USAFIME 11 permission to make aerial and engineering surveys for direct air route Cairo to Dhahran.

Summary as follows:

1. Proposed air route raises serious problems. Studies and discussions to remove great obstacles must precede decision to grant permission or not.

2. Before decision can be made to permit surveys or not Saudi Arabian Government must know detailed survey program: Exactly when the surveys would take place; whether planes will land; whence they come, which direction they go, whether each returns each time to point of takeoff. Furthermore, route should be shifted further to north, if, as appears on map furnished, it would pass close to Jauf, Tayma and Hayil. End summary.

Complete text 12 follows by air pouch.

Sent Department, repeated Cairo for Giles.

EDDY

890F.248/10-644: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, October 6, 1944-11 a. m. [Received 5:25 p. m.]

3007. Re No. 7 from Dhahran, October 4.13 From Eddy. Most authentic confidential source confirms that British told Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US Army at Dhahran. Royal Air Force Chief Cairo stated to same source that Air Ministry London would not concur in US Army request for Dhahran aerodrome.

In view of British survey for Dhahran airfield this appears to be an unfriendly act constituting (1) anti-American coercion of Saudi Government (2) obstruction to Allied war effort. Perhaps it is test of equal opportunities for US and of British cooperation in Saudi Arabia.14 [Eddy.]

11

TUCK

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME).

12

Text not printed; in his covering despatch 1, September 4, the Minister in Saudi Arabia said: "It would appear that careful and detailed negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government will be necessary before progress can be expected in this important matter." (883.79690F/9-444)

13

Not printed; it reported the visit of two British officers to Dhahran for the purpose of finding a site for a Royal Air Force landing field (890F.248/ 10-444).

14

For correspondence relating to the American-British joint supply program in Saudi Arabia, see pp. 670 ff.

811.248/10-944

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1944.

Mr. Michael Wright 15 came in to see me and I raised with him the question of the Dhahran airfield. I told him that, as he knew, we had had a field in Abadan, in Iran; the British oil interests had purchased oil interests in that field; this gave us reason to believe that eventually the field would be taken over by British interests.16 We then had undertaken to get a concession for a field at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, which would serve our purposes as well. Ibn Saud had declined the concession, urging us to consult with the British; we now had information that this had been done at British instance, accompanied by information that the British were unalterably opposed to our having this field. At the same time a British survey party had appeared in Dhahran. I said that, as Mr. Wright knew, we had worn ourselves out here trying to prevent this kind of thing from the very beginning. There was no law in heaven or earth which entitled anybody to interfere with our building an airfield for legitimate purposes in Saudi Arabia. I pointed out that the top-ranking diplomatic officer who had reported on the incident had characterized it as an "unfriendly act". He said that, bluntly, this kind of thing could not continue.

Wright said that this was entirely contrary to the whole spirit of the arrangements in respect of the Middle East; 17 they were consulting on everything. He could not believe that the facts were as reported. I said I certainly hoped this would prove to be the case. He volunteered to get the facts from his Government and come in and discuss them. I said that my observation had been that statements of policy from Whitehall did not always reflect what happened on the ground, and that the situation certainly ought to be cleared up. I said that he had to remember that all these incidents were being added up here for instance, the conjunction of this with the attempt to negotiate a four-year meat contract with the Argentine 18 was beginning to open a good many questions. For this reason, I hoped a prompt solution could be had.

15 Counselor of the British Embassy.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

16 For correspondence regarding the Abadan airfield, see pp. 486 ff.

17 For correspondence regarding arrangements to insure Anglo-American cooperation at all levels in the Middle East, see pp. 6 ff.

18 See vol. VII, section under Argentina entitled: "Efforts of the United States to enlist the American Republics and the United Kingdom in a common policy toward Argentina."

890F.248/10-644: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1944-11 p. m.

2777. ReLegs 3007, October 6, 11 a. m. from Eddy. For Eddy. Please report nature, extent and dates of British airfield survey at Dhahran referred to in your message from Cairo.

Please state also whether at any time King Abdul Aziz suggested that we consult with the British regarding the proposed field at Dhahran.

Dhahran's no. 7, October 4 19 not yet received by Department.
Sent to Cairo, repeated to Jidda.20

HULL

890F.248/10-1244: Airgram

The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State

DHAHRAN, October 12, 1944-5 p. m. [Received November 6-6 p. m.]

A-12. Major General Benjamin F. Giles, Commander, USAFIME, Cairo, accompanied by a plane-load of officers and men, flew to Dhahran from Tehran on October 11, 1944, arriving about 2:45 p. m. They left for Cairo via Abadan the following morning.

