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have right of flight in Ethiopia without reference to Ethiopian regulations.

Sub-soil rights not mentioned in agreement but paragraph 5 of British letter No. 1 printed with agreement concedes that with exception of water, sub-soil and mineral rights on [sic] Ogaden and reserved areas are Ethiopian property the exercise of rights to which will not be interfered with by British Military Administration. In view of this letter it seems unlikely that American firms would encounter difficulties on part of British in this connection (reLegs 265, December 21 35).


884.77/10–1244 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1944—8 p. m. 197. Please advise whether new agreement contained provision anticipated in your telegram 206, October 12,84 that operation of railway by Ethiopians requires clearance with French. If so please report what if any steps the Ethiopian Government has taken to secure agreement with the French.


884.77/12–2944: Telegram

The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

ADDIS ABABA, December 29, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received December 29–11:40 a. m.] 272. ReDepts 197, December 27, 8 p. m. Transfer of railway operation is to be not later than 3 months after notice by Ethiopia that its proper operation has been arranged for, and Ethiopia agrees that operating arrangements will not violate French rights. In reply to my formal inquiry, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 35 stated yesterday that Ethiopian Government considers that no negotiations with French prior to transfer of operation are required, as Ethiopian operation like British Military operation is merely temporary. He showed me British note not published, copy of which is promised for transmission in next pouch,se indicating that British do not intend to insist upon evidence of agreement between Ethiopians and French before effecting transfer of operations.



33 Not printed. 34 Telegram not printed. Aklilou Abte Wold. Despatch No. 319, December 27, from the Minister in Ethiopia, not printed.

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868.01/429 : Telegram The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary

of State

Moscow, January 4, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.] 19. The Greek Ambassador a informed me today that he has received note from the Soviet Government to the effect that in view of assurances which the Soviet Government has received from the British Government regarding the possibility of achieving unity among the Greek guerrillas, the Soviet Government supports the efforts of Greek Government to form a united front in Greece against the common enemy (see my telegram No. 1, January 3, 9 a. m.*).

As the British Minister received negative reply to the two appeals he made to Molotov prior to my delivery of your message, I infer that your message influenced the decision.


868.01/430 : Telegram The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary

of State

Moscow, January 5, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.] 32. A memorandum dated January 4 has been received from the Foreign Office stating that a memorandum to the following effect has been delivered to the British Foreign Office by the Soviet Ambassadors (see my telegram 19, January 4, 3 p. m.):

1 Continued from Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 124–166. *Athanasios Politis.

8 Not printed; in the last paragraph of this telegram (860N.00/242), Ambassador Harriman reported that he had informed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov of Secretary Hull's message to Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos. The message referred to was that of December 23, 1943, supporting Tsouderos' attempts to achieve unity among the partisan groups in Greece; for text, see telegram Greek Series 67, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, p. 164. For correspondence concerning the outbreak of fighting among the Greek partisans, see ibid., pp. 154 ff., passim. •John Balfour, Chargé d'Affaires.

As the British Government, on the basis of the information available to it, considers that a reconciliation of the rivalry among the partisan groups in Greece is now possible, the Soviet Government considers it expedient, with the aim of strengthening the struggle against the German invaders, to support the creation of a unified front of all partisan groups in Greece.


868.00/1332: Telegram The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to

the Secretary of State


CAIRO, January 5, 1944–10 p. m.

[Received January 7–1:59 p. m.] Greek Series 4. In regard to the matter discussed in my telegram No. 148, Greek Series of December 28, 4 p. m. my British colleague informed me on January 3 that Mr. Eden? did have another go" at Molotov and that the latter reiterated that he could not issue a statement for use by the Greek Prime Minister along with Mr. Eden's and the Secretary's because he was insufficiently [informed ?] on the Greek situation. However, the Moscow radio emitted a broadcast to Greece on New Year's Day (to which I understand Mr. Molotov made no reference) calling on "guerillas and citizens” to “unite for the final struggle against the Germans and for the independence and freedom of the Greek people" and I am today informed by the Greek Foreign Office that further word has been received now from Mr. Molotov to the effect that he will support the Allied attitude on the basis of information supplied him by the British Embassy in Moscow.

