further instructions which it desired, relative to the point in question. The Secretary General said that he hoped that I would do so as his Government desired further information with regard to the meaning of the reservation. I assume that the Turkish Government has taken this matter up again with me as a result of the remark made by von Papen to the Prime Minister last Saturday to the effect that he did not understand how Turkey could take a step towards entering the war when the United States had made a reservation to the effect that it would not afford any military assistance to Turkey. KELLEY 740.0011 European War 1939/8-144: Telegram The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, August 1, 1944-7 p. m. [Received August 2-11:49 a. m.] 1404. ReEmby's 1398 July 31. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested me to call on him this afternoon and stated that following our conversation yesterday he had given further consideration to the matter of the reservation contained in the statement of the position of the American Government relative to Turkey's rupture of relations with Germany and decided to put down on paper the thoughts of the Turkish Government in regard to this matter. He thereupon handed me a memorandum which reads as follows in paraphrased translation: "The Turkish Government has taken cognizance of the communication made orally by the American Chargé d'Affaires on July 25, 1944, with a view to supporting the position taken by Great Britain relative to the immediate rupture by Turkey of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, and emphasizing in this connection that such action by the Turkish Government would be considered by the American Government as only a first step toward actual belligerency, with the reservation that, in taking this position, the United States is not committed to military, naval or air support of any campaign in the Balkans. "From this communication and from the explanations which were given by the Chargé d'Affaires it is evident that the American Government, while considering the action of the Turkish Government on breaking off its economic and diplomatic relations with Germany as only a first step toward actual belligerency, is anxious to make it clear that it does not consider itself committed thereby to furnish military, naval or air assistance to any Balkan campaign which might be undertaken and in which Turkey might participate, without the American Government having given its previous consent. However since the American Government has supported the British request for the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and since it has always associated itself with the British Government in steps toward this end, the Turkish Government considers that, in the event that Turkey should become involved in a Balkan campaign as result of an aggression arising out of the decision thus made. to break off her economic and diplomatic relations with Germany not only would the American reservation in such a contingency serve no logical purpose but the American Government should hasten to furnish Turkey all the assistance in its power." I informed Acikalin that I had telegraphed to my Government a summary of our conversation yesterday and that I would bring to its attention the memorandum which he had just handed me. KELLEY 740.0011 E.W.1939/8-244 Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 2, 1944 This Government welcomes as a step towards full cooperation with the United Nations in their struggle against Nazi aggression today's decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. 740.0011 European War 1939/8-744 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1944. THE SECRETARY: I have just received a letter " from General Marshall in reply to two letters 78 from us requesting interpretation of the reservation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Turkey's breaking of relations with Germany. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs approved the action subject to the reservation that the United States was not to be committed to a military campaign in the Balkans. The reason for the reservation is that our military resources are already committed to major campaigns in Europe and the Joint Chiefs are unwilling to make any additional commitments, although they express their willingness to consider whether any resources could be diverted to the Balkans in the event a campaign developed there. E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS] 740.0011 European War 1939/7-2644: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) WASHINGTON, August 12, 1944-3 p. m. 699. The Ambassador is returning fully informed regarding the questions raised in Embassy's 1374, July 26, 8 p. m., 1398, July 31, "August 4, not printed. 78 July 31 and August 3, neither printed. 9 p.m. and 1404, August 1, 7 p.m. and will make the American point of view clear to the Prime Minister immediately following his arrival. If you are pressed for a reply, you may convey the foregoing informally to the Foreign Office. STETTINIUS 740.0011 EW1939/7-344 President Roosevelt to the President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü) WASHINGTON, August 18, 1944. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been touched by your kind letter of July 3, 1944 which Ambassador Steinhardt has handed to me. I want you to know that I heartily reciprocate the sentiments to which you have given expression in your letter. The Turkish Government, in breaking off all economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, has given tangible evidence of your desire to align Turkey openly on the side of the United Nations and has taken a step toward cooperation in bringing this war, which has caused so much suffering to humanity, to a speedy and victorious conclusion. May I express the hope that the Turkish Government will in the near future take further steps to hasten the triumph of right and justice over the forces of evil. In recalling our meeting in Cairo and the great pleasure thereby afforded me of coming to appreciate personally your high qualities, I share your desire