Pennsylvania will serve to show the limits there set to the master's duty to instruct his servants in the managemeut of novel machinery and implements, and to inform them of a danger necessarily connected therewith, which is unknown to such servants.

In Lebbening v. Struthers, Wills & Co., 157 Pa. 312. The company was held responsible for an injury to one servant, resulting from the unskilfulness and neglect of a fellow servant, who was engaged with him in the management of a piece of machinery, whose nature and character had not been sufficiently pointed out to them by the foreman in control of their work. Both workmen were unacquainted with the manner of working the machine. It was there stated to be the positive duty of the master, before putting an inexperienced employé in charge of dangerous machinery, with the use of which he is unacquainted, to properly instruct and qualify him for such new service. If he does not do so himself he must remain responsible for the manner in which the person, to whom he has delegated the work of instruction, performs it. The master can not clear himself by showing that he selected for the performance of his duty a person, to the best of his knowledge, competent and trustworthy. To this extent the subordinate is the "vice-principal." In this case it will be noted that the person injured was not injured solely by the darger inherent in the nature of the machine of which he was unwarned, but by that combined with the unskillfulness of a fellow workman, produced by the lack of that instruction, which it was the master's duty to give him, not only for his own safety but for that of all those who might be harmed by his lack of skill.

This duty to warn workmen of danger and instruct them in the management of 'their machines only extend to those who obviously lack experience. Thus, in Burrows v. Pa. & N. Y. Canal and R. R. Co., 157 Pa. 51, decided just before the above case, it was held that, where the railroad allowed the engines of another road to run upon their line, they were not bound to warn such of their own engineers as might be put in charge of those engines of the somewhat greater width, which,

It

taken in connection with the width of the bridges, etc., on the line, might be a source of danger, inasmuch as he was an experienced engineer and more likely to know of the dangerous nature of the route than any other employé of the company. The former case shows the true meaning of the term vice-principle, when used in the Pennsylvania cases. means one to whom the master has delegated the performance of some positive duty laid by the law upon him, and for the proper performance of which he is answerable just as much when he so delegates it as when he undertakes its performance himself. In sharp contrast to this meaning of vice-principal is that adopted by the Supreme Court cf Washington, which is applied in the recent case of Morgan v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 34 Pac. Rep. 152, in which following the federal decisions (R. R. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, etc.). it was said, that test as to whether one employé was a fellow servant of another or a vice-principal for whose conduct the master was responsible, depended upon whether or not the one servant had the power of control over the other. There, it was held that a fire boss, who had only the power to order the miners from one place to another, was not vice-principal but a fellow servant with a miner who was injured by the fire boss' negligence in lighting his pipe where there was fire damp, and so causing an explosion. He had no control over their work or their manner of conducting it. Had, however, the injury resulted from the act of the fire boss in ordering the miners into a place of danger the company would be liable. Where a limited power of control is given the company is only liable for a misuse of that power. Where authority over workmen is conferred by the master he must be liable for the mode in which it is exercised. Such is the definition of vice-principal in that case. The distinction between the two meanings is clear, the one describes a subordinate in what so ever grade of service to whom is delegated the performance of some positive duty which the master, at his hazzard, is bound to see performed, the other one to whom the master has given authority to control the movement and actions and work of other employés.

Pennsylvania will serve to show the limits there set to the master's duty to instruct his servants in the managemeut of novel machinery and implements, and to inform them of a danger necessarily connected therewith, which is unknown to such servants.

In Lebbening v. Struthers, Wills & Co., 157 Pa. 312. The company was held responsible for an injury to one servant, resulting from the unskilfulness and neglect of a fellow servant, who was engaged with him in the management of a piece of machinery, whose nature and character had not been sufficiently pointed out to them by the foreman in centrol of their work. Both workmen were unacquainted with the manner of working the machine. It was there stated to be the positive duty of the master, before putting an inexperienced employé in charge of dangerous machinery, with the use of which he is unacquainted, to properly instruct and qualify him for such new service. If he does not do so himself he must remain responsible for the manner in which the person, to whom he has delegated the work of instruction, performs it. The master can not clear himself by showing that he selected for the performance of his duty a person, to the best of his knowledge, competent and trustworthy. To this extent the subordinate is the "vice-principal." In this case it will be noted that the person injured was not injured solely by the darger inherent in the nature of the machine of which he was unwarned, but by that combined with the unskillfulness of a fellow workman, produced by the lack of that instruction, which it was the master's duty to give him, not only for his own safety but for that of all those who might be harmed by his lack of skill.

