smaller nations especially Lebanon because of their long traditional friendship and close relations. President said that, although he hoped such friendship would always continue, Lebanon's position had materially changed during past year and that now Russia and United States had in turn accorded it unconditional recognition. Beynet commented that Soviet policy is essentially realistic, its action in 1939 towards Baltic States 52 being hardly such as to warrant confidence of smaller nations, and that United States seemed concerned primarily with Pacific affairs. To President's reply that he placed high faith in American idealism Beynet answered that though such idealism no doubt existed its effectiveness as factor in determining the peace should be considered in light of concurrent isolationist sentiment among its people; it could hardly be expected to interest itself actively in Levant problems except in protection of its various cultural and trade interests. Beynet then turned conversation to progress of the war voicing conviction in Allied victory but fearing it might not be achieved in Europe before spring. Their leave-taking the Foreign Minister concluded struck a note of sober parting of the ways. Repeated to Caserta. WADSWORTH 890E:01/9-2844 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. Murray Mr. Kohler Mr. Wright called and presented the attached Aide-Mémoire dated September 28, 1944,53 in response to Mr. Murray's request of September 22, 1944, for information as to the present British policy toward Syria and Lebanon in the light of the reported recommendation of the British Minister at Beirut to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that they consent to negotiate treaties with the French regulating their respective relations. Mr. Wright read a telegram which the Foreign Office had just sent to General Spears instructing him not to press the question further 52 For correspondence relating to pressure by the Soviet Union upon Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to conclude pacts of mutual assistance, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 934 ff. 53 Infra. at present in view of the strong negative reaction of the Syrian and Lebanese authorities. The Foreign Office explained, however, that it had not envisaged treaties which would be unduly onerous on the Levant Republics or derogatory to their independence but rather a normal regularization of the status of the States and termination of the mandate on the lines of the Iraqi precedent. (Mr. Wright has since supplied the text of this telegram, copy attached.54) In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Wright said that the British could not be expected to remain in the Levant States indefinitely to provide a counter-weight which the local authorities could use against the French and expressed the opinion that France was rapidly becoming stronger and that Syria and Lebanon might not be able to obtain later the same favorable terms they could expect at present. Mr. Wright was asked to explain the meaning which the British attached to their recognition of a "predominant position" for France among European powers in the Levant States, and particularly whether they considered that there was any conflict between their use of the word "predominant and privileged" as the equivalent thereof. Speaking personally but as an official who had been closely associated with the problem, Mr. Wright said the British purpose had been to calm the French apprehensions, rampant at the time of the invasion of the Levant States in 1941,55 that the British intended to supplant the French in that territory; and that the British meant simply that they were prepared to see the French have relations with the Levant States similar to British relations with Iraq. He emphasized that the British concession to the French was limited to "predominance among European States" and that it was specifically stated that this predominance should not prejudice the independence of Syria and Lebanon. He thought that the de Gaulle-Lyttleton exchange had been done in something of a hurry to calm the French; that the British had not taken issue with the phraseology used by General de Gaulle at the time and that it had just not been specifically clarified since. Asked whether Russia was included among the "European nations" in reference, Mr. Wright replied that no one was thinking about Russia in that area then. As to the proposed treaty between France and the Levant States, Mr. Wright agreed with Mr. Murray that the case was not exactly parallel to that of Britain in Iraq or Egypt, as the French were not in a position to offer the usual quid pro quo of military security and protection in return for the rights and privileges obtained. 54 Not printed. 55 For correspondence relating to the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by Free French and British forces in 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. I, pp. 725 ff. 890E.01/9-2844 The British Embassy to the Department of State AIDE-MÉMOIRE His Majesty's Minister returned to Beirut recently with instructions that with the end of the war in view it is most important that our efforts should be used to the fullest possible extent to pave the way for an eventual agreement between the Levant States and the French which would permit the conduct of their future relations on an ordinary diplomatic basis. No less formal agreement than a treaty seemed likely to attain this object. Sir E. Spears was therefore to neglect no opportunity of impressing on the local Governments our view that a treaty was not only the best but perhaps the sole method of securing full and unchallenged independence. 