Dissenting Opinion: Lamar, J. was to be void. The agreement of October 6, 1881, is, on its face, an absolute one, that the amount due to Johnson under the prior contract of April 23, 1879, was the sum of $25,000 on October 6, 1881; and it cannot be reduced by parol evidence to a mere offer that in a certain contingency Johnson would accept the sum specified in full for the sum provided in the original contract. As to the appeal by the plaintiff, which calls in question so much of the decree as imposes upon it the costs of the suit and the payment of the $1000, that appeal must be dismissed, because it does not involve an amount sufficient to give this court jurisdiction of it. In No. 60 the decree is affirmed with costs against Johnson; and in No. 71 the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR dissenting. I concur in the judgment dismissing the appeal in No. 71 for want of jurisdiction, but I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the court, just announced, affirming the decree of the court below in No. 60. As I see the case, it is a bill in which the complainant, (The St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company,) asks the aid of a court of equity to relieve it from the execution of a judgment of a court of law, affirmed by this court, upon the ground that it would be against conscience to execute that judgment in obedience to the mandate of this court. I do not say that a court of equity cannot interfere in such a case. But, as has been remarked by Lord Redesdale, "bills of this description have not of late years been much countenanced." 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 888. In general, such jurisdiction is exercised only in a case where the equity of the applicant is free from doubt-such equity, for instance, as that the judgment was obtained by fraud, accident or mistake; or that the applicant had a good defence to the action at law of which he could not avail himself in a court of law, or was prevented from doing so by the act of the adverse party, or by some accident unmixed with negligence or fault Dissenting Opinion: Lamar, J. in himself; or that the right, upon which the relief he asks in equity, arose after the judgment at law was obtained, and independently of it, and which would not have constituted a defence in the suit at law. Marshall v. Holmes, ante, 589, and cases there cited. I do not think that the state of facts which appears in this record presents such a case. It is more like the case of Ballance v. Forsyth, 24 How. 183. In that case, Ballance brought an action of ejectment against Forsyth and obtained a verdict and judgment for the recovery of the land in dispute. The judgment was affirmed by this court. 13 How. 18. After the mandate went down from this court, Ballance filed a bill in equity, setting forth the same titles that were involved in the suit at law, and praying relief on certain special grounds. Mr. Justice Campbell, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "This is a bill filed by the plaintiff to enjoin the execution of a judgment in the Circuit Court, upon which a writ of error had been taken to this court and affirmed. The cause in this court was between the same parties, and the decision of the court is reported in 13 How. 18. The plaintiff sets forth the claims of the respective parties, and insists that his is the superior right, and that he is entitled to have the property. But it is not allowable to him to appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court and Supreme Court to a court of chancery upon the relative merit of the legal titles involved in the controversy they had adjudicated." These few sentences aptly characterize the case under consideration. The two cases, in their essential features, are very similar. In the one cited, the relative merits of the legal titles to the property in dispute were involved. In this, the relative claims of right to the possession of the property in dispute are involved. There is one difference between them. The applicant for relief in this case comes into court an adjudged trespasser and wrong-doer, asking for relief from the legal effects of his own wilfully illegal act. In speaking of the complainant as a trespasser and wrong-doer, I am sustained by the statement in the bill itself, to the effect that, whilst the action of forcible entry and detainer was pending, the complainant bought the property of which the appellant was dispossessed, Dissenting Opinion: Lamar, J. took possession thereof and became a maintainer of the defendant in the suit, and was itself made a party to said suit. The special equities upon which Forsyth, in the case just referred to, asked for relief, are not enumerated in the report of the case. But in this case we find none of the equities which courts of chancery have recognized as justifying an interposition by injunction to restrain the execution of a judgment. It is not pretended that the judgment in the action at law was obtained by fraud, mistake or accident. It is not denied that that judgment was rendered after a fair, legal, protracted and warmly contested trial. There is not an averment that the judgment is even erroneous in law or that it worked an unjust hardship on the railroad company. The bill alleges no fact or circumstance which has occurred since the rendition of the judgment by the District Court and this court, which would make its execution against conscience. The only equity it assumes to set up is the irreparable damage and injury which it alleges would be caused to the railroad company by reason of its being a common carrier and a United States mail carrier over the railroad in question, whose duties it would be unable to perform if not allowed to retain possession and use of said railroad. The answer to this claim is, that the irreparable mischief was as imminent when the action at law was pending as it is now. Nor was there any fact which