Purpose of visit was technical inspection of Dhahran airfield for suitability as ATC base on India route. General and staff declared themselves entirely satisfied with potentialities of the field and did not visit alternate field at Ras Tanura, which has been recently flooded by exceptional tides. No contacts made with Saudi authorities, although General stated he had previous clearance for his visit. Soil samples were taken and data assembled.

General had been informed by Colonel Eddy at Cairo of visit of two British officers reported in my secret telegram no. 7 of October 4, 1944, and my secret despatch no. 16 of October 8, 1944.21 Their visit appeared to him particularly significant in view of fact that he had recently been told by a high British authority at Cairo that British were opposing concession of field to American Army on grounds that it was "unnecessary to war effort". General agreed with view given by British visitors here that Muharraq Field, Bahrein, is not strong enough to support heavy planes of type henceforth to be sent to India.

19 Not printed.

20 Repeated to Jidda as telegram 207. In his telegram 302, October 11, 11 a. m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia reported that the "King at no time suggested our consultation with British regarding Dhahran field." (890F.248/10-1144) 21 Neither printed.

554-184-6543

He is eager to have negotiations with King expedited to enable Army to initiate development of field at earliest possible date.

General also supports oil company project, now before King at Riyadh, for importation of some 800 Italian skilled workers from Eritrea to help in refinery construction, but insists such matters be given second place to negotiations for Dhahran airdrome. He offered to delegate Colonel Weathers of his staff to assist company in recruiting this labor at Asmara, and will authorize transportation to Ras Tanura when final clearance made.

Repeated to Jidda and Cairo.

HART

890F.248/10-1744: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

(Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1944-midnight.

8598. A covert contest which begins to assume unpleasant proportions is prevailing over airfields in the Middle East. As you are aware, the United States constructed an airfield at Abadan, which is an important link in our airways to India and the Far East. Part of the land on which this field was constructed was owned by British oil interests; recently these British oil interests purchased the rest of the land on which this was situated, under circumstances which convinced the Department that in due time the British proposed to retake the field.

Chiefly in view of the need of the United States Air Corps for a better field than the one at Bahrein and because the proposed oil developments in Saudi Arabia will call for a very considerable number of Americans to work at Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, King Ibn Saud was approached to grant us the right to build an airfield there. He declined.

We now have reliable, but highly confidential information indicating that the British directed Ibn Saud to refuse; however, the King has not at any time suggested that we consult with the British regarding the matter. Early in October two British officers from Bahrein, as civilians, paid a visit to Dhahran announcing it to be their purpose to find a site for an RAF airfield to supplement the one at Bahrein. These two officers, however, appeared only to be technicians acting under instructions and unaware of political obstacles and the neutral status of Saudi Arabia.

You might take a convenient occasion to suggest to Mr. Eden 22 that this has made an extremely painful impression here; and it is

22

Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

being connected with such matters as the Argentine meat contract, and other similar incidents, as evidencing the real trend of British policy. Needless to say, it does complicate the problem of the forthcoming air conference 23 in view of the wholly different basis on which matters have been discussed thus far. The essence of our approach in aviation matters heretofore has been non-exclusivity, coupled with a generally cooperative live-and-let-live attitude in respect of British and American aviation, along with the development of institutions which might lead to closer cooperation as rapidly as facts might warrant. This last incident is, of course, a reversion to a dog-eat-dog policy which, if continued, has possibilities we are not presently able to appraise.

At present the United States Army Air Corps is flying planes to the Far Eastern theater of war via Iraq and Bahrein. The field at Bahrein, because of the soft character of the soil on the island, is not suitable for heavy planes. It will be necessary, therefore, to find a suitable field in another locality nearby. Furthermore, the Air Corps desires to fly its planes directly across the central part of Saudi Arabia to this field. The Air Corps has found the terrain in the vicinity of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia suitable for an airfield. It desires, therefore, to secure permission from the Saudi Arabian Government to construct a field there and to fly planes directly across the country rather than over the northern part. The direct flight to Dhahran would save about 220 miles.

The Saudi Arabian Government has not granted permission to the Government of the United States for the U.S. Army Air Corps to build a field in the vicinity of Dhahran or to fly its planes directly across the country because of an objection expressed by the British Government to the Saudi Arabian Government to the construction of such an airfield in the vicinity of Dhahran. It is understood, however, that the Government of Saudi Arabia would grant such permission

23 For correspondence regarding the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago, November 1-December 7, 1944, see vol. II, index entry under Civil Aviation Conference.

24 Forwarded under cover of a letter of November 9 to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling).