C. CAS. R.] HARROP AND ANOTHER v. HIRST. [Ex. therefore, that a person on board a British ship is amenable to the British law just as much as a British person on board an American ship is subject to the American law. My view is that when a person is on board a vessel sailing under the British flag, and commits a crime, that nation has a right to punish him for the crime committed by him; and clearly the same doctrine extends to those who are members of the crew of the vessel. CHANNELL, B.-I am also of opinion that the conviction was right. The 267th section of the Merchant Shipping Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104) has been referred to. I agree in the view taken by the Lord Chief Justice that it is not necessary to pray in aid that statute. When the question arises this Court must exercise the power which has been created by Act of Parliament to deal with the case. Nevertheless, this Court is at liberty to ascertain what the international law may be, and construe the words of the statute in harmony with that if it will bear the construction. I give my judgment on the ground that the ship was within the Admiralty jurisdiction think that it is not necessary to resort to the 267th Lusп, J.-I am of the same opinion. I also at the time the offence was committed, and that is a sufficient ground to support the conviction.viction; and I offer no opinion upon the construcsection of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, to support this conThat view is supported by the decisions (Rex v. Allen and Thomas v. Lane), and is also in consonance with the text books. BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. I adhere to the opinion that I expressed at the trial. A British ship is, for the purposes of this question, like a floating island, and when a crime is committed on board a British ship it is within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, and therefore of the Central Criminal Court, and the offender is as amenable to British law as if he had stood on the Isle of Wight and committed the crime. Two English and two American cases decide that a crime committed on board a British vessel in a river like the one in question, where there is the flux and reflux of the tide, and wherein great ships do hover, is within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court; and that is also the opinion expressed in Kent's Commentaries. I give no opinion on the question whether the case comes within the enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is not necessary to decide whether the case comes within the Merchant Shipping Act. If the offence could have been properly tried in any English court, then the Central Criminal Court had jurisdiction to try it. It has been decided by a vast number of cases, that a ship on the high seas, carrying a national flag, is part of the territory of that nation whose flag she carries, and all persons on board her are to be considered as subject to the jurisdiction of the laws of that nation as much so as if they had been on land within that territory. From the earliest times it has been held that the maritime courts have jurisdiction over offences committed on the high seas where great ships go, which is, as it were, common ground to all nations, and that the jurisdiction extends over ships in rivers or places where great ships go as far as the tide extends. In this case the vessel was within French territory, and subject to the local jurisdiction, if the French authorities had chosen to exercise it. Our decisions establish that the Admiralty jurisdiction extends at common law over British ships in the high seas, or in waters where great ships go as far as the tide ebbs and flows. The cases Rex v. Allen and Rex v. Jemot are most closely in point, and establish that offences committed on board British ships in places where great ships go are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty, and consequently of the Central Criminal Court. In America it appears from the case of The United States v. Wilberger, that it was held that the United States had no jurisdiction in the case of the crime of manslaughter committed on board a United States vessel in the river Tigris in China; but, as I understand the American cases of Thomas v. Lane and The United States v. Coombes, a rule more in conformity with the English decisions was laid down; and upon those authorities I take it that the American courts would agree with us. It is clear, tion of that enactment. I give my judgment in this case on the ground that the offence was committed on board a British ship in a tidal river, navigable for seagoing ships, and at a spot where there is the flux and reflux of the tide, and that it was therefore within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. Conviction affirmed. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by H. LEIGH and E. LUMLEY, Esqrs., Barris tersat-Law. Tuesday, Nov. 24, 1868. HARROP AND ANOTHER v. HIRST. Right of inhabitants of district to flow of water by custom-Action for interference with flow of waterWhether maintainable by individual inhabitant without actual damage to himself. The inhabitants of a certain district were entitled by custom to the flow of water from a certain spring to a spout in the public highway, and to take water therefrom to use for domestic purposes in their habitations. The defendant, a proprietor of land through which the water flowed from the spring to the spout, abstracted and diverted the water on divers occasions so as substantially and sensibly to diminish the flow of water to the spout. The plaintiffs being inhabitants of a house within the district, brought an action against the