frequently been held, a distinctly proper subject for its excrcise, especially when it is remembered that uniform national game laws are out of the question on account of the widely varying conditions in different parts of the country.

So much for the general classification of the legislation. The object of the law being of acknowledged wisdom and validity, are the means directed for enforcing it proper and constitutional?

The objection upon which the plaintiffs mainly relied was that the statute deprived them of their property without due process of law. They were fishermen whose nets had been found set (in violation of the Act) and promptly destroyed by the defendant, a game and fish protector. The court found that "the only real difficulty connected with the Act was the right it gave to summarily destroy" the cenfiscated nets, and met and overcame this difficulty by recognizing the eminently practical mode of preventing such a nefarious practice that such destruction presented, which, taken together with the fact that the articles destroyed were of comparatively slight value, distinguished the case from those which hold judicial proceedings necessary before condemnation.

Undoubtedly a rigid application to the facts of this case of the general principle that property cannot be taken and destroyed without due process of law, if by the latter is meant judicial proceedings, must result in the conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional. But where the general purpose sought to be accomplished by the law is one preeminently popular with all classes of law abiding citizens, and the only persons against whom its provisions operate are those who stand practically outlawed, it would be pointless and absurd to throw about the latter the protection afforded by a general principle. Of course, the comparatively slight value of the property taken, considered alone, should not exempt it from a rule which applies to property of greater value, but it is at least to be regarded as an element in forming a conclusion as to the best and most effective means of carrying the law into effect. The occupation of the poacher is one that is very difficult to put a stop to. The only thorough means of accomplishing this would seem to be to

destroy the means by which it is carried on. If it were necessary to go through a judicial process of condemnation, it is not likely that the purpose of the law would be very effectually accomplished.

The decision seems to us a fortunate departure from a general principle, and throws new light on the general subject of “due process." W. S. E.

The quo warranto proceeding in the New Jersey Senate contest.

The recent contest for the New Jersey Senate which culminated in an action of quo warranto to determine in whom vested the title to the presidency of that body is of general political rather than general legal interest. A large part of the case, also, depended upon the interpretation and construction of certain clauses of the State Constitution. The preliminary question of jurisdiction, however, interposed by counsel for Mr. Rogers, was considered at some length by the Chief Justice in his opinion. (Att'y-General ex rel. Werts v. Rogers et al., 28 Atlantic, 726.)

The state of facts presented to the court (without considering the political causes which produced them) was briefly, as follows: Twenty-one Senators of the State had divided themselves into two bodies. Nine of the old members, with one newly-elected member, who subsequently joined them, formed themselves into what was known as the "Adrain" Senate, while four of the old members, with seven newly-elected, comprised the "Rogers" Senate. The former had been recognized officially by the Governor, and at the time of the action remained in session. The "Rogers" Senate was recognized officially by the lower House, but not by the Executive, but it had passed various measures and had appointed certain State officers with the cooperation of the House of Assembly.

The applicants for the writ (the "Adrain” Senate) contended that the "Rogers" Senate had no legal existence inasmuch as it was organized in a manner contrary to the fundamental law of the State and the Constitution, "and, said the court, the proposition, therefore, would seem very evident that, as no

power is vested by the Constitution in this majority of Senators to construe such law in this respect, the power to expound and enforce it is lodged in the ordinary legal tribunals." (Sce Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 46.) The counsel for the "Rogers" Senate, however, surprised the court by assuming the position that the interpretation of the Constitution “being a matter of purely legislative character," the court could not entertain jurisdiction of the case.

In reply to this the court said: "It is believed that no decision has been made for a century past that does not antagonize such a proposition."

The doubt expressed as to the court's jurisdiction certainly seems to have had no foundation whatever. The question was not whether the senatorial body had been organized in the accustomed mode or contrary to the custom prescribed by its own rules. Had that been the case it would have been proper for the settlement of the matter to have been arrived at by the senate itself without recourse to the courts. The court simply found itself called upon to determine whether or not the Constitution had been violated by the legislature and it has jurisdiction over such a question is clear.

The other points of the case fall, as we have said, within the particular provision of the New Jersey Constitution, and, although interesting in their bearing on the general subject present no doctrine of importance.

To readers of the daily newspapers the events which finally led to the application to the court are still fresh. The general concurrence and approval of the judgment that have been expressed form another instance of the willingness of the people of all partics to accept cheerfully a judicial decision, no matter how bitter may have been the contest.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF THE HOUSE RULES.

There has been introduced into the House of Representatives at Washington a resolution amending Clause 1 of Rule VIII, of the Rules of the House. It has for its object the securing of a quorum on a yea and nay vote of the House when there is a quorum present. As is well known, for a

long time it has been the custom of the members of the minority desiring to block legislation, to refuse to vote on a call of the House, and thereby prevent the quorum of the members which is necessary to pass any measure. Mr. Reed, when he was Speaker, nullified this filibustering proceeding by counting as present, to aid in making the quorum not only those members who voted, but those who were present and refused to vote. The constitutionality of this proceeding was doubted, but all doubts relative thereto were set aside by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1. Mr. Justice BREWER, in his opinion in that case, said (p. 6): "The Constitution has prescribed no method of making this determination, and it is therefore within the competency of the House to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact. It may prescribe answer to roll-call as the only method of determination; or require the passage of members between tellers and their count as the sole test, or the count of the Speaker or the Clerk, and an announcement from the desk of the names of those who are present. Any one of these methods, it must be conceded, is reasonably certain of ascertaining the fact, and as there is no constitutional method prescribed, and no constitutional inhibition of any of those, and no violation of fundamental rights in any, it follows that the House may adopt either or all, or it may provide for a combination of any two of the methods. That was done by the rule in question, and all that that rule attempts to do is to prescribe a method for ascertaining the presence of a majority, and thus establishing the fact that the House is in a condition to transact business."

"As appears from the journal, at the time this bill passed the House there was present a majority, a quorum, and the House was authorized to transact any and all business. It was in a condition to act on the bill if it desired. The other branch of the question is, whether, a quorum being present, the bill received a sufficient number of votes, and here the general rule of all parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of

the body. This has been the rule for all time, except so far as in any given case the terms of the organic act under which the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations. As, for instance, in those states where the Constitution provides that a majority of all the members elected to either House shall be necessary for the passage of any bill. No such limitation is found in the Federal Constitution, and therefore the general law of such bodies obtains."

The principle on which this decision rests is that the Constitution requires, and only requires the presence in the House of a majority of the members legally elected thereto in order that the House may transact business.

Any rule for ascertaining this fact-the presence of a majority of elected members—which is reasonably sure in practice of coming to a correct conclusion is constitutional. Once the fact of a quorum being present is ascertained, then anything which the majority of these members there present determine to do, the body, as an organization, does. The theory that, in order to pass a bill or do any other act as a representative body, a majority of the whole number of elected persons must unite in actively desiring the thing to be done; the theory, in other words, which required the majority party, which is responsible for legislation, to constantly keep a quorum of its own members in the House, however, it may be defended in the realm of politics or statesmanship, is entirely untenable in the realm of constitutional law.

The difficulty of obtaining a quorum in the present House of Representatives (without counting the quorum) after the manner of the last Congress above described, has been, we understand, very great. This, we presume, is the reason of the introduction into the House and the probable passage of the resolution above referred to, which, besides from its political aspect, raises a very nice question of constitutional law. The first and second sections of the resolution are as follows:

"1. Every member shall be present within the House during its sittings, unless excused or necessarily prevented, and shall vote on each question put unless he has a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such question.