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every person so objecting, except overseers, is to give a notice to the overseers in the form No. 4, schedule A, or to the like effect, and to the person objected to in the form No. 5, schedule A, or to the like effect. In the forms Nos. 4 and 5, schedule A, the list is simply described as the list of voters for the county of By sect. 13 of the same Act the overseers in boroughs are to prepare lists of persons other than freemen entitled to vote, and by sect. 17 any person whose name is inserted in any list of voters for a borough may object to any other person as not being entitled to have his name inserted in the list of voters for the same borough, and every person so objecting shall give notice to the overseers in the form No. 10, schedule B, or to the like effect, and to the person objected to in the form No. 11, schedule B, or to the like effect. To the form No. 10, schedule B, is appended the following note:-"Note. If more than one list of voters, the notice of objection should specify the list to which the objection refers; and if the list contains two or more persons of the same name the notice should distinguish the person intended to be objected to. In Barton v. Ashley, 1 Lutw. 307; 2 Č. B., 4, it was held that that note amounted to a positive enactment, and that where there was more than one list in a borough, a notice of objection served on the overseers would be bad if it did not state in which list the name of the person objected to appeared. By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 6, it is enacted that the notice of objection to any person on the list of claimants for any parish or township may be given according to the provisions of the 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 7 (that is without specifying the ground of objection), but with that exception no notice of objection given under the provisions of that section, other than a notice to the overseers, is to be good unless the ground or grounds of objection are specifically stated therein, but that this provision shall be deemed to be satisfied by naming the column or columns of the register on which the objector grounds his objection, provided that if the objection be grounded on the third column, then it shall be necessary to state whether the objection relates to the nature of the voter's interest in the qualifying property, or to the value of the qualifying property, or to both. By the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 30, subs. 1 it is enacted that the overseers of every parish or township shall make out or cause to be made out a list of all persons on whom a right to vote for a county in respect of the occupation of premises is conferred by this Act, in the same manner, and subject to the same regulations, as nearly as circumstances admit, in and subject to which the overseers of parishes and townships in boroughs are required by the Registration Acts to make out or cause to be made out a list of all persons entitled to vote for a member or members for a borough, in respect of the occupation of premises of a clear yearly value of not less than 107. By the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 58, s. 19, it is enacted that on the lists and register of voters for a county the names of the persons in any parish or township, on whom a right to vote for a county in respect of the occupation of premises in such parish or township is conferred by the Representation of the People Act 1867, shall appear in a separate list after the list of voters in such parish or township otherwise qualified, and such separate list shall be deemed to be part of the list of county voters of such parish or township, and shall be annually made anew by the overseers of such parish or township, &c. By the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 56, it is enacted that, "Subject to the provisions of this Act, all laws, customs, and enactments now in force conferring any right to vote, or otherwise relating to the representation of the people in England and Wales, and the registration of persons

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entitled to vote shall remain in full force, and shall apply, as nearly as circumstances admit, to any person hereby authorised to vote, and shall also apply to any constituency hereby authorised to return a member or members to Parliament, as if it had heretofore returned such members to Parliament, and to the franchises hereby conferred, and to the register of voters hereby required to be formed." It is submitted that that section applies to such a case as this, and has the effect of incorporating the provisions as to objections in boroughs, where there are more lists than one. The same reason applies to both cases, as the object of pointing out in the notice of objection the particular list on which the name of the person objected to appears is to prevent the necessity for the overseers looking through all the borough lists to find the name.

Quain, Q. C. (Hopwood with him) for the respondents, contended that sect. 56 of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102 had no application to such a case as this, and that if it had been the intention of the Legislature to apply the borough proceedure to counties they would have done so by express words aud not in this general manner.

Wills in reply.

[KEATING, J.-The object of the notice to the overseer is to enable him to make out the lists, and in the case of counties, the notice would state the name of the person objected to and the nature of the qualification, and in the case of boroughs the name and the list on which it appeared, I should have thought that one would give as much information as the other, as the overseer could tell at once from the nature of the qualification which list the person objected to was on.]

BOVILL, C. J.-Throughout the Acts of Parliament relating to the representation of the people and the registration of voters, an important distinction has always been made between voters for counties and voters for boroughs and the registrations and forms with respect to each. The enactments are not only separate in the Act of 1832, but there are separate schedules applicable to each; schedule A containing forms of the lists and notices applicable to counties, and schedule B containing forms of the lists and notices applicable to cities and boroughs. The forms given by the Act of 1832 were extremely general, not pointing out such particulars as would enable the parties or the overseers to direct their attention to the particular points that were to be brought under discussion. When the Act of 1843 was passed (6 Vict. c. 18), the same distinction was presented in the schedules, and in the enactments with regard to boroughs and counties, the forms applicable to each were kept entirely distinct, the schedule A containing the forms for the counties, and schedule B the forms applicable to cities and boroughs. Again, when it was thought right by the Legislature in the year 1865, by the 28 Vict. c. 36, sect. 16, to make a fresh provision in regard to registration the enactments are all with reference to county voters, and an alteration was then made in the form of objection in the counties, which was to be given to the parties on the register. It made no difference as to the form of notice to be given to the overseers. It is quite true, as has been said, that there are now separate lists to. be made out in the case of the counties much in the same form as in the case of boroughs as was formerly required; but there is nothing that I can find in the Acts (giving full effect to sects 56 and 59 of the Representation of the People Act 1867) which at all renders it necessary or right that the court should mix up enactments relating to boroughs

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with enactments relating to counties, or mix up forms prescribed for one with the forms that are to be observed as to the other; and if we were to attempt to do that I believe it would leave the matter in almost inextricable confusion both as to the enactments and as to the forms. Nor, as it seems to me in the present case, is there the slightest reason for altering that which has been expressly enacted by the Legislature in the Registration Act of 1843; the forms that are given in that Act of the notice of objection to the overseers in the case of counties and in the case of boroughs are essentially different. In the case of notice to the overseers as to counties the party objecting is obliged to state, under the form appropriated for that purpose, the nature of the qualification as described; in the other form the notice, namely, with respect to boroughs, as it stood in the forms of the Act of 1843, no such column is to be found, and no such information is to be given. Then there was made an attempt to cure the defect by a notice, which stated that if there was more than one list of voters the notice of objection should specify the list to which reference should be made, and if there were more than two persons of the same name, the notice should distinguish the person intended to be objected to. It is quite clear that the notice as to counties being given to the overseers, the parties who make out the lists mentioning the nature of the qualification described, would apply most clearly to those overseers who have made out the list on which the name would be found, and afford just as much information to the overseers as to the list as if it had been expressly mentioned by name. The present case is an instance in which it is important to see whether there is any possibility of mistake or misleading, or any additional trouble to the overseers in the way suggested by Maule, J. It appears that notice was given to the overseers who made out the list, the place of abode of Mr. Ree is put in under "place of abode as described " in the column; then the "nature of qualification" is described "freehold house and land." It is impossible, therefore, that the overseers could have been in the slightest doubt what list was intended, and on which list the person was. Certainly the description could not be found on the list of persons entitled to vote as 127. occupiers. And therefore there is no misleading; there is full information given, and it is only necessary to decide that point with reference to showing that there is no necessity to mix up the forms and mix up the enactments. I make that observation as it only shows that the Legislature has considered that the enactments are sufficient to meet the cases with reference to registration as they exist. This notice appears to me applicable; it is in the form and the only form prescribed by the Act of Parliament; it appears abundantly sufficient, and there is no reason for attempting to fix upon counties borough forms. I am therefore of opinion that in this case the decision of the revising barrister was right, and this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. I entirely accede to all that has fallen from the Lord Chief Justice. The lists are to form part of the county list of the parish; that is expressly enacted; there is no distinct enactment to make this list anything else than a part of the entire list, with a separate alphabetic arrangement. It may be that there are separate lists in order to facilitate objections. With respect to the old list, it appears the duty of the overseers is only a ministerial act; they have nothing to do but to register the parties, and to make a list of the parties who stand on the register. In the new list they have to exercise a discretion; therefore it must be convenient to make a separate