that circumstances will permit of our meeting again in the near future. Please accept the expression of my sincere and most cordial friendship. Very sincerely yours, [FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT] 740.0011 European War 1939/8-2644: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, August 26, 1944-8 p. m. [Received 10:57 p. m.] 1579. In conversation with the Russian Ambassador today he told me that subsequent to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany the Turk Government had informed the Russian Government that it felt it had substantially complied with Allied desires and that closer collaboration between Turkey and the Allies had become possible. To this the Russian Government replied that Turkey's entry into the war would serve no useful purpose and was no longer desired. The Turk Government then proposed a joint statement emphasizing the friendly relations between Turkey and Russia to which the Russian Government replied that such a statement would add nothing to the treaties already in existence between the two countries. The Turk Government then suggested that notwithstanding the existing treaties a joint statement along the lines proposed might be helpful. The Russian Government has not replied formally to this last suggestion. Vinogradov however has received instructions to discourage the Turks from pressing the same. Repeated to Moscow. STEINHARDT 740.0011 European War 1939/9-1244: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State ANKARA, September 12, 1944-10 p. m. [Received September 13-12:10 p. m.] 1717. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I had a general talk today with the Prime Minister. I found him in a rather troubled state of mind. He said he had reached the point at which he could no longer understand British policy towards Turkey while at the same time he was becoming concerned with recent unfavorable radio and newspaper comment in the United States with respect to Turkey. In response to my inquiry as to what he could not understand about British policy towards Turkey Saraçoğlu replied that Turkey had complied with every request made by its [British] ally but that notwithstanding such compliance London continued to evidence irritation and dissatisfaction with the Turk Government. In response to my inquiry as to whether the irritation he said he had sensed could perhaps be ascribed to the fact that Turkey had not as yet declared war on Germany, Saraçoğlu replied that since the rupture with Germany no such request had been made of the Turk Government by the British. He expressed the firm conviction that the British for reasons best known to themselves have not desired and do not desire a declaration of war by Turkey against Germany. He then remarked that shortly after the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany he had inquired of Hugessen as to whether the British Government desired Turkey's entry into the war and that Hugessen had answered him to the effect that it was too late for such action to be of any value. Saraçoğlu indicated that ever since the rupture of relations between Turkey and Germany his Government had been anticipating a request from the British either for air or naval bases, for the transit of British troops to the Balkans through Turkey, or for a declaration of war against Germany, observing that as long as no such request was received it was hardly advisable for the Turk Government to take such action on its own initiative. He expressed the opinion that were Turkey to declare war on Germany without having been requested to do so by the British London would be deeply offended. In consequence he said Turkey has for some months past been placed in a false light before the world. He said he was aware of the fact that the Russians some time ago had desired Turkey's entry into the war but that it had not been possible for the Turk Government at that time to comply with the desire of the Russian Government because of the then British attitude and that even had it been disposed to do so notwithstanding the British attitude the reservation contained in the American note to the effect that Turkey could not look to the United States for any assistance in connection with a Balkan campaign would have been a sufficient deterrent. Saraçoğlu then expressed his concern with recent developments in Bulgaria remarking however that he regarded recent developments in the Balkans as a whole as more of a menace to British than Turk interests in that as he put it "we have been neighbors of the Russians for many years with a common frontier and have learned how to get on with them, something the British still have to learn". From my talk with the Prime Minister I gained the impression that the present policy of the Turk Government is one of watchful waiting and that while it is prepared to grant bases, permission for the transit of British or American troops through Turkey to the Balkans, or to declare war on Germany if so requested by the British, it does not contemplate taking any action of its own volition unless extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances develop in the Balkans. STEINHARDT BREAK BY TURKEY OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS 767.94/12-1544: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) WASHINGTON, December 15, 1944-7 p. m. 1180. 1. The British Embassy handed the Department a paraphrase of a telegram 80 from Mr. Eden 81 to Lord Halifax 82 dated November 24, which states that previous objections to the idea of requesting the Turkish Government to break relations with Japan have now disappeared. The message states that a good example has been set by Rumania and Bulgaria breaking relations with Japan under pressure from the British and American Governments and that the Soviet Government, particularly at the Moscow Conference,88 80 Not printed. 81 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 82 British Ambassador in the United States. 83 For correspondence concerning the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Moscow, October 18-November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff. |