being a good defence, either legal or equitable, pending the action, of which it was prevented from availing itself by any agency of the opposite party or by any accident unmixed with its own negligence or fault. I do not think that the viritten agreement of October 6, 1881, between the appellant, Johnson, and Bailey, (the president of the railroad company,) merits consideration as a ground of equitable relief, in view of the peculiar circumstances which attended its execution. That writing was entered into whilst the possessory suit was pe ding and before the complainant was made a party thereto. If it is a valid ground for equitable intervention now, it was then; and the complainant could have filed his bill on the equity side of the court, praying that the action be suspended until the equities of the case could be adjusted, and thus have prevented the judgment from being Dissenting Opinion: Lamar, J. obtained. Instead of pursuing such a course the complainant waited about seven months after the judgment was affirmed by this court, when, assuming that the written agreement, so called, was the sole measure of the rights of Johnson under the judgment, it tendered him the sum named in that agreement, and upon his refusal to accept the same as a full satisfaction, instituted this suit, asking the court to aid it in retaining its illegal and ill-gotten possession of the property in the controversy. The same remark applies to the tender by the company to Johnson of $25,000. It was not such a fact, arising after the judgment, and independent of it, as constitutes in itself alone a right to invoke the aid of a court of equity; but it was an act closely connected with that judgment, not independent of it, resorted to as a means of avoiding the execution thereof by offering the $25,000 as a substitute for its satisfaction; in no aspect of it does that tender, relied on as the foundation of this suit, create the clear and unquestionable equity which alone can justify a court of chancery in suspending the execution of a judgment, for the express purpose of giving its sanction and protection to a possession acquired by an unlawful forcible entry and detainer. The undisputed facts of the case are, that the appellee purchased from the original transgressor, who had ousted Johnson of his rightful possession of the railroad property, took possession and continued in the wrongful occupancy and use of it; contested the action of forcible entry and detainer brought by Johnson until judg ment was rendered in his favor, awarding to him restitution of the possession of the property, which, on a writ of error from this court, was affirmed; and now when it asks for a decree enjoining Johnson from taking the possession thus adjudged to him, equity demands that before the preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked, there must first be an actual restoration of the injured party to his original rights. I think the decree of the court below should be reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the bill and dissolve the injunction. MR. JUSTICE GRAY was not present at the argument and took no part in the decision. Syllabus. MOLINE PLOW COMPANY v. WEBB. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 1227. Submitted October 19, 1891. -- Decided November 9, 1891. 66 An action was brought upon three promissory notes with interest payable annually, each providing that if not paid when due it was to bear the rate of interest of the principal, it being expressly agreed that in default of payment of interest when due the principal is to become due and collectible." Each note recited the fact that it was secured by a deed of trust executed to a named trustee on certain described property. The deed described the notes and declared: “provided, however, it is agreed that if at any time said interest shall remain unpaid for as much as ninety days after the same shall become due and payable then the whole debt as well as the interest shall become and be due and payable, and further it is understood and agreed that if said note first falling due shall remain unpaid thereafter for as much as six months then the whole debt is to be and become due and payable, and this trust, in either event, to be executed and foreclosed, at the option of said third party." It also contained a clause to the effect that if the money due on the notes was not paid "according to the tenor and effect of said notes in hand, and according to the terms, stipulations and agreements of this instrument," the deed should remain in force, and the trustee, or in the event of his death or refusal to act, "then at the request of the holder of said notes, the sheriff ... may proceed to sell said described property, or any part thereof, at public vendue, to the highest bidder for cash, and shall receive the pro ceeds of said sale, out of which shall be paid, first, the costs and expenses of executing this trust, including compensation to said trustee, or said sheriff for his services, and next to the said third party or holder of said note whatever sum of money may be due thereon, and the remainder, if any, shall be paid to the said parties of the first part, or their legal représentatives." The statute of Texas provided that "actions for debt where the indebtedness is evidenced by or founded upon any contract in writing, must be commenced and prosecuted within four years after the cause of action accrued, and not afterwards." The case was heard by the court, and a general finding made. No bill of exceptions was signed. Held, (1) The error in this case was one of law, apparent on the record, and need not have been presented by bill of exceptions; (2) Construing the notes and the deeds as contemporaneous agreements, relating to the same subject matter, the limitation of four years under the law of Texas ran from the dates named in the respective notes, as the dates of maturity, and not from the date of the |