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list. There is another reason for a separate list, namely, that the Legislature have enabled anyone at once to say, without any trouble, what addition in practice is made by the new right of voting. There is nothing to show that the old form of notice of objection is not applicable. I think, therefore, that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

KEATING, J.-I am of the same opinion. If the introduction of an additional list in the counties would, by adhering to the old form of notice, tend to mislead the overseers, and not furnish them with sufficient information to discharge their duties, then I think the words of the incorporating sections might be held to be sufficiently large to render it necessary to apply a different machinery to those public duties of the overseers, and different forms of objection. But here I think that Mr. Quain has successfully pointed out that in truth the county notice of objection to the overseers would enable him sufficiently to discharge his duties, even under the existing state of things, better, I think, than if he had received a notice in the form No. 10. The particularising of the qualification of the voter does give, with the rest of the description, full and sufficient information to all the world as to the identity of the party who is objected to. Therefore it seems to me that the present notice is amply sufficient, as giving the name of the party, the nature and description of the qualification, the residence of the party, and the situation of the property in respect of which he claims. Therefore I entirely concur with the Lord Chief Justice and my brother Byles, that the decision of the revising barrister should be affirmed. This being quite an objection beside the merits, and as there is not a suggestion of anything that could have misled any human being, I think it ought to be dismissed with costs.

BRETT, J.-I have not heard the whole of the argument, but so far as I have heard I agree with the rest of the court. As to the argument to be derived from the 17th section of the 21 Vict. c. 53, that would be against Mr. Mellish. We know that the old system of preparing the lists was different in the counties and boroughs. In the counties the duty of the overseers was entirely ministerial; they had but to make out the lists from the claims sent in to them. But in the boroughs they had to exercise a discretion; the duty of the overseers was to put on the list all whom they thought ought to be there; if anyone was omitted, he had to send in a claim. Under the new law it appears that the borough system was introduced into the counties as to 127. occupiers. Under those circumstances it seemed but just that the person left out from the list should send in a claim in the same way as persons in boroughs sent theirs. But then a difficulty was started, which was that the 15th section of the 6 Vict. was applicable in terms to forms of notice in counties, and that difficulty appears also by the 17th section; and the attention of the Legislature was called to the difficulty of adapting the old Registration Act to the county registration under the new form, and they declared that as to the mode of claiming the 15th section should be applicable to counties, but they confined the enactment to the question of claim only, and left the mode of objecting just as it was before. Now, before, there were two forms of objection, one the county form of objec tion, and the other the borough form of objection; therefore the Legislature has left the old county form just as it was before, and for a good reason, because the objector in the county form does point out to the overseers the list to which the objection applies. The Legislature, having had their attention called to the matter, have not altered that form. This objection is in the county form, and it seems to me impossible

to say it is not a perfectly good form of notice of objection to the overseers.

Judgment for the respondent.

Attorney for the appellant, P. H. Lawrence. Attorneys for the respondent, N. C. and C. Milne.

Nov. 7 and 9, 1868. CHORLTON (app.) v. LINGS (resp.) Parliament-Right of women to vote-Lord Romilly's Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21), s. 4-Representation of the People Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), s. 3. Women are not entitled to vote in the election of Members of Parliament, because they are by reason of their sex subject to a "legal incapacity" within the meaning of the enfranchising clauses of the Representation of the People Act 1867.