defendant for wrongfully obstructing the flow of water. It appeared that many of the inhabitants had been put to inconvenience on divers occasions by failing to find water on going to the spout, while the flow was so diminished; but the jury found that the plaintiffs had not personally suffered any actual inconvenience or damage by want of water: Held, that the plaintiffs_could maintain their action without having suffered actual damage individually, for the acts of the defendant, if continued, would be evidence of a right existing in him in derogation of the rights of the inhabitants of the district, among the number of whom were the plaintiffs. Declaration, for that from time whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, there has been, and of right ought to have been, and still of right ought to be a certain public waterspout in a public highway called Kiln-lane, within the district of Tamewater, in the parish of Saddleworth, in the West Riding of the county of York, and during all the time aforesaid, the water of a spring arising in a certain close now called the Wharnton Grammar School Close, ran and flowed, and of right ought to run and flow from and out of the said spring, in and along a certain watercourse through divers closes unto and into the said spout, for the supply of water to the said spout for the purposes hereinafter mentioned; and during all the time aforesaid, by an ancient and laudable custom and usage of the said district, the inhabitants for the time being of the said district residing therein and occupying dwelling-houses situate and being within the said district, have been entitled, and still are entitled to take, use and enjoy water from the said spout for their culinary and other domestic purposes, to be used in their said respective dwelling-houses, for the more convenient use, occupation, and enjoyment thereof respectively; and the plaintiffs, before and at the time of the committing of the grievances by the defendant, as hereinafter next mentioned, were and still are inhabitants of the said district, and residing therein, and jointly occupying a dwellinghouse within the said district, and entitled to take, use, and enjoy water from the said spout for their culinary and other domestic purposes, to be used in their said dwelling-houses for the more convenient use, occupation, and enjoyment thereof, yet the defendant, well knowing the premises, and contriving and intending to prejudice and aggrieve the plaintiffs and other the persons so entitled as aforesaid respectively, and to deprive them respectively of the water to which they were so respectively entitled as aforesaid, on divers days and times before the commencement of the suit, wrongfully diverted large quantities of the said water which ought to have run and flowed, and which otherwise would have run and flowed in and along the said watercourse unto and into the said spout, for the pur poses aforesaid, as such water otherwise would and ought to have done, whereby the said spout became and was, on divers days and times, imperfectly and insufficiently supplied with water for the purposes aforesaid, and on divers other days and times, was wholly deprived of water, and by means of the premises the defendant wrongfully hindered and prevented the plaintiffs from taking from and out of the said spout, and using and enjoying divers large quantities of the said water to which they were entitled as aforesaid, and the plaintiffs were thereby put to and suffered and incurred great inconvenience, loss and expense, and were much disturbed in the use, occupation and enjoyment of the said dwelling-house for want of the said water for the purposes aforesaid, and to which they were so entitled, and of which they were so deprived as aforesaid, and have been otherwise much injured and damnified. Pleas: Not guilty; and traverses of the principal allegations of the declaration. Issues thereon. At the trial, which took place at the Leeds summer assizes, before Bramwell, B., it appeared that the defendant was the occupier of certain land through which the spring in question flowed, and the jury found that the defendant had, by various acts extending over a space of some years, diverted and abstracted the water of the spring on its way to the spout, so as sensibly and substantially to diminish the flow of water on various occasions, and so far had infringed the plaintiffs' right, but they also found that the plaintiffs had not personally sustained any actual inconvenience from the want of water, or any inconvenience except the trouble of complaining and endeavouring to put a stop to the abstraction. It appeared that other persons, inhabitants of the district, had been put to actual inconvenience by failing to get water when the flow was so diminished. Upon these findings the verdict was entered for the plaintiffs for 40s. damages, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit on the ground that the action was not maintainable by the plaintiffs without special damage to themselves. A rule nisi had been accordingly obtained. Field, Q. C. and Wills showed cause.