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serve common cause; in aspiring to a future of freedom and peace Lebanon places its all at disposal of Democratic Powers.

Syrian President struck key note of official reaction when after presentation ceremonies he said informally “you give us new courage to deserve [sic] to persevere in the way we have chosen; only once before since assuming office have I felt so moved, so sure of our future; that was when we signed the Catroux protocol of last December”.


890E.01/12–144: Airgram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, December 1, 1944.

[Received December 9—6 p. m.] A-143. Reference the Department's airgram 166 of November 8,93 the position of the United States with regard to the relationship between France and the Independent States of Syria and Lebanon was discussed at length with Mr. Chauvel, Director General of the Foreign Office, who was familiar with the Department's memorandum of October 5 and the substance of Mr. Murray's remarks to Mr. Hoppenot. It was emphasized that the Department had no objection to the conclusion of the agreements defining relationships between the French and Independent States which were agreed to in a friendly manner between the interested parties provided they did not infringe the rights and interests of others, although the United States Government took note of the "relations of special friendship which have so long existed between France and the Lebanon [Levant?] States."

Mr. Chauvel stated that the latest reports from the Levant indicated that the course of Franco-Levantine relations which he described roughly as “following a chart of abating fever" seemed for the time being to have returned to a "normal temperature.” Ostrorog was now in the Ministry on consultation, and he reported no feeling of apprehension that relations would become aggravated.

Chauvel stated that the French Government felt that some agreements were absolutely essential between France and the States in question, that he felt that a treaty was by far the most preferable way of definitely handling [terminating?] mandate status, and he repeated the now familiar French thesis as regards France's responsibility to the League of Nations. He said, however, that France was fully prepared to undertake the negotiation of the subsidiary conventions before proceeding to the more thorny treaty. Among the conventions he mentioned: One establishing judicial rights and procedures both as regards French citizens in the Lebanon [Levant?] States and Lebanon [Levant?] citizens in France and its colonies; one military convention regarding protection of the area and the disposal of the special troops; one with regard to other military matters; one with regard to education matters and one with regard to commerce.

3 Not printed; it instructed Ambassador Caffery to discuss informally with the French Provisional Government the American position on French relations with Syria and Lebanon (890E.01/11–844).

Chauvel stated that in his opinion the chief difficulty was that the two Levant Governments were obsessed with the idea that they would be afforded an opportunity to participate actively, although in a minor role, at the Peace Conference and that they felt that this participation would be handicapped if they concluded any treaties before the Conference met. This he felt was an error. He said that some days ago an invitation had been sent out to the Syrian Foreign Minister to come to Paris to negotiate. While no answer had been received, Chauvel was encouraged by the fact that at least the invitation was receiving consideration. He stated that the experience of 1936 had proven that negotiations could be much expedited provided they did not take place in the Levant. He said that if the Syrian Minister accepted, a similar procedure would follow automatically as respects the Lebanon.


President Roosevelt to the President of the Syrian Republic

(Kuwatly) 94

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1944. MY DEAR PRESIDENT KUWATLY: Your letter of September 19, 1944,95 setting forth your views and those of the Syrian Government as regards the present situation and policy of Syria, has had my sympathetic attention and that of the competent officers of the Department of State.

While I have not heretofore been able to reply directly to your friendly letter, I am sure you will understand that the several communications which have recently been made to you and to your Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by Mr. Wadsworth have constituted a response intended to define the attitude of the United States Government toward the issues in question. I refer particularly in this regard to the State Department's memorandum of October 5, 1944, to the French Delegation at Washington and to Mr. Wadsworth's note to your Foreign Minister of October 11, 1944,96 copies of which I attach for your convenient reference.


94 Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; original transmitted to Beirut in instruction 270, December 13 (not printed).

Ante, p. 787. » Not printed; for substance, see telegram 176, October 7, 8 p. m., to Beirut, p. 798.

I believe these documents speak for themselves and I have been glad to hear from Mr. Wadsworth that you found them reassuring as regards the policy of this Government.

The American people have recently recorded overwhelmingly their determination that the United States shall assume its full share of the responsibility, in cooperation with other nations of like mind, in creating a future world of peace, prosperity and justice for all. I therefore have no hesitation in assuring you that my Government will pursue these objectives with all the influence at its command, and am confident that we shall enjoy the wholehearted cooperation of the Syrian Government in this task. Very sincerely yours,



RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GERMANY 740.0011 European War 1939/32640 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1941. The British Government informs us that it has learned through an extremely secret source that the Turkish authorities consider the United States to be much less insistent upon Turkey's entering the war than the British are and that Great Britain alone is putting pressure on Turkey in this regard. The British Embassy in Washington has requested the Department to authorize Ambassador Steinhardt 2 to "back up any representations that the British Ambassador in Ankara 3 may make”, in order to dispel the Turkish impression.

Furthermore, the British Government intends to let the Turks know that the present offer to the Turks to enter the war is final and that if it is not accepted Great Britain will be obliged to reconsider its whole Turkish policy.

Am I correct in assuming that while you would not wish us to authorize Ambassador Steinhardt to back up any representations which the British Ambassador may make, you would like him to make it clear to the Turks that we as well as the British would welcome Turkey's contribution to the common victory by active participation in the war?



740.0011 European War 1939/32769a : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1944–6 p. m. 29. The British authorities believe that Turks have gained the impression that only Great Britain is pressing Turkey to enter the war

1 Concerning the attitude of the United States toward the entry of Turkey into the war, see bracketed note, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, p. 1057; for previous correspondence regarding preemptive buying of Turkish goods, see ibid., pp. 1111 ff.; for previous correspondence on the efforts of the United States and the British Governments to acquire Turkish chrome and to prevent its sale by Turkey to Germany, see ibid., pp. 1150 ff.

? Laurence A. Steinhardt, Ambassador in Turkey.
3 Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen.
* Marginal notation : "CH OK FDR”.



and that a much more lenient attitude is held by the United States. Consequently, the British have requested the Department to authorize you to support the British Ambassador in Ankara fully in this connection, as a means of counteracting the above-mentioned Turkish impression.

The American Government believes that the present war is being fought by the Allies in the interests of all nations large and small and that all peoples have a common interest in the achievement of the victory for which we are fighting. Turkey, as the outstanding nation of the Balkans and Near East, has particularly important interests in the future world which we are fighting to bring about. We believe that Turkey will wish to contribute its part, in a direct military manner, to the achievement of these aims, and the American Government hopes that Turkey's decision will be to join its forces with those of the United Nations for rapid victory. You are authorized to make clear again to the Turkish authorities this Government's attitude as. indicated above.


740.0011 European War 1939/32718: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State


ANKARA, January 14, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received January 17–4:35 a. m.] 77. Department's 29, January 11. If as the British authorities believe the Turks gained the impression from the Cairo Conference that only Great Britain is pressing for their entry into the war and that a much more lenient attitude is held by the United States, my conversations since then with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and numerous other high Turk Government officials must have disabused them of any such impression. Very shortly after our return from Cairo my British colleague expressed concern to me on this same point and it was at his suggestion that I have made it unmistakably clear to Numan on several occasions that my Government hoped the Turk Government would take an active part in collaboration with the British in accelerating the impending victory of the United Nations. In view of the Department's instructions I shall continue to emphasize to Numan that my Government desires Turkey's active participation in the war and hopes the Turks will reach a speedy agreement with the British as to the time and condition of Turkey's entry.

For correspondence regarding the conference at Cairo, December 4–6, 1943, between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and the President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü), see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 655 ff.

* Numan Menemencioglu.

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