By sect. 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), it is enacted that “ every man" having certain qualifications shall be entitled to vote; and by Lord Romilly's Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21), s. 4, it is enacted that in all future Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary is expressly provided :

Held, that the words "every man," in the Representation of the People Act, did not include females, because what is necessarily implied from the language of an Act is "expressly provided," and the Legislature, in the Representation of the People Act, were dealing not with the description of persons entitled to vote, but with their qualification, and therefore used the word "man" in the sense of "male persons." This was a consolidated appeal from a decision of the revising barrister for the City of Manchester.

CASE.

At a court held at the town-hall in the City of Manchester, on the 15th Sept. 1868, for the revision of the list of voters for members of Parliament in the Parliamentary borough of Manchester, Mary Abbott appearing on the list published by the overseers of claimants to votes in the township of Manchester was duly objected to by Matthew Chadwick, a person on the list of voters for the said Parliamentary borough.

The name of the said Mary Abbott appeared upon the list of claimants in the following manner :— Abbott, Mary 51,Edward-street House 51, Edward-street

It was admitted that the said Mary Abbott was a woman of the age of twenty-one years and unmarried, and that she had for twelve months previously to the last day of July 1868 occupied a dwelling-house stated in the said claim within the said township, and had been duly rated by the said overseers in her own name for such occupation, and that she had paid the rates for the relief of the poor assessed in respect of such dwelling-house before the 20th July last, and in other respects had complied with the requirements of the Registration Acts.

On behalf of the claimant it was contended that under the existing statutes the claimant was duly qualified and entitled to be registered as a voter, and when registered, to vote in the election of a member of Parliament, and that women, for the purpose of being registered electors and voting in election of members of Parliament, are not subject to any legal incapacity.

It was maintained on the part of the objector, that under the existing statutes the claimant was disqualified on account of her sex.

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The revising barrister held that Mary Abbott, being a woman, was not entitled to be placed on the register, and her name was erased from the said list of claimants.

There were also struck out of the list the names of 5346 women whose names and qualifications are set forth in the schedule, and as the validity of their claims depends on the same point of law as that raised in the case of Mary Abbott the appeals were consolidated.

If the court shall be of opinion that the said Mary Abbott is not entitled to have her name inserted in the list of voters for the said borough of Manchester, then such names, the names referred to and set forth in the schedule above mentioned, will remain erased; but if the court shall be of opinion that the said Mary Abbott is entitled to have her name inserted in the said list of voters, then her name and the said names referred to and set forth in the schedule are to be restored.

Coleridge, Q. C. (Pankhurst with him), for the appellant. The short question is, Are women submitted that as matter of law they have the entitled to vote at the election of members? It is franchise, that they did, in point of fact, exercise it in ancient times, and that no statute has taken it away from them. If it is shown that the objection of sex has no application in counties, it would go a long way to show that it was no objection in boroughs. The first statute relating to the exercise of the franchise in countics is the 7 Hen. 4, c. 15, by which it is enacted that the election shall take place in full county court, and that all they that are there present, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause as others, shall attend to the election of their knights for the Parliament. This is commented on by Hallam's Constitutional History, cap. 13, where he says that women have generally been supposed capable of no political rights but that of reigning; but there is no distinction drawn between men and women in the statute, and if women could be suitors in the County Court, as it is clear they could, that statute entitled them to vote. The statute of Hen. 4, is confirmed by the 1 Hen. 5, c. 1, in which the words are large enough to include women, and if women did exercise the franchise under those Acts, it is for the other side to show what statute has taken the right away. The constitution of the County Courts is explained in 1 Bl. Com. 178, and Reeves's History of the English Law, vol. 1, p. 47; and it is clear that the County Courts being courts for the trial of small causes, there is no reason why women should not have been suitors, and the onus is on the other side of showing that they were excluded. By the Statute of Marlebridge (52 Hen. 3, c. 10), religious men and women are exempted from attendance at the tourn and hundred courts, and the tourn was the ancient County Court, but that statute only relieves them from a burden, and does not show that they had not a right to be there if they thought proper. In Prynne's Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva, pp. 152-3, several instances are given of women having executed indentures returning members to Parliament. (He produced several certified copies of these indentures from the Record office.) The earliest is in the 13 Hen. 4, and is made between the sheriff of York and the attorneys of the Earl of Westmoreland and of Lucy Countess of —. A portion of the return is illegible, and the whole of the title of the lady cannot be read, but it is clear that she was a woman. The next is in the 2 Hen. 5, which is also a return from Yorkshire, and is executed by the attorney of Margaret, the wife of Henry Vavasour. The next, which is in the 6 Edw. 6,

