of Jews whose lives are or may be jeopardized in Axis Europe, the British should at the same time be asked to consider formulating and announcing the immigration policy which they will pursue in Palestine between the time when the White Paper quota becomes exhausted and the time when a long-range settlement of the Palestine question becomes operative.