-It is clear that this action is maintainable for infringement | [Ex. of plaintiffs' right, without damage in fact. In Wood v. Waud, 3 Ex. 748, it was held that a riparian proprietor had a right to the natural stream of water flowing through the land in its natural state; and if the water be polluted by a proprietor higher up the stream, so as to occasion damage in law, though not in fact, it gives him a good cause of action against the upper proprietor, unless the latter have gained a right by long enjoyment or grant. In that case, it was contended that the stream was already so polluted by other works, that the defendant's act made no practical difference; but the court held that there was damage in law, and that was sufficient. The only way in which the other side could succeed would be by showing that this case, being one of a right common to the inhabitants of a district there is a difference, and that an action will not lie for that reason. But this is not a case where an indictment would lie, for that lies only where the injury is to a right of common to all the Queen's subjects. This case is therefore not analogous to the obstruction of a highway: (see 1 Hawk. P. C. 696.) In Westbury v. Powel, cited by Coke, Attorney-General, arguendo in the case of Fineux v. Hovenden, it was held that where the inhabitants of Southwark had a common wateringplace, and the defendant had stopped it, and the plaintiff being an inhabitant there, brought his action upon the case, the action was maintainable: Cro. Eliz. 664; Co. Litt. 56 a. The principle is there suggested to be that "where there is not any other remedy than by action, every one may have his action who is grieved." So in Rex v. Thrower, 3 Keble, 28; 1 Vent. 208, it was held that where there was a way for the inhabitants of the parish to a church, each inhabitant might have an action, but no indictment would lie (See also Catherine Austin's Case, 1 Vent. 189. MARTIN, B.-If this abstraction of water continued, would not a right to abstract the water be gained? Would not an action lie under these circumstances without actual damage? (He referred to the notes to Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Wms. Saund. 346a.)] Yes: it is there said: "If cattle are permitted to depasture the common, whether they are the cattle of a stranger, or are the supernumerary cattle of a commoner, a commoner may have an action upon the case in which it does not seem necessary for him to prove any specific injury which he has sustained. For the consumption of the grass by the other cattle is of itself a diminution of the right and profit of the commoner, and considered as sufficient proof of the damage alleged in the declaration. Besides, the law considers that the right of the commoner is injured by such act, and therefore allows him to bring an action for it to prevent the wrongdoer from gaining a right by repeated acts of encroachment. For wherever any act injures another's right, and would be evidence in future in favour of the wrongdoer, an action may be maintained for an invasion of the right without proof of any specific damage, and this seems to be a governing principle in cases of this kind." See also Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415; Price, Q. C. and Kemplay, in support of the rule.The cases of Wood v. Waud, Sampson v. Hoddinott, and others cited on the other side, are all cases of actions by riparian proprietors, and there was in those cases a right to have the water flow uninterruptedly in its natural state. Here the plaintiffs' right, as alleged by the declaration, was only to have water sufficient for domestic purposes when Mayne on Damages, 256, 257; [Ex. they wanted it. The jury have found that the | of the right to stop the water arise? He cited plaintiffs personally suffered no inconvenience; also they never ventured to say that when they wanted water they could not get it. [MARTIN, B.-In one sense no doubt it must be taken that they suffered no damage; but is that the sense in which damage is said for this purpose to arise in contemplation of law?] It is laid down in Addison on Torts, 2nd edit. 58, that when the act of which the plaintiff complains has been done by the defendant on his own land, and the constant repetition of it, however long continued, would establish no prescriptive right against the plaintiff, there is no cause of action until some substantial perceptible damage has been sustained by the plaintiff (see Bonomi v. Backhouse, E. B. & E. 622; 9 H. L. 511.) It cannot certainly be contended that this was an injury to a right of the general public, and therefore that no action will lie without special damage; but it is submitted that it is so far analogous to such a general right, that by such abstraction of water as here took place no prescriptive right could be obtained as against such an individual inhabitant. If so, no action will lie without some special damage to the plaintiff. In Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 154, it was held that a commoner might maintain an action on the case for an injury done to the common by taking away from thence the manure which was dropped on it by the cattle: and it was held the fact that this might give rise to multiplicity of actions, was no objection; but then damage existed, though very trifling. Lord Kenyon there says that Lord Coke was of opinon that a commoner could not maintain such an action without showing that he had sustained actual damage: (see Mary's Case, 9 Rep. 113.) [BRAMWELL, B.-Would not the acts of the defendant form evidence of a right in derogation of the right of the inhabitants, for might not there be a right in the inhabitants to the flow of water to the spout, subject to another right in the proprietor of a close through which the water passed on its way to the spout?] We contend that, however many times he might have abstracted the water when the plaintiffs did not want any, still, if they went to get water and could find none, an action would lie. It must be admitted that this is such an abstraction of water as would be actionable if done by one riparian proprietor against another, without particular damages; but this is not such a case. The plaintiffs' right, as alleged in the declaration, which was to have water when they wanted it for particular purposes, was not infringed. The plaintiffs do not allege that they, or all the inhabitants, were entitled to have the whole of the water come to the spout. As against them the defendant, a riparian owner, was entitled, subject to this right, to take the water. [BRAMWELL, B.