is a return from Surrey, and relates to a borough, and it is executed by Lady Elizabeth Copley. widow of Roger Copley. The next is in the 1 & 2 Ph. & M., and is a return from Surrey executed by Dame Elizabeth Copley, and states that she had herself elected a knight; there is also a similar return in the 2 & 3 Ph. & M. [WILLES, J.-She might unquestionably have been returning officer.] That would not account for the first return, as it is executed by a number of others. The next is the Aylesbury case in the 14 Eliz., which is set out in Heywood on County Elections, 256, where he cites the passage from the 4th Institute, p. 5, where Lord Coke states that women are not entitled to vote, but Lord Coke may have been mistaken in that instance as he gives many instances of persons as not entitled to vote who undoubtedly were entitled. [WILLES, J.-Have you found any instance of the clergy voting before 1664?] No. [WILLES, J., then peradventure, Lord Coke was right when he wrote that the clergy were nonparties to the elections of knights, citizens, and burgesses.] Peradventure he was wrong. How could one find an instance of a clergyman voting? There would be nothing to show whether the persons voting were clergymen or not. In 2 Lud. Rep. of Controverted Elections, 13, an ancient roll is set out, containing the names of several women, and it was used in a disputed return to show that liberi tenentes and liberi burgences meant the same thing, and would go to show that women at that time had the same rights as men. Therefore, as men and women in ancient times took part in the elections, whatever justified men being put on the roll, justified women being there. The next question is, if any of the statutes passed in restraint of the exercise of the franchise altered this state of things. The first is the 8 Hen. 5, c. 7, which enacts that knights of the shires shall be chosen by people dwelling and resident in the counties whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement of the value of 40s. by the year. [BOVILL, C. J.-Have you read the heading of that statute? "What sort of men shall be chosen, and who shall be chosen knights of Parliament?"] That must have been put in later, and in the old statutes the English rendering in many cases cannot be trusted but, however that is, the heading cannot alter the operative words of the statute. In any case it does not affect the argument, as it is a statute in restraint of the franchise, and if it were the intention to restrain women appropriate words would be used. There are other statutes in pari materia which it is not necessary to read, but to which precisely the same observations apply, viz., that supposing women had the franchise the words are large enough to include them. They are the following:

10 Hen. 6, c. 2;

7 & 8 Will. 3, cc. 4 and 25;

10 Anne, c. 23;

2 Geo. 2, c. 24;

20 Geo. 3, c. 17.

There are very many statutes in which the word "man" is used. Where it must include "women as in criminal statutes, and in all statutes where it would involve no absurdity, it is used in its generic sense. By the Reform Act 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45) all the rights of the 40s. freeholders were expressly reserved. Sect. 18 limits the right of voting in counties in respect of freeholds for life, and sect. 19 confers the right of voting in respect of copyholds; and it is important to observe the distinction between the words used in a restrictive sense and those used when conferring the franchise. The words in sect. 18 are that no person shall be entitled to vote," &c., but the words in sect. 19, "that every male person of full age, &c., shall be entitled to vote," &c. The Registration Act has

