in treating in concert with his Allies; but he trusts that the idea of negotiation may not be made a mere means of gaining time, and a pretext for prolonging the armistice, as he is determined never to separate his interests from theirs, being satisfied that the only means of acquiring the general object-a permanent and stable peace-is by an union of council and arms." It then goes on to state that

"The points for Great Britain's consideration may be divided into three heads :-First, those to which her honour and faith are pledged, and on which she could in no case relax, viz., Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and the fulfilment of the engagements with Sweden.

"Second, those to which Great Britain may be pledged, by implied engagements, or that involve questions of paramount policy, and which she would insist on, conjointly with her Allies-viz., the restitution of Austria and Prussia to their former power; the separation of Holland from France; the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign.

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Third, those which Great Britain considers to be certainly of the greatest interest, but on which, as questions of continental policy, she would be disposed -where her own immediate honour or interests were not concerned to regulate her views generally by what the Allies should consider as most likely to effect the object in view; that of an honourable and lasting peace, viz., the arrangement of the affairs of Germany -Hanover being provided for-and a better state of things in Italy and Switzerland.”

Such are the general outlines of the conditions

upon which Great Britain is disposed to treat for peace; the application of them to depend, of course, on existing circumstances. The despatch continues that "in the event of the expulsion of the enemy from the Peninsula, Lord Wellington will carry his arms into France." And assurances are given that "at no period was Great Britain more ready, or able, to continue every assistance to her Allies, as the exertions in every quarter already made, and now making, bear witness."

The mediation of Russia between Great Britain and America is declined, as "we can never consent to trust a question involving our maritime rights to any Power, however unexceptionable-independent of that consideration-that Power might be as a mediator."

Regrets are expressed "that the offer was made before the sentiments of Great Britain were known upon it," and instructions given to "press the Emperor not to urge it further, as it could only have the effect of prolonging the war with America; a consequence which has, in fact, resulted from it by enabling the President to hold out a vague idea of peace, and thereby to reconcile the people to the sacrifices and hardships which the war exposes them to."

Diaries-August 2nd.-On my return from Lord Cathcart's I found letters from Gentz and Sir Charles, to both of whom I had written in the morning. There is no doubt that there will be war between France and Austria, and I know not on what grounds

Sir Charles can doubt it. It may be, that he knew of Bonaparte's journey to Mayence to meet the Regent, which has caused here so much anxiety.

theless, I still hope the best.

Never

It is evident, from

Gentz's letter, that Caulaincourt had no specific instructions whatever.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Stewart to George Jackson,

Esq.

DEAR JACKSON,

Berlin, July 30th, 1813.

Your despatches and letters have been received and are forwarded by the courier who came to the Prince of Sweden. I cannot draw from the reports and letters you have sent me such warlike conclusions of Austria as you have done. God send, how

ever, that I may be wrong and you right.

I am just starting for Brandenburg with the Prince, to see Woronzow's troops; from thence we go to Strelitz, and then return here or to Potzdam. After this I shall probably travel in your direction.

I don't send you the last instructions from England, as they are only copies of Lord Cathcart's. As you are so well together, he will communicate them to you, I have no doubt, and tell you the arrangements made here by the Crown Prince.

Have you seen Semple? I understand he is at liberty, and that he was at first mistaken for a rather notorious fellow of similar name who is supposed to be now on the Continent.

Pray acquaint Addington, when you have an

opportunity, that his communications are satisfactory, and that I wish him to continue them.

You are enlivening your present dulness at headquarters, I hear, by a good deal of heavy feasting. We are doing much the same thing here. I beg my compliments to all friends. Believe me ever, &c., &c.,

CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.

Le Chevalier von Gentz to George Jackson, Esq.

Prague, ce 30 juillet, 1813. Caulaincourt est arrivé avant hier.

Dans sa

première conversation avec M. de Metternich il a professé, ou affiché, en son propre nom privé, des principes extrêmement pacifiques. Mais lorsqu'il a été question de ceux de son maître il a avoué qu'il n'en savait pas beaucoup plus que nous; que cet homme s'était placé dans une position si fausse et si critique qu'il était difficile de prévoir par quel coin il en sortirait; qu'on avait autant de raison pour croire qu'un beau matin il accorderait tout ce qu'on lui demandait que pour croire qu'il se jetterait, pour ne céder sur rien, dans les derniers extrémités; que la chance le moins possible était celle d'une ligne intermédiaire, &c.

le

Tous ces propos, et d'autres, nous font croire que plénipotentiaire si longtems attendu n'a aucune instruction positive quelconque, et qu'il attend ce qu'au moment de la rupture Napoléon lui fera savoir, sans anticiper seulement le sens dans lequel il s'expliquera

Il nous a, au reste, confirmé dans une conjecture à laquelle nous tenions depuis long tems; c'est que Bonaparte n'a jamais pu se décider à croire, et ne crois pas à l'heure qu'il est, que l'Autriche lui ferait la guerre. Cet aveuglement inconcevable est le pendant de celui qui l'a fait croire jusqu'à la veille de son départ de Moscow que l'Empéreur de Russie lui offrirait la paix. Il faut espérer que les résultats seront les mêmes.

En attendant, M. de Metternich a adressé hier une note aux Ministres de Russie, de Prusse, et de France pour leur exposer que les négociations par écrit et par l'intervention de la puissance médiatrice-telles qu'on les avait conduites au Congrès de Teschenétaient préférables sous tous les rapports aux conférences directes entre les plénipotentiaires des puissances belligérantes.

M..de Metternich a fait cette proposition parcequ'il savait que les Ministres de Russie et de Prusse ont l'instruction expresse et catégorique de ne pas négocier directement avec les Français. Par conséquent, ces Ministres ont sur-le-champ accepté la forme indiquée par le Ministre d'Autriche. Mais il n'en est pas de même des Français. Quoiqu'ils n'aient pas encore répondu par écrit, Caulaincourt a annoncé de bouche à M. de Metternich que "Napoléon insistait sur des conférences directes." Il paraît même tenir à cette idée au point que les Ministres Français refusent jusqu'ici la communication de leurs plein pouvoirs autrement qu'en Congrès assemblé. M. de Metternich leur a fait entendre que ce refus était incompatible