-What you say amounts to this, if the defendant had stood at the mouth of the spout, and diverted the water, no action would have lain if, as soon as any of the inhabitants came for water, he let it flow again. KELLY, C. B.-But were not the inhabitants entitled to a constant flow of water for their supply for domestic purposes?] That is not the right alleged. [MARTIN, B.-The declaration may be amended if necessary to the decision of the real question. It appears to me a fallacy to say that the right of the inhabitants was only to have their kettles filled when they wanted them filled. The right was to a constant supply.] If the action lies without special damage to the individual, every inhabitant of the district might bring his action. If any right has been infringed it is that of the inhabitants at large. But it is impossible for them to bring an action, which shows that no prescriptive right could be gained by the defendant as against them in derogation of their right. How could a presumption of a grant by them to the defendant KELLY, C. B.-In this case the plaintiffs, in com❤ mon with other inhabitants of a certain district, claim a right to the flow of water to this spout for the supply of such inhabitants for domestic purposes. The defendant, the owner or occupier of land through which the stream flows, has from time to time abstracted considerable quantities of water, and so diminished the flow that it was sometimes insufficient for the supply of the district. It does not appear that any injury was caused to the plaintiffs individually, because they do not seem to have endeavoured to obtain water at any time when the stream was largely diminished. The question is whether, under these circumstances, an action lies without evidence of actual damage to the plaintiffs. Let us first consider whether this infringement is the subject of an action by one of several claimants. Now it is clear from the citation from Coke, Littleton and other ancient works, and especially from the case of Westbury v. Powell, that such action will lie. In Fineux v. Hovenden, where it was held that an action is not maintainable for injury done to a right of the public not confined to a district, but common to all the subjects of the king, without special damage, this case is cited, and it appears from it that where the inhabitants of a district had a watering-place, and the defendant stopped it, and the plaintiff, being an inhabitant, then brought his action, it was adjudged that the action was maintainable. It did not appear there that the plaintiff had sustained any particular damage, and so he may have been in much the same position as the present plaintiffs. When we consider the nature of the right so infringed by the abstraction of a large quantity of water from time to time, and the probable effect of such acts, if continued and repeated by a wrongdoer, it is impossible not to see that they might in time furnish a foundation of a claim of right so largely to diminish the flow of water as to interfere with the rights of the inhabitants, and to render them of little value. On this ground alone, in my opinion, an action will lie without any particular damage. My brother Martin referred to the note to the case of Mellor v. Spateman, and we there find it laid down: "Whenever any act injures another's right, and would be evidence in future in favour of the wrongdoer, an action may be maintained for an invasion of the right without proof of any specific damage, and this seems to be a governing principle in cases of this kind." I hold it to be an undeniable principle of law, that when there is a right in one man, and acts are done by another man which, if continually repeated, would be evidence of a right in derogation of the former right, such acts are the subject of an action by the claimant. In the case of Bower v. Hill, 1 Scott, 526, Tindal, C. J. says: "But independently of this narrow ground of decision, we think the erection of the tunnel is in the nature of, and until removed is to be considered as, a permanent obstruction of the plaintiff's right, and therefore an injury to the plaintiff, even though he receives no immediate damage thereby. The right of the plaintiff to this way is injured if there is an obstruction in its nature permanent. If acquiesced in for twenty years it would become evidence of a renunciation, and abandonment of the right of way. That is the ground on which a reversioner is allowed to bring his action for an obstruction apparently permanent, to light and other easements which belong to the reversion." So here it is imimpossible to deny that if this defendant, being occupier of the land through which the water REG.. FAWCETT AND OTHERS (Justices of Durham); Er parte HODSON. BAIL COURT. BAIL. Reported by FRAS. TURNER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Monday, Nov. 23, 1868. Ex parte HODSON. Ex.] passes which constitutes the entire source of supply to this spout, could show at the distance of some twenty years he had during that time abstracted water from time to time so as to keep the spout insufficiently supplied, that would be evidence in derogation of the right of the inhabitants. In this REG. v. FAWCETT AND OTHERS (Justices of Durham; case the jury found that there was no individual damage; the plaintiffs did not happen to require water at any time when the abstraction was taking place; but some inhabitants