Knox et al. v. Smith et al. the time when the debt secured by the latter should be paid, is primâ facie evidence of fraud; but the presumption of fraud may be repelled by proof of fairness in the transaction, and that the instruments were executed for an adequate consideration. Maney v. Killough, 7 Yerger, 440. The marshal, therefore, had a right to levy on the slaves as the property of the debtor. The property had been levied on by the marshal, on the first execution, and a bond taken before the trust matured, and the bond was forfeited. But that did not prevent the trustee from taking possession of the negroes after the bond was forfeited; because a forfeiture of the bond released the property from all lien or liability on account of the levy, and it again became a part of the debtor's general property, and might have deen taken by the trustee, without legal hindrance, so far as the first levy was concerned. Where an execution is levied, and bond taken for the delivery of the property on the day of sale, the lien of the execution continues until the bond is forfeited. It is then discharged, and the property is subject to the claims of other creditors. Malone v. Abbott, 3 Humphrey, 532. The levy of the marshal was therefore valid as against the trust, which, for want of proof to the contrary, was fraudulent. This levy vested the title in the marshal for the benefit of the plaintiffs, to pay their debt by execution; it was a lien created by law, which could not be enforced at law, because the marshal was forcibly prevented by the interference of the State tribunals, called into existence by the defendants. Their only remedy was in equity to enforce their lien, to prevent multiplicity of suits, conflicts of jurisdiction, and to inquire into the fraudulent conveyance by the deed of trust. A judgment creditor, having a lien on personal property, has a right to come into chancery to remove obstacles thrown in the way of the due execution of his process by a levy and seizure of the property by a junior judgment creditor. Parrish v. Saunders et al., 3 Humphrey, 431. This is an analogous case. The courts of Tennessee have decided, that a suit in equity can be brought for slaves, from the peculiar nature of the property. Loftin v. Espy, 4 Yerger, 84. A fortiori, to enforce a lien upon them. Lastly; the State court had no authority to enjoin an execution issuing from a court of the United States. McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279; 3 Story on the Constitution, 625, §§ 1751, 1752; United States v. Wilson, 8 Wheat. 253; 1 Kent's Comm. 409. It is true that the national courts have no authority (in cases not within the appellate jurisdiction of the United States) to issue injunctions to judgments in the State courts; or in any other manner to interfere with their jurisdiction or proceedings. 3 Story on the Knox et al. v. Smith et al. Constitution, 626, § 1753; Diggs et al. v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179. But the federal court had complete jurisdiction in this case, by injunction, to prevent the sale of the property levied upon by execution from its court. Parker v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 561. And as the State and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction (Act of September 24th, 1789, § 11; 1 Lit. & Brown's ed. 78) of the action brought at law, and the suit in equity which arose out of it, the federal court having first acquired jurisdiction, the same cannot afterwards be taken from it by the State courts. Under such circumstances, the aid of the United States court is not an irregular interference with the proceedings of the State tribunal. If the State courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the marshal from selling specific property in possession of the defendant, they may enjoin for all his property, or for any number of adverse claimants; and thus, in effect, entirely defeat the plaintiff's execution. At the same time, an injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be produced, inconsistent with the harmony which ought to exist between the State and federal jurisdictions. "Where the jurisdiction of the federal courts has once attached, no subsequent change in the relation or condition of the parties will oust the jurisdiction. The strongest considerations of utility and convenience require that, the jurisdiction being once vested, the action of the court shall not be limited, but that it should proceed to make a final disposition of the subject." United States v. Myers et al., 2 Brockenbrough's Rep. 516. Mr. Milton Brown, for the appellees. The principal and leading question in this case arises on the demurrer to the bill; for if this be adjudged for the appellees, there is an end of the case. The bill, if its allegations be true, states a case of clear and unembarrassed remedy at law. When analyzed, it amounts to this:-That complainants had recovered a judgment at law, on which execution issued, and had been levied by the marshal of West Tennessee, on seventeen negroes and four mules, the property of Collier, one of the debtors in the execution, for the forthcoming of which, on the day of sale, a delivery bond had been taken, with sureties. That one Peyton Smith had applied to the Circuit Court of the United States, from which the execution had issued, for an injunction to restrain the sale of said negroes; which application, however, was refused by the court. That afterwards, the property not having been delivered on the day of sale, the bond was forfeited; and on this judgment of forfeiture another execution issued against the defendants in the original judgment, and also the sureties in the forfeited delivery bond; on which last execution another levy was made, and another delivery bond, with new surety, taken. Knox et al. v. Smith et al. The bill then adds: Upon this last execution the marshal made the following return: "The property executed, delivered according to bond, and then arrested from me by the sheriff of Tipton, under order of the Chancery Court at Brownsville, 5th December, 1840." The next two paragraphs then disclose the points on which the supposed equity of the bill is made to rest. They are as follows. "And your orators further show, that the said Peyton Smith, although your honor refused to grant an injunction restraining the sale of said negroes levied upon, has, by some means or other, procured from the State courts of the State of Tennessee a process of injunction, or some other process, enjoining the sale of said negroes and property levied upon by virtue of the executions issuing from your honorable court, and has procured one Josiah Horne, the sheriff of Tipton county, a citizen of the State of Tennessee, to arrest and take possession of said negroes from the custody of the marshal of this court; and the said Josiah Horne has still possession of said property so levied upon as aforesaid, and refuses to deliver the same to the marshal of the Western District, to be sold according to law. "Your orators further show, that said negroes and mules were the property of said Probert P. Collier, and liable to be sold for the debt due to your orators, and that the State courts had no right, power, or jurisdiction to enjoin the process issued from this honorable court; and your orators believe, and so charge, that the said Collier and the securities upon said delivery bond combined and confederated with said Peyton Smith to prevent the sale of the property levied upon, and so defeat the execution of your orators; and your orators have now no adequate and complete remedy at law." On these vague uncertainties and allegations, meaning nothing and amounting to nothing, the debtors in the original judgment, the sureties to both the delivery bonds, and Peyton Smith and the sheriff of Tipton, are all made defendants. And it is only remarkable, that in this wholesale business, the chancellor of West Tennessee was not included. The prayer of the bill for specific relief is,-1. That the negroes "be sold to pay the judgment due to your orators." 