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no bearing on the question, nor has the Representation of the People Act 1867, so far as the 40s. freeholders are concerned, as their rights are reserved. The great difficulty in the way of the appellant is that in point of fact women have not voted for hundreds of years, but if the right ever did exist nonuser would not take it away. The next question is, how does the law stand as to boroughs? Hallam says in his Constitutional History, cap. 13, that all inhabitant householders paying scot and lot and local rates should vote for members of Parliament. Women might be bur gesses, and, therefore, there is nothing to show that they might not vote. The 23 Hen. 6, c. 14, alters the mode in which burgesses for cities and boroughs should be chosen, but uses words which if women were then entitled to vote would include them. If the franchise existed the statutes would not take it away, though if it did not exist it is admitted that the statutes would not confer it on women. By Lord Romilly's Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 21), s. 4, it is enacted "that in all Acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, and the singular to include the plural, and the plural the singular, unless the contrary as to gender or number is expressly provided." The language of that Act is express, that the male shall include the female unless the contrary is expressly provided. and that Act was passed after the Reform Act of 1832. The words "male person in the Reform Act do expressly exclude women; but in the Representation of the People Act 1867, passed with a full recollection of Lord Romilly's Act, and with a full apprehension of what the consequences might be the word "man" is used, which does not exclude woman, and in the sections of the same Act comprising the new franchises the expression “male person," is substituted for man, which strengthens my argument. If the word "man" was used in its generic sense of course it would include women, and if it was used as importing the masculine gender, then by the force of Lord Romilly's Act it would include women. If then the word "man" includes "women," the only remaining question is if women are under any "legal incapacity." There is nothing to show any incapacity but non-user, and that cannot affect the question In Olive v. Ingram, 7 Mod. 263, it was held that women might vote in the election of a sexton, and might themselves be elected sextons. In R. v. Stubbs, 2 T. R. 395, it was held that they might be overseers, and the reason given is that the only qualification required is that they should be substantial householders. In Reg. v. Crosswaite, 17 Ir. L. Rep. N. S. 157, it was held that the words "Every person " included women, and that they might vote in the election of town commissioners under a local Act. That decision was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, but only by four judges against three, so that the majority of the Irish judges were in favour of the right: (See 17 Ir. L. Rep. 463.)

Mellish, Q. C. (R. G. Williams with him) for the respondent. The question must depend on the construction of sect. 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1867, because the claim is to vote for the city of Manchester, which was first represented under the Reform Act 1832, and it is admitted that that Act did not confer the franchise on women. In construing Acts of Parliament the consideration of what was understood to be law at the time the Act was passed would have almost the same weight as what actually was the law, and what has been received to be the law, and acted upon as such from time immemorial, is the strongest evidence of what the law really is, unless the contrary is clearly shown. The first question in this case is if the word

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66 man as used in the Representation of the People Act includes woman, and, secondly, supposing that it does, whether a woman is not under a legal incapacity. Independently of Lord Romilly's Act there could be no question as to what man means, and if the court can see that it was the intention of the Legislature when the Representation of the People Act was passed that the word "man" should not include "woman," Lord Romilly's Act cannot alter it. By sects. 56 and 59 of the Representation of the People Act that Act is to be construed with the Reform Act, and that carries it back in construction so as to exclude Lord Romilly's Act. How can the two Acts be read together if there is to be a new interpretation clause? The word "man" admits of two constructions; it may be used in a generic sense in opposition to angels and beasts, as applying to the whole human kind, or in opposition to children and women, and if used in the latter sense it does expressly provide that only such persons shall have the franchise. No one can doubt but that in this Act the word "man is used instead of the word "person," for the express purpose of excluding women. In construing Acts of Parliament the court must not drive away their common sense entirely, and the argument on the other side is really an argument for the respondent, viz., that in all the early statutes general words are used and put in practice. As far back as memory goes women have not voted. Therefore there must always have been a general incapacity. Some of the statutes do not say that idiots and minors cannot vote, and yet they cannot, because there is an incapacity by the common law. It is admitted that if ever women were entitled to vote they are entitled now; but what evidence is there to show that what was laid down in the time of Lord Coke and has been acted upon ever since, is not the law? The return produced only showed that some women signed the indentures, and if they were of any value they would not only show that women might vote, but also that a married women could appoint an attorney, and could vote by attorney. These women may possibly have been returning officers, and it does not appear that there had been any contest, so that probably they were returns of uncontested elections and it cannot be held that a few instances of such irregularities as these should override modern user. Then the dicta of the judges in Olive v. Ingram are in favour of the respondents. Probyn, J., says plainly that women were not entitled to vote for members of Parliament, and Lee, C. J., in his judgment expressly distinguishes the case of a sexton, and says that in public matters women are not entitled to vote. As it is clear that women are not entitled to vote under the Reform Act, it would be an absurdity that in respect of one qualification a woman should be entitled to vote, and not in respect of another, though either would entitle a man to vote; and if it had been the intention of the Legislature to give votes to women, it would have been done by some one clause that would meet all the cases. This point has already been decided in Scotland, where the judges held that women were legally incapacitated from voting, and that it would be against public policy to hold that they were enitled to vote, and therefore that Lord Romilly's Act did not apply.