of the, district were hindered from obtaining the supply to which they were entitled. There was a right to-I do not say an unceasing flow of-water, but at any rate an ample flow for domestic purposes whenever they required it, and that right having been invaded by the abstraction of large quantities of water, I think the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain this action, though they have not themselves personally been inconvenienced; and I base this decision principally upon the principle I have before adverted to as laid down in the notes to Mellor v. Spateman. MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. I think this case clearly falls within the rule laid down in Mellor v. Spateman. BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. CHANNELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. It appears that there are two propositions of law which go a long way to decide this question. Where an indictment may be maintained for interference with a right there is no remedy by action unless there be individual damage; but on the other hand, where an indictment will not lie it is conceded, and was laid down in Mellor v. Spateman, that if there have been an actual injury to a right, there an action is maintainable. It is said here there is an injury to a right; but it is contended that there must be actual personal damage. The verdict finds that here was a right, and an injury to the right, but not one attended with any pecuniary loss, or expenditure of time or labour. All that it comes to is this because the plaintiffs did not want water on any particular day when the flow was dimi nished, there was no damage, and they cannot maintain this action. It is conceded, however, that if one of the other inhabitants who did go for water and failed to get it, had brought an action, there would be sufficient damage, and the action would have been maintainable. But if there was evidence that any of the other inhabitants were interfered with in the exercise of their right, would not that be some evidence in future against the plaintiffs in derogation of their right? It is a user that, if continued a sufficient time, would be some evidence against the plaintiffs of acts done, and of a right exercised contrary to the right of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances, I think the action will lie without pecuniary damage. Application to justices for a summons-Refusal to grant -Non-exercise of judicial functions-Vexatious Indictments Act. If, on application to justices for a summons for an indictable offence, they have heard and determined the application, and, on the merits, have declined to grant it, the court will not grant a mandamus to compel them to review their decision. Secus, if they have refused to hear the application, or if, after hearing, have refused to grant it from a mistaken view of their duty, amounting to a declining of jurisdiction. Greenhow showed cause against a rule obtained by Keane, Q. C., calling on these justices to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, commanding them to hear and determine an information and complaint by one William Hodson, who sought to summon Helen Mitchenson before them to answer a charge of wilful and corrupt perjury. On Aug. 7th, Mitchenson laid an information before the justices against Hodson, for an assault committed upon her while in bed in her room in Hodson's father's house. She gave evidence of the offence. Hodson in reply, called his father, sister, and four other witnesses, but eventually the magistrates convicted and fined him 50s., which he paid. Nothing more was done till Oct. 22, when Hodson applied for a The summons against Mitchenson for perjury. justices heard all the evidence he had to call, and asked him if he had any more. He said no, and the justices then, acting in their discretion, refused to grant the summons. This was a judgment on matters of fact, and entirely within their discretion, which this court will not overrule or review. [BLACKBURN, J.-Then they did not decline but exercised jurisdiction.] Exactly so. They heard all that the complainant had to say, and ultimately declined to do what he desired. But they had a perfect right to do so. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 9, and Reg. v. Ingham, 14 Q. B. 396, where the court, under similar circumstances, refused to grant a mandamus. [HAYES, J.-Under the Vexatious Indictments Act the complainant was bound to go before the justices.] It is now only necessary to obtain the leave of the judge at the trial: (30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 1.) [BLACKBURN, J.-Reg. v. Ingham is not precisely the same thing, as there the ruling was that the justices might leave the complainant to his remedy before the grand jury. But that was a decision at the hearing of the complaint, and not a refusal to grant a summons.] It is difficult to see why justices are to have a discretion at the hearing and none on the application for a summons. They have been often ordered to grant summonses and warrants respecting rates, because their functions in such cases are merely ministerial. But when they hear an application for a summons of this kind, they are, by the section of the Act cited, expressly required to exercise a discretion whether they will grant it or not. Keane, Q.C. in support of the rule.-The justices never heard the case at all, and they do not say that they did. [Affidavits read.] They heard Hodson's evidence, then that of his father, and at first they decided to grant the summons. While their clerk was making it out, he made some sign to them. One of the justices thereupon said, "It would be like trying the case again," apparently C. P.] BENNETT (app.) v. Brumfitt (resp.) JONES (app.) v. BUвв (resp.) [C. P. stated that they agreed that the sole point intended to be raised was as to the validity of the notice. BOVILL, C. J.