At all times, the acknowledgment of a new dynasty (to say nothing of an usurpation) is counted as a concession for which, if necessary or desirable, a com take for granted to be) their intention to give to the emperor of Russia every pos sible aid in the prosecution of the war, when once begun. I understand them to have abstained from any advice or inter-pensation may be demanded. In the ference tending to urge the emperor of Russia to embark in a war, which, had it been carried on with ordinary means, or in an ordinary spirit-had it not been national-had it not been a war of the people as well as of the government, must ere now have led to his ruin. I give them credit at the same time for having hailed with admiration and delight, the first symptoms of such a determined spirit on the part both of the government and of the people of Russia, as has been exhibited in this unexampled campaign; and for having endeavoured to aid a contest begun (without their advice) by Russia, for Russian objects, and conducted by Russian councils, with purely Russian energy and zeal, as warmly, as if it had been commenced at their instigation. But here, Sir, a question arises, respecting which some future explanation seems to me indispensable. How has it happened, that having made a treaty of peace with Sweden, upon which we are called upon to congratulate the Prince Regent; and having for the last six months heard notes of preparation in every port of that kingdom, how happens it that the power of Sweden has not been brought to bear in aid of the Russian cause, at a moment when, if ever, the interposition of a third power might have been decisive of the contest? To this question I do not desire an immediate reply; but I cannot vote for an Address containing a congratulation on the conclusion of a treaty with Sweden, and at the same time observe Buonaparté retreating, and in a situation which an effective attack on his rear might render doubly perilous, without asking, what impediment prevented the co-operation of Sweden, and whether that impediment was indeed such as it was not in human foresight to anticipate, or in human wisdom to remove? The treaty with Sweden is not before the House; I can therefore argue upon it only from the general information, which every one possesses. But, it ought not to be forgotten, that in concluding this treaty, the court of St. James's and that of Stockholm, did not stand on an exact footing of equality. We had a boon to grant, for which we had a right to require an equivalent. (VOL. XXIV.) treaty with Sweden, we began with the acknowledgment of a new dynasty, and incidentally of the Frenchman who is now the crown prince, and eventually heir to the throne. That an equivalent for this acknowledgment should have been required merely for the sake of maintaining the principle and the right, I am not so pedantic or so scrupulous as to pretend: but with Russia in the situation in which she was, I think our right ought not to have been improvidently waved, if we could have stipulated any thing for her benefit. That such a stipulation must have been in our contemplation when we made peace with Sweden, there can be no doubt: it remains to be explained, how that stipu lation has been missed, or has been rendered inefficient. In considering the war in Russia, as arising out of the war in the peninsula, (the view of it taken by the noble lord), a new question arises. Hitherto we have carried on the war in the peninsula, with no relation to any other nations than those which inhabited the peninsula itself. But our efforts in the peninsula are no longer to be considered as devoted exclusively to the interests of Portugal and Spain; it is not for their sakes, or for our own and theirs, alone, that we were under an obligation to prosecute vigorously a contest, on the faith of the vigorous prosecution of which Russia involved herself in hostilities with France. I have already said, that judging what must probably have been the language held by our government to Russia, I entirely and unequivocally approve it. I believe our government to have said to the court of St. Petersburgh," if you engage în a war with France with a view to your own interests, we will help you as far as we may be able; but depend not on our direct and immediate aid. Our principal efforts must be made in the peninsula, and in making them there we shall do more towards your assistance than by any pecuniary or military support that we should be able to afford you.' That, I take, Sir, to have been the language held to Russia; and it was wise language. Having held it, it behoved us to strain every nerve in the peninsula, to make good the expectations which we had raised. (F) _ out before. If any measure can now be adopted by which the disposable force of the country may be augmented, the burden is on ministers to prove that such a measure could not have been taken six months ago; when, instead of retrieving reverses, it might have ensured a continuance of success. If ministers have it in contemplation at present to call on the country to make any extraordinary effort, why was not that call made in July last? Why was not the last session of the last parliament prolonged for that purpose? I can, therefore, concur in the implied approbation of the conduct of the war in the peninsula, only on the understanding that it shall be hereafter shewn that government did not possess the means of making any additional effort, to bring the contest to a favourable termination. The higher we estimate lord Wellington's merit, and no man is disposed to estimate it more highly than myself, the more should we regret any misplaced economy, any shrinking from exertion that had a tendency to cripple his operations, and prevent him from attaining those important objects which his great mind had in contemplation. It is difficult, as I have already said, to prove to a demonstration that more might