2. "That said defendants be jointly and severally bound personally to pay said judgment and interest to your orators." And lastly, -"That said negroes be forthcoming, to abide the decree of this honorable court." An injunction was prayed for, but not granted. To this bill the defendants severally demurred. The demurrers were overruled by the court below, and the defendants required to answer. And now comes up the question, whether there is sufficient equity in the bill, and stated with sufficient legal certainty, to authorize a decree to be made on it. Knox et al. v. Smith et al. And first, as to the defendant Peyton Smith, against whom there is equity, if against any one. The point is, the improper suing out of process and arresting the property from the possession of the marshal. If it be the design of the bill to invoke the chancery powers of the court, to control or decide any real or supposed conflict between the federal and State judiciaries, the exercise of such a power would be alike unwarranted and dangerous. But this is probably not the object of the bill. It proceeds on the ground that the process was wholly and absolutely void. What the process was, whether an injunction or a final process of execution, either in law or chancery, is not stated. The vague and unmeaning allegation is, that it was "a process of injunction, or some other process." Nor is it stated on what this very uncertain process was sued out, or on what it was founded; whether on a final decree in chancery, on a final judgment at law, or on an application for an injunction, does not appear with any degree of legal certainty. The allegations are, that said Peyton Smith, "by some means or other," "procured from the State courts of the State of Tennessee a process of injunction, or some other process," by which the sale of the slaves by the marshal had been prevented; and that the State courts "had no right, power, or jurisdiction" to issue this process. Now, if these allegations be true, the process, whatever it might be, was absolutely void, and all acting under it trespassers. The marshal should have paid no attention to it; and if the property was taken without his consent, an action of trespass or trover, in his name, by virtue of his levy, was the plain remedy. If the process in the hands of the marshal was, as is here alleged, wrongfully and unlawfully obstructed or interfered with, it certainly furnishes no ground on which to invoke the chancery powers of the court. The case would be much nearer the province of a grand jury than the conscience of a chancellor. In this it is not designed to intimate, that, in point of fact, there was any unlawful or improper interference with the rights of the marshal or the complainants. Nor is it designed to intimate that there was any conflict of jurisdiction between the federal and State courts. It is believed there was no such interference, and no such conflict. But for the purposes of the argument on the demurrer, the facts are taken as stated in the bill. The attempt in the appellant's brief to sustain the bill, on the ground of its being filed to set aside a fraudulent deed of trust, finds no support in the allegations or frame of the bill itself. The case made in the bill is the alleged improper issuance of the process from the State courts, and the seizure of the property. On what this process issued, as already clearly shown, is not stated. There Knox et al. v. Smith et al. is nothing on the face of the bill to show, with sufficient legal certainty, that the existence of a deed of trust is the subject of complaint. "Every material fact to which the plaintiff means to offer evidence ought to be distinctly stated in the premises." Story's Eq. Pl. § 28. If fraud is charged, it must be distinctly and clearly set out. Story's Eq. Pl. § 251. The only reference in the bill to a deed of trust is a mere historical reference in the statement that Peyton Smith had applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for an injunction, which was refused. It is not charged that any other or further use was ever made or intended to be made of it. Before the issuance of the " process from the State courts, of which complaint is made, there had, as appears on the face of the bill, been an entire change in the nature of the question. The delivery bond had been forfeited, a new statutory judgment had attached, a new execution had issued, embracing not merely the former defendants, but the sureties in the delivery bond also, a new levy under this execution had been made, &c., &c. This "process," therefore, which is spoken of in the bill in such remarkably indefinite terms, might have been founded on an intervening judgment or decree in chancery, taking priority of lien, as happened in the case of Brown v. Clarke, decided at the present term of this court. In that case it was decided that, on the forfeiture of a delivery bond, the first lien was extinguished and a new lien attached, and that intervening liens might take precedence. May this not have been the case in this very instance, so far as any thing appears on the face of the bill? In fact, the language of the bill favors this conclusion. It says that, "by some means or other," process was sued out. Does this not leave it wholly uncertain whether this process was obtained by " means " of a deed of trust, or by that "other" means referred to? But again; the bill says there was sued out" a process of injunction, or some other process,' thus leaving it entirely uncertain what that "other process" was. Might not that "other process" here referred to have been founded on an intervening judgment or decree, creating a prior lien, and entitled to prior satisfaction? These considerations are deemed sufficient to show that the reference to the deed of trust in the bill is too indefinite and uncertain to require an answer, or form an issue, and can furnish no possible ground for equitable interference. A statement of facts, to form the basis of relief, must not be vague and uncertain. And if, as in this case, they are stated in the alternative, or are otherwise left doubtful, it is such uncertainty as will be bad on general demurrer. Story's Eq. Pl. §§ 243-249 and 450. Upon what ground the sureties in the delivery bonds have been made parties it is hard to perceive. Complainants already had |