-It has been decided by this court that where appeals are improperly consolidated the court will not hear the appeal: (See Thompson v. Brown, 1 C. B., N. S., 34). Therefore this appeal must be dismissed. BYLES, J. concurred. thinking that granting it would imply there had | spondents, and Mellish, Q. C. for the appellant, been a miscarriage of justice on the former occasion. They then retired to their private room, and on their return they refused the summons, though complainant said he had four other witnesses to call, whom they had not heard. If they were not satisfied with the facts before them, they should have said, "Produce those other witnesses;" but it is not hearing an application to say, first, "We will grant a summons," and then, "We will not grant it, because doing so would be like trying a case over again, which some other justices have heard and decided." The answer is, that the case is admittedly one which requires to be tried again. Evidently | from the decided cases. there was some squeamishness in dealing with the matter, because it would be like overruling other justices. But if that view is to prevail, it would be impossible ever to convict a person of perjury after that perjury had been successful. [HAYES, J.They do not refuse on the ground of what themselves had heard, but because of what some other justices had done, after hearing other evidence in another case. And thereby they refuse jurisdiction under a mistaken view of the law. Reg. v. Justices of Cumberland, 4 A. & E. 695. BLACKBURN, J.—I do not decide whether justices are bound to issue a summons, or whether it is an act respecting which they have a discretion; but if they have, they must exercise it on the facts and evidence before them, and if they decline it from a mistaken view of the law, Reg. v. Justices of Cumberland shows that a mandamus ought to issue. Here they seem to have refused to grant the summons because on different evidence, and in a different case, other justices had come to a conclusion which they appear to have thought inconsistent with the granting of the summons. If this were to be the rule, no summons for perjury could be issued after the perjury complained of had obtained a verdict, and therefore the rule must be made absolute. HAYES, J.-I entirely agree. On the case as it stood they were inclined to exercise jurisdiction, but afterwards, from entirely different considerations, they declined it. Rule absolute. KEATING, J.-This case cannot be distinguished Attorney for the appellant, H. H. Poole. Friday, Nov. 13, 1868. Borough voter-Rates “made” during qualifying year This was an appeal stated by the revising barrister of the borough of Malmesbury. William Stephens Jones, a person on the list of voters for the said borough, duly objected to the name of William Bubb being retained upon the list of persons entitled to vote in the election of a member for the said borough in respect of his occupation of a dwelling-house in the parish of Somerford Magna, within the said borough. The ground of objection was, that the respondent had not been duly rated. A rate made for the relief of the poor of the said parish was produced by the overseers. By the Attorneys for the applicant, J. T. and R. Cole heading thereof this rate purported to have been 49, Lime-street. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by W. GRAHAM and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. REGISTRATION APPEALS. Monday, Nov. 9, 1868. BENNETT (app.) v. BRUMFITT (resp.); Parliament-Consolidated appeal from revising barrister -Appeal improperly consolidated. Where a revising barrister had consolidated appeals, in some of which men were appellants and in others women, the court refused to hear the appeal on the ground that the appeals did not all depend on exactly the same point, and therefore that they were improperly consolidated. This was an appeal from the decision of a revising barrister, and the point sought to be raised was as to the validity of a notice of objection, but it appeared that some of the appellants were men and some women. made by the overseers on the 18th July 1867, and on each page thereof, in the usual form, there were the words "Rate made the 18th of July 1867.” The rate was duly allowed on the 4th Sept. 1867, and that date appeared in the entry of such allowance as the date thereof. The rate was duly published on the 8th Sept. 1867. The respondent was not rated to the said rate. The appellant contended that this was a rate made during the twelve calendar months preceding the 31st July 1868; that the date in the heading of the rate was not the time when it was made within the meaning of the third section of the Representation of the People Act 1867; and that the said rate was not so made until the day of the tion thereof; and that not being rated therein the allowance thereof, or nntil the day of the publicasaid respondent was not entitled to be registered under the said third section of that Act. Apart from the question raised by this objection, the respondent's qualification was proved to my satisfaction. I decided that although a rate is of no force until it has been allowed and published, yet that after allowance and publication it is to be deemed to have been made on the day on which it purports to have been made by the overseers, upon whom the duty of making it devolves; that the word "made" Manisty, Q. C. (Crompton with him) for the re- in the third section of the said Act is to be thus MAG. CAS.-VOL. V. T |