This duty to warn workmen of danger and instruct them in the management of 'their machines only extend to those who obviously lack experience. Thus, in Burrows v. Pa. & N. Y. Canal and R. R. Co., 157 Pa. 51, decided just before the above case, it was held that, where the railroad allowed the engines of another road to run upon their line, they were not bound to warn such of their own engineers as might be put in charge of those engines of the somewhat greater width, which,

taken in connection with the width of the bridges, etc., on the line, might be a source of danger, inasmuch as he was an experienced engineer and more likely to know of the dangerous nature of the route than any other employé of the company. The former case shows the true meaning of the It term vice-principle, when used in the Pennsylvania cases. means one to whom the master has delegated the performance of some positive duty laid by the law upon him, and for the proper performance of which he is answerable just as much when he so delegates it as when he undertakes its performance himself. In sharp contrast to this meaning of vice-principal is that adopted by the Supreme Court cf Washington, which is applied in the recent case of Morgan v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 34 Pac. Rep. 152, in which following the federal decisions (R. R. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, etc.). it was said, that test as to whether one employé was a fellow servant of another or a vice-principal for whose conduct the master was responsible, depended upon whether or not the one servant had the power of control over the other. There, it was held that a fire boss,

who had only the power to order the miners from one place to another, was not vice-principal but a fellow servant with a miner who was injured by the fire boss' negligence in lighting his pipe where there was fire damp, and so causing an explosion. He had no control over their work or their manner of conducting it. Had, however, the injury resulted from the act of the fire boss in ordering the miners into a Where a place of danger the company would be liable. limited power of control is given the company is only liable for a misuse of that power. Where authority over workmen is conferred by the master he must be liable for the mode in which it is exercised. Such is the definition of vice-principal in that case. The distinction between the two meanings is clear, the one describes a subordinate in what so ever grade of service to whom is delegated the performance of some positive duty which the master, at his hazzard, is bound to see performed, the other one to whom the master has given authority to control the movement and actions and work of other employés.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of In re Coleman's Estate, 28 At. Rep. 137, has consistently carried out the principle of the decision in Miller's Ap., 111 Pa. 321, recognizing the liability of foreign real estate owned by a Pennsylvania testator, to the collateral inheritance tax law, where the owner has, by his will, effected an equitable conversion with respect to such real estate. In Coleman's Estate the converse of this question was presented. A nonresident testator directed his executor to sell certain real estate, situate in Pennsylvania, covert the same into money and pay certain legacies to collaterals. It was held that the assessment of the land, as land, for the payment of the collateral inheritance tax was void, inasmuch as the testator willed only the proceeds of a sale of such lands to collaterals.

In former pages we have called attention to some peculiarities of this branch of our collateral inheritance tax law. Thus, in Miller's Appeal, the tax was imposed upon a fund arising from the sale of foreign real estate, owned by a domestic testator, with respect to which he had effected an equitable conversion. "As the order to sell was imperative and absolute," said the court, "and worked a conversion . . . we “have no choice to regard it as other than personalty. As "such it must be regarded as passing by the law of the "domicile."

In commenting upon this decision, it was observed that the notion that real estate and everything pertaining to its devolution, transmission and tenure was governed and controlled by the lex rei sitæ had been settled by a long line of authorities: Bigelow's Story's Conf. of Laws (8th Ed.). To charge the succession of foreign real estate with the payment of the collateral inheritance tax is inconsistent with the spirit of such taxation. Land situate abroad and devised by a domestic will, does not devolve by force of the will nor of the domestic law, but by permission of the State where the land is situate; and, not depending upon the domestic law, cannot legally nor in good conscience be asked to pay the price of succession: In re Swift's Estate, 32 N. E. Rep. 1096; 32 Am. L. R. and Rev. 367; Bittinger's Appeal, 129 Pa. 338.