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BOVILL, C. J.-This is a case of such general importance that we will take till Monday morning to consider our judgment.

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Nov. 9.-BOVILL, C. J.-In this case it is quite unnecessary to consider the question whether it is desirable that women should possess the franchise of voting at the election of members of Parliament; what we have to determine is whether by law they now possess that right. In the present case it is agreed that the right of the appellant to be placed on the list of voters for the borough of Manchester must depend upon the construction to be placed upon the Representation of the People Act 1867, and under that statute two questions arise, one whether women are included under the words "every man," and the other whether women If subject to any legal incapacity." women are not included in the terms of the Act, or are so incapacitated, then our judgment must be in favour of the respondent. Upon the question of whether they are incapacitated, Mr. Coleridge, on the part of the appellant, contended that women had a right to the franchise at common law, that nothing had taken it away from them, and that they were, therefore, not incapacitated from voting; and, indeed, in the first instance, I rather understood him to contend that the present appellant was entitled to the franchise as a common law right. Though he fully argued the question, the appellant has failed to produce before us any reported decisions of any court in favour of the right of women to exercise the franchise of voting for members of Parliament. With the exception of one of the cases which were referred to in the 7th Mod. Mr. Coleridge was obliged to admit that for several hundred years there was no instance to be found of the exercise by women of any such rights. This alone is sufficient to raise a very strong presumption against the existence of the right in point of law. It is quite true that a few instances have been brought before us where in ancient times, as in the reigns of Henry IV., Henry V., and Edward VI., women appear to have been parties to the return of members to Parliament, and, probably, other instances may be found in early times not only of women having voted, but of their having assisted in the deliberations of the Legislature, and, indeed, it is mentioned by Selden in his "Collected Works," that there were records to show that they did so. But these instances are comparatively of little weight as opposed to the long and uninterrupted usage of the country for several centuries, which has been commonly received and acquiesced in as the law. This raises a strong presumption of what the law is, and at least throws on those who question it the burden of showing that the law is not what it has been understood to be. The statute 52 Hen. 3, c. 10, relieving women from attendance at the sheriff's court, and the instances included in the books of the borough of Lyme Regis, and mentioned in 2nd Luders, by no means prove that they were entitled to vote, or did vote at the elections. The record produced of the time of Philip and Mary showed that Dame Copley was party to an indenture, as returning officer, and this possibly may be an explanatory of the return of a member for Gatton in the reign of Edward IV. The same observation applies to the instance of Lady Packington, who had joined in the return for Aylesbury, as it appears from 7 Mod. 268, that the precept was directed to her as lady of the manor, to return two members to Parliament. With regard to the case mentioned in the report of the case of Olive v. Ingram, 7 Mod., which appears to have been cited from a manuscript report by Mr. Hakewell, the statement of this is varied in different parts of the report, and although the argument was several times