have been done. But if I were put to the question, I must say, that I believe that greater efforts might have been made, and I believe, that if those efforts had been made, they might have proved eminently, nay, perhaps conclusively successful. While, therefore, I cordially join in | I cannot hesitate to say, that if there be every word of the Address which congra- in the power of ministers any means yet tulates his Royal Highness on the splendid untried-any effort yet unattempted-any exploits of our army in the peninsula, resources yet unexplored-any accumulaand of their gallant and immortal leader, tion of force yet omitted-any increase if I am called upon to declare that the of energy yet delayed-not only such adresult of those brilliant exploits, such as ditional exertion ought to be immediately we now see it, has satisfied the hope and made, but that it ought to have been expectations of the country, I must beg made long ago. If a reinforcement can leave expressly to guard myself against be sent out now, it is for ministers to being supposed to concur in that inter-prove that it could not have been sent pretation of the Address. Do I, therefore, count the victory of Salamanca as nothing, even if its consequences terminated on the plains upon which it was fought? Certainly not. I, who held up the barren Jaurels, (as they were often described), of Talavera, to the admiration of the country, can hardly be suspected of a disposition to withhold my applause from the splendid achievement of Salamanca, even had no result proceeded from it but the acquisition of national glory. But, Sir, I am compelled to compare the hopes which the victory of Salamanca inspired, with the situation of our affairs in the peninsula presented to us at the opening of the present session. It is impossible for any man not in an official situation, actually to demonstrate that we could have made greater efforts in the peninsular war, or, if we had made greater efforts, that they would have been successful. On a former occasion-an occasion which occurred not in this House, but in the course of transactions which took place last year, and which became matter of publicity-I mean, Sir, during the negociations last year for the formation of a new administration, I studiously and explicitly declined giving a decided opinion myself, or concurring in an opinion given by others, (with whom in most points of public moment I did concur), that the scale of the war in the peninsula had not been as great as our means might enable us to make it. I had not then the materials for forming a confident, much less a criminatory judgment upon that point. I have not those materials now. It would require a detailed knowledge of the state of the military, and the pecuniary means of the country, which, out of office, and without any official information as yet laid before parliament, I do not pretend to possess. But this information must be laid before us. And in the mean time I cannot hesitate to allow, that the prima facie case of such successes, terminating in such a retreat, does call for explanation. To those, Sir, who habitually despond of the means and resources of the country; who think that she has taken her stand too high among the nations of the earth, and that she ought to return to her proper level, to shrink into her shell, I may expose myself to the imputation of insanity, when I talk of extending our military exertions. But I will ask those gentlemen, whether if the efforts which we have lately been making had been predicted ten years ago, the prophecy would not have been received with absolute derision. But whether it be true or no that the resources of the country are, (as I believe the spirit of the country to be), adequate to an extension of our exertions in the peninsular war, must, I allow, be matter of discussion hereafter. This, at least, is certain, that the imagination of man could hardly devise a situation of affairs in Europe so favourable to a great effort as that which has recently occurred. Since the commencement of the present war, since the commencement of the revolutionary war, the power of France was never so thoroughly occupied. Never has she played so deep a game; never has her hazard been so mighty; never has her ruin been so near its accomplishment. While the strength of France was withering in the north, Oh! that we had had the means of pushing to a successful extent our efforts in the peninsula! With such a general, and such a cause, what might we not have justly expected!-a general of whom it is not too much to say, that whatever might have been the scope of action opened to him, he would have made it one continued scene of glory to himself and his country. Looking at what he has already done, with means comparatively so limited, is it extravagant to presume, that with an increase, even a small increase of force, he might have occupied Madrid, not merely as the extremity, but as the centre of his operations? Considering the present state of France, and the general discontent that must pervade that country, considering the situation of Buonaparté, struggling with unexpected and unprecedented reverses, war and famine wearing down his exhausted legions in the north, might not lord Wellington before this time, instead of retreating within the frontiers of Portugal, have been advancing to the boundaries of Spain, and hovering from the brow of the Pyrenean mountains over insurgent provinces of the French empire? But however questionable it may appear to some gentlemen, whether such an extension of our military efforts was indeed within our power, clear at least, I apprehend it will be admitted to be, that our power alone ought to have been the limit of our exertions; the principle at least will be admitted, that an economy in war which restricts and husbands our efforts, is the worst description of economy; and that a great exertion, tending to a sudden