2. The outcome of the interview which Sir E. Spears had with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on his return is summarised in the attached statement.56 3. There is, of course, no intention on the part of His Majesty's Government of imposing treaties on the Levant States (as they have implied in commenting to Sir E. Spears) although it still seems to His Majesty's Government essential that some further agreement or treaty be made for the final definition and regularisation of the position. His Majesty's Government do not propose to press the matter further at this stage. WASHINGTON, September 28, 1944. 890E.01/10-444 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. Murray, NEA Mr. Alling, NEA Mr. Kohler, NE Mr. Wright called to continue his recent discussions with us regarding the situation in Syria and Lebanon, and handed to Mr. Murray the attached documents received from the Foreign Office,57 namely: 1) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax 58 dated September 26, 1944, summarizing a letter from the Syrian President to Mr. Churchill; 56 Not printed; see telegram 190, September 15, 6 p. m., from Beirut, p. 777. 57 None printed. 58 British Ambassador. 554-184-65-51 2) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax dated September 26, 1944, repeating the text of a telegram addressed to Mr. Eden by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs; 3) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to Sir Edward Spears dated October 1, 1944, containing British reply to Syrian Foreign Minister. We informed Mr. Wright that communications similar to 1) and 2) above had likewise been addressed to President Roosevelt and the Secretary by the same Syrian officials. Mr. Wright said that Sir Edward Spears had been instructed to emphasize to the Syrians, in delivering 3) above, that it was no part of the intention of the British Government to impose any particular procedures or any particular conditions in suggesting the negotiation of a treaty with the French; that the British Government considered the present time the most favorable for the Syrians and Lebanese to obtain confirmation and regularization of their independence and interests and felt the local Governments would make a mistake if they did not give serious consideration to this factor. Mr. Wright continued that the Foreign Office, referring to the exchanges of views on this subject between the Embassy and the Department last year, had asked the Embassy to express the earnest hope that the Department would agree with its present views. Elaborating as to the timeliness of negotiations now, Mr. Wright emphasized that with the favorable developments of hostilities the time would soon be reached when British forces, which had been a source of strong support for the local Governments, would have to be withdrawn. It seemed important to him [Mr. Murray] that the British and ourselves should do what we could to persuade the French that their own best interests would be served by a friendly and generous attitude toward the Syrians and Lebanese rather than insistence upon a legalistic and dictatorial approach. Mr. Wright strongly agreed and undertook to recommend to London that Mr. Duff-Cooper 59 be asked to talk with the French in this sense. Mr. Murray said that he would try to discuss the matter also with Mr. Caffery,60 prior to his departure for Paris. Concluding the discussion, it was generally agreed that it was not necessary at this time to raise the technical question of the capacity of the French Committee of National Liberation to enter into a treaty 59 Alfred Duff Cooper, formerly British Representative with the French Committee of National Liberation; appointed Ambassador to France, October 23, 1944. 60 Jefferson Caffery, Representative to the de facto French Authority at Paris; appointed Ambassador to France, November 25, 1944. of the nature in question, since present developments indicated that there would probably be a recognized provisional French Government before any negotiations came to a conclusion. 890E.01/10-544 The Department of State to the French Delegation in Washington 61 MEMORANDUM The Government of the United States has been guided in its attitude toward Syria and Lebanon since the events of July 1941 by two principal considerations: 1) Its frequently reiterated sympathy with the aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples for the full enjoyment of sovereign independence which has been envisaged since the establishment of the "Class A" Mandate; and 2) its established policy of according recognition to another government only when such government is in possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority, and is in a position to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of a sovereign state. The United States Government was thus unable to accede to the original request that it grant full recognition to Syria and Lebanon, made to it by the French authorities following the issuance of the independence proclamations by General Catroux in 1941,62 though it was glad to recognize the step thus taken towards independence by establishing Legations at Beirut and Damascus and accrediting to the local Governments a "Diplomatic Agent," 63 a rank customarily used in the case of semi-independent States. This Government has subsequently followed developments in the Levant States with careful attention. It welcomed the accords concluded with the local Governments by General Catroux in December 1943 and observed with satisfaction the transfer to them of the substantial governmental powers previously exercised by the French authorities. As the French Delegate at Washington was recently informed, the Government of the United States has concluded that Syria and Lebanon may now be considered 61 Notation on the original: "Presented personally to M. Hoppenot by Mr. Wallace Murray Oct. 10, 1944 FDK." See memorandum of October 10, p. 799. Henri Hoppenot was a member of the French Delegation in Washington. 62 For correspondence relating to the refusal of the United States to recognize the new regimes in Syria and Lebanon, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. III, pp. 785 ff.; see also memorandum of October 23, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, post, p. 805. |