chased by the Government has not been put in evidence. The Commission is left in doubt whether the right acquired by the Government was to build a road the usable portion of which was to be 8 feet wide or whether the Government's right was to build a road no portion of which, including cuts and fills, should ever exceed 8 feet. The latter arrangement would have been so unreasonable that it is difficult to believe that it occurred, without clear evidence. If the Government was entitled, under its contract, to a usable road 8 feet wide plus necessary cuts and fills, then there is no evidence in the record that the lawful width was exceeded. Moreover, the lands on which the claimants' finca was situated were originally indultado lands, the grant whereof by the Government to the claimants' predecessor in title reserved the Government's rights for the construction of roads as set forth in art. 102 of Law 20 of 1913. Among the rights reserved in this article was that of taking without compensation the right of way necessary for the construction of caminos de herradura. There is some question as to whether this phrase includes ordinary country wagon roads or only trails for horses. At any rate, it is clear that the right of the Government under this article extends to whatever property is required for cuts, fills and drains, and it is not shown that the actual road in question after reconstruction exceeded in width a reasonable allowance for a camino de herradura under art. 102, with reasonable extensions for cuts and fills. The Commission decides that the claim must be disallowed. Done at Washington, D.C., this 26th day of June, 1933. D. W. VAN HEECKEREN COMMENT This Decision is of no importance in the field of international law except, perhaps, as one further evidence of the fact that, whenever called upon to do so in connection with the proper decision of questions submitted to their determination, international tribunals do not hesitate to pass upon questions of rights in real estate under the lex loci re sitae (contrary to contentions made by the Agent of Panama in this arbitration). CLAIM on behalf of MARIPOSA DEVELOPMENT DOCKET REGISTRY NO. 15 Syllabus 1. The rule of treaty interpretation which requires that all provisions of a treaty be given effect, if possible, " is no stronger than the presumption that the draftsmen of the treaty would not repeat themselves or use unnecessary words ". 2. "The Commission does not feel that it can extend its jurisdiction in order to prevent the first sentence in Article VII [of the arbitral convention] being superfluous." 3. The supplemental convention concluded December 17, 1932, requiring the Commission "to hear, examine and decide, before July 1, 1933, all the claims filed on or before October 1, 1932 ", was held not to require a decision on the merits of a claim filed on August 22, 1932, because "the Commission believes that the provision just quoted was merely intended to extend the dates for filing and deciding claims ". 4. The Commission held that its jurisdiction did not extend to claims arising after the date of the exchange of ratifications of the original arbitral convention. 5. The Commission rejected the contention that the claim "arose " at the time of the enactment of an allegedly confiscatory law and the bringing of suit by the Government under authorization of that law to cancel the claimants' titles, and held that a claim for the expropriation of property must be held to have arisen when the possession of the owner is interfered with and not when the legislation is passed which makes the later deprivation of possession possible ". 66 6. The Commission rejected the contention that a law creating the basis for a suit to cancel land titles, which basis did not previously exist, was pro tanto confiscatory and that suit brought by the Government before exchange of ratifications of the arbitral convention on the basis of that law, which suit resulted in a decision (after exchange of ratifications), retroactively canceling the titles, gave rise to the international claim within the period of determined jurisdiction of the Tribunal, namely, before the exchange of ratifications. 7. The Commission rejected the contention that a decision of the Supreme Court, rendered after exchange of ratifications of the arbitral convention, which wrongfully and retroactively orders the elimination of all records of previously existing land titles, took effect retroactively so that, with the allegedly confiscatory law authorizing the suit, which was enacted before the exchange of ratifications, the international claim" arose before the exchange of ratifications. 8. On a finding that jurisdiction of the Commission did not extend to claims in which the full measure of damage was not inflicted until after the exchange of ratifications of the arbitral convention, it held that the fact that a decision of the Supreme Court was rendered after that date, in violation of local law which required that it be rendered before that date, does not operate to give the Commission jurisdiction over a claim if based on that decision. 9. The Commission rejected the contention that, under the terms of the arbitral convention, the jurisdiction of the Commission depended upon the date of the international wrong from which the claim "arose ", or had its inception, not necessarily upon the date of the infliction of the full measure of damage; and held" that the damage from which the Mariposa claim arose was not sustained prior to October 3, 1931 [date of exchange of ratifications], and that the claim is [therefore] not within its [the Commission's] jurisdiction ". 10. The recitation of facts by the Commission as a basis for its decision stated that it was not "to be taken as indicating a belief as to the validity or invalidity of the claim, the legality or illegality of any of the facts recited, or as binding the United States or the Republic of Panama in respect to the facts recited in any subsequent proceeding". SUMMARY OF FACTS The United States presented this claim on behalf of 53 American citizens who were registered owners of portions of a large tract of land in the Republic of Panama, known as "El Encanto". International liability was asserted on the bases of a certain act of the Assembly, certain acts of executive officials, and a decision of the Supreme Court of Panama of October 20, 1931, which ordered the annulment of all the private titles "to the tract in question" and which, it was contended, constituted illegal confiscation of private property, being considered a gross denial of justice. The factual background of the claim, briefly stated, was as follows: On November 9, 1860, one Manuel A. Borrero, by public document, sold the property in question to Simon Rojas, basing his title on certain evidence of an auction sale of the property by the Kingdom of Spain to his paternal ancestor in 1689. On December 8, 1913, Rojas sold the property to one Herbert H. Howe. Howe subdivided it, selling part to the Mariposa Development Company (the principal claimant) and the remainder to Leslie R. Drake. Portions of the property then passed by various successive conveyances to the fifty-odd other claimants. In 1913 the Assembly of Panama enacted a socalled land registration law, the clear purpose of which was to protect bona-fide holders for value against the consequences of possible latent defects in the titles of their sellers. The law required that the Registrar should be a person having all the qualifications of a member of the Supreme Court of the Republic and that his appointment should be made by the President for the period of good conduct (as contrasted with that of members of the Supreme Court who are appointed for 5 years only). The law authorized the Registrar to refuse registration of defective titles offered for recording and placed his decisions on the same basis as those of a circuit court with respect to appeal therefrom directly to the Supreme Court, and made him liable, to the extent of his own property and a bond of 5,000 balboas, "for damages which he may cause to private persons". Articles 10 and 11 of that law (which had become articles 1762 and 1763 of the Civil Code before the litigation in this case took place) provided as follows: "ART. 1762. Registration does not validate the acts or contracts registered which are null or voidable according to law. 177402-34- -35 |