decision of the contest, at an opportunity peculiarly favourable, although it may be accompanied with twofold cost,-is best calculated to bring a contest to a speedy and honourable termination, and therefore most congenial to the interests as well as the character of the country. And however it may be doubted whether this doctrine could be practically applied to the contest in the peninsula, no man, I presume, will deny it to have been both within our power to apply, and peculiarly applicable to that third contest in which we are exclusively engaged-I mean the war with America. I will not detain the House with expressing what every man in the country feels in common with myself-an anxious wish that two nations, bound to each other by so many ties of consanguinity and interest, should remain in a state of amity. But, Sir, with America as with any other country, when once the die was cast, when once war was manifestly inevitable, it became us to be prompt in our measures, and, by vigorous proceedings, to bring the contest to a speedy and succesful termination. The Address moved by the noble lord states, that we learn from his Royal Highness, that the declaration of war by America was issued at a time when circumstances led his Royal Highness to hope, that the disputes between the two countries might be amicably arranged. If, Sir, the Address had stated that as our opinion, I could not have assented to such a statement. In receiving the opinion from his Royal Highness, we must presume his Royal Highness to speak from sources of intelligence not open to us. From any observation which I had the means of making at the time, I must say plainly that, when the declaration of war reached this country from America, (I believe it reached us on the day on which the last parliament was prorogued) I did not entertain the slightest expectation, nor was there on the face of the document, the slightest justification of any expectation, that what had been done in this country would remove the causes which had induced America to go to war with us. For in that declaration, the demand for the rescinding of the Orders in Council, which had hitherto been insisted on by America, and still more by those who argued in favour of America on this side of the water, was studiously postponed to many other grievances. If America had ever intended to close with us on the Orders triumph. I really never did suppose that in Council, she had evidently reviewed we should be conquered. It never en that intention, and had come to a de- tered into my mind that we should be liberate determination to go to war with compelled to seek for such a consolation. us unless we should likewise make every It never entered into my mind that the other concession that she demanded. | mighty naval power of England would be It was evident, then, that the revoca- allowed to sleep while our commerce was tion of the Orders in Council alone could swept from the surface of the Atlantic; not restore peace; and therefore, Sir, and that at the end of six months war it until I obtain better information than that would be proclaimed in a speech from the of which I am at present possessed, I must throne, that the time was now at length continue to think that, war having been come, when the long-withheld thunder of declared by America, all that remained to Britain must be launched against an imthis country was, to determine how the placable foe, and the fulness of her power war could best be carried on. The best at length drawn forth. It never entered way to carry on any war is the way that into my mind that we should send a will lead soonest to peace; it is by vigour, fleet to take rest and shelter in our own not by forbearance and hesitation; it is ports in North America, and that we by exertions calculated to make an enemy should then attack the American ports feel and dread our power; that such an with a flag of truce. enemy as America, an enemy making a war of experiment, of experiment on her own force, and on your patience, would be soonest, and most effectually brought to reason. Sir, I would go to the extreme verge of concession to preserve peace; but when the preservation of peace becomes hopeless, I would not dilute my measures of hostility, I would not by a series of maukish palliatives, convert war, which is naturally an acute distemper, into a chronical one; and incorporate it with the habitual system of the country. This war with America, which a prompt exertion might presently have subdued and swept away, has been nursed up by this petty policy, until it is probably fastened upon us for a considerable period. I will ask any man, whether, if two years ago, in the contemplation of a war with the United States of America, it had been prophesied to him, that after six months of hostilities, the only maritime trophies gained in the contest would be on the side of the United States, and our only consolation that we had not been conquered by land, he would not have treated such a prediction as an insult to the might, the grandeur, and the character of this country? It is true, Sir, we have not been conquered by land. I am sure, I am disposed to pay my tribute of admiration to our gallant troops in Canada, and my tribute of regret to their heroic leader, with as much sincerity of feeling as any man; for individual heroism and selfdevotion, under any circumstances, are glorious; but really, Sir, what has happened in Canada is not a matter of great When his Royal Highness tells us that, at the period of the American declaration of war, there were circumstances which led him to believe that peace might be restored, it must be that those circumstances were of a nature of which we and the public are wholly ignorant, but which in due time may, perhaps, be disclosed, and may then bear out such a belief. But certainly, on the face of the American declaration, any man must observe a studied mind to prevent