Should a statement from Mr. Molotov be forthcoming, as now seems possible, it may be regarded as bringing the Soviet technically into concert with the other two powers but on the other hand the delay in its issuance as well as the absence in the above mentioned broadcast of any allusion to the British and American appeals is also likely to have the effect in Greece of giving the Russian pronouncement when it comes a unique distinction as that of a power peculiarly interested and specially to be heard and this may have been the Russian aim from the beginning. The Russian Foreign Office can hardly be presumed ignorant of the considerable activity of Communist groups in all the Balkan countries at the present time as well as of the existence of liaison if nothing more between Tito's 8 Partisans and the direction of EAM' and though it may not be supporting such activity directly it is probably not averse to its continuance or to capitalizing on the opportunities it is offering so widely for the spread of Soviet influence and prestige.

* Fëdor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom. * Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, p. 165. ? * Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.


868.00/1336 : Telegram The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to

the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 14, 1944—5 p.m.

[Received January 15–11:58 a. m.] Greek Series 18. See my telegram No. 4, Greek Series January 5, 10 p. m. The Soviet Government's statement in support of the Greek Prime Minister's appeal for unity in Greece has now been handed to the Greek Government and was released to the press on January 12 in the following form "The Soviet Government support the creation of a united front of all guerrilla bands in Greece with the object of reinforcing the struggle against the German invaders”.

I am informed that Mr. Tsouderos has decided against transmitting the statement to Greece in a special broadcast on the grounds that this might tend to make the Russian message appear over important (see my comment in paragraph 2 of my telegram above referred to) but that it has been included as a news item in the regular Greek program of the Cairo radio station.

It is expected that the Soviet statement together with those of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden will be printed in pamphlet form and dropped over Greece.


868.01/434 : Telegram The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to

the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 21, 1944–8 p. m.

[Received January 22—6:57 p. m.] Greek Series 27. The Greek Prime Minister on January 16 received from the Central Committee of EAM a telegram which indicates that Mr. Tsouderos' recent broadcasts have made a favorable impression within Greece and urges the formation of a government of national unity. Mr. Tsouderos answered pointing out that recon

8 Assumed name of Josip Broz, Yugoslav partisan leader. Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front).


ciliation between the guerrillas must precede the creation of such a government. Though he hopes that Mr. Eden's fortuitously synchronized statement to the House on January 19 regarding unity and relief 10 (see my telegram No. 12, Greek Series January 11, 1 p. m.") may have a favorable effect, the Prime Minister is somewhat reservedly optimistic about the possibility of reconciling the guerillas. But he is on the whole pleased about the general situation in Greece, since the extent of the recognition of himself and his Government which he feels is implicit in EAM's message, seems to bear out reports that in some sections, at least, of public opinion in Athens there has been in recent months a swing toward support of the Government in Exile.

The text of the telegrams and further comment are being sent to the Department by airgram.12


868.01/466 : Telegram The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to

the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 13, 1944–3 p. m.

[Received March 14—7:55 a. m.] 83. For the President. The Greek Prime Minister has asked me to inform you that he has written the King 13 on the basis of widespread advices from political leaders and other competent persons in occupied Greece that while it is not necessary for him to make any further public declaration beyond his letter of November 8,14 he should certainly and at once authorize the appointment of a Regent to exercise Governmental powers in Greece from the moment of liberation until a plebiscite may determine the question of the regime. “On this" the Prime Minister has written "there is complete agreement among all the parties without any exception the resistance organizations and the Archbishop”,15 who is proposed as Regent.

The Prime Minister wants you to know this, he says, because he believes you to be interested in the King's fate and he emphasizes his hope that the King will consent. If he does not the Prime Minister believes the cause of the monarchy will be lost in the situation now prevailing which he describes as being "controlled by Leftist elements and the armed guerrillas in the mountains”. On the other hand if he does “the situation will finally develop in favor of Your Majesty”.




Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 396, col. 153. Not printed.

Airgram No. A-8, January 22, 7 p. m., not printed. 18 George II, King of the Hellenes. 14 See Greek Series telegrams No. 110, November 23, and No. 128, December 12, 1943, and aide-mémoire from the British Embassy, December 22, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 155, 157, and 160, respectively.

Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens.

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