pacification, or at least to defer it; and as to Canada, the desire entertained by the American government to possess that province, is not much frowned upon even by those Americans who are the best disposed towards this country. As an additional proof of the true tone and character of the American declaration, let it not be forgotten, that immediately after the promulgation of it an ambassador to France was appointed, who traced the steps of the Gallic conqueror, through the realms which he had devastated. A republican ambassador, bearing the homage of a free state to the conqueror (as he was taken for granted to be) of independent Russia, and authorised to sign, amidst the smoking ruins of Moscow, a treaty of hostility against the liberators of Spain! With such an exhibition of republican virtue and republican love of liberty before my eyes, faint, I confess, were the hopes which I could cherish, of a disposition on the part of America to conciliate Great Britain. Much has been said indeed, and too much cannot be said, or felt, of the natural affection that ought to subsist between the two countries; of the force of kindred blood, of common interests, of common language. But, Sir, we are told by natural historians, that affection descends; that parents love their children more than children love their parents; and I would ask of those who, in this country, speak of America with parental affection, whether they do not begin to apprehend that they may have counted a little too much on a reciprocity of feeling on the part of their transatlantic offspring. Before, however, I quit that part of the Address which relates to Canada, let me again guard myself against the possibility of being supposed to undervalue the heroism there displayed, or not to set its due value upon that exemplary loyalty in his Majesty's Canadian subjects which is stated in the Speech from the throne to have remained proof against all temptation. Most cordially do I concur in that sentiment of approbation, and, adverting to a vote which I had the honour of proposing to the House last year, in favour of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects, let me remind the House that these provinces of Canada, so assailed, and so attempted to be seduced, and so inaccessible to seduction, constitute the single specimen in the British empire, in which the Catholic is allowed to sit side by side with the Protestant in the legislature, as well as to fight side by side with him in the field!! really playing the game of the party friendly to us? I doubt it. Here is a country divided into parties, one of which, to deter their countrymen from war, predicts the evils that must follow hostility with England: I cannot conceive a mode better calculated to diminish the influence of that party, instead of upholding it, than that of rendering their prophecies comtemptible, and enabling those opposed to them in politics to appeal to experience against their forebodings. But is this an ideal picture? By no means. I found the other day the report of a speech made by one of the party in America, whom we are told we ought to conciliate by forbearance. This gentleman (gen. German) endeavoured to divert the senate of the United States from its warlike resolutions, by an anticipation of the evils which Great Britain could inflict upon America the moment that war was declared. He observed, "that the first consequence of the maritime superiority of Great Britain, would be the loss of New Orleans, from which the English could not be dislodged without a great sacrifice of blood and treasure; that they might then pass northward along the American coast to Charleston and Norfolk ;" and he asked " if they thought it possible to defend those places, or that they would not be in the possession of the English in six day's?" He assured the senate, "that if they calculated But to return to the war. For this sys- on the forbearance of the English, they tem of forbearance-of mitigated and half would be deceived;" and to ridicule afraid hostility, we are told there is a two- the notion, that, after the decisive step fold reason. We are told that we have of declaring war had been taken, any friends in America whom we should en- thing would postpone for a day the vendeavour to conciliate by mildness, and geance of Great Britain; "You are not that we should be careful to put ourselves to imagine," says he, "that England will completely in the right. No man can sub-complaisantly wait till you are prepared scribe more readily than I do to the latter proposition. So much so, indeed, that I confess, I should contemplate the most splendid victory that ever decorated the historic page with little admiration, if it were gained in a cause essentially unjust. It may also be wise to do whatever may depend upon us, to forward the political views, and political preponderance of the party in the United States;-I will not call it the English party, for that would be unjust ;-but that party of good Americans, who loving their country, and consulting for her good, maintain the opinion that an alliance with England is preferable to an alliance with France. But, Sir, are we sure that by this system of restricted and inoffensive hostility we are to repel her attacks. She is not so simple in her enmity."-Alas! Sir, gen. German gave us credit for a promptitude which we did not possess; for a quicker sense of insult and injury than belongs to us-we have shewn ourselves more simple than the orator supposed us. We have waited till America is prepared. The decisive step of war was taken, and our vengeance yet sleeps. Nothing has happened in consequence of the American declaration of war, except that America has captured our ships and attacked our provinces. But as for the prophet of our resentment, his influence is lost for ever. This injurious mode of backing our friends by falsifying their ar guments has probably silenced the advo |