5 L. R. H. L. 508, the plaintiff, who had originally carried on the manufacture of "Glenfield" starch at Glenfield, a little place of some sixty inhabitants, had removed his factory, retaining the name. The defendant had purchased a small lot at Glenfield, and carried on the manufacture of starch there, also using the name "Glenfield" to denote his starch.. But, in view of the fact that the whole scheme was intended to induce people to believe that the defendant's starch was the plaintiff's, an injunction against the use of the name was held proper.

So, in Thompson . Montgomery, 41 Ch. D. 35, the plaintiffs below and their predecessors had carried on a brewery in Stone (a town of Staffordshire of about six thousand inhabitants) since 1780, using the name Stone Ales" to designate their product. The defendant, who had previously sold their product, put up a brewery at Stone, and used the word "Stone" in connection with liquor of his own manufacture, with a view, in the opinion of the trial judge, to lead the public to the belief that the ales he was then selling were those of the former firm. An injunction was accordingly granted, and affirmed on appeal. The case was then carried to the House of Lords, and there the decision was reaffirmed, though there was a doubt in the minds of some of the Lords as to the question of the use of the name "Stone:" Montgomery v. Thompson [1891]. App. Cas. 217. This precise question has not yet risen in the United States; but it is to be hoped that when it does it will be decided in accordance with the just doctrine laid down above.

VII. There is another class of cases to which the foregoing reasoning applies with special force-where the goods to which the trade-name is attached are the products of only the one locality, and the plaintiff has the exclusive right to manufacture or deal there; or where the name of the locality is an arbitrary and fanciful one, as that of a mineral spring. In these cases there is every reason for holding that he has an exclusive right to the name of the locality as a trade-name. "A trade-mark may be a name adopted and used by a merchant or dealer, in order to designate the goods that he sells,

and distinguish them from those sold by another, to the end that they may be known in the market as his, and thus enable him to secure such profits as result from the celebrity of his wares, or a reputation for superior skill, industry, or enterprise, in handling the articles put on the market. Any name may be so used that he may deem appropriate, as designating the true origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed, though he may not appropriate a name indicative of the quality of his goods, which others may employ with equal truth for the same purpose. There is no conceivable reason why the name of a place may not be selected as a trade-mark, or a natural product of a spring be the subject of the protection afforded by it:" Parkland Hills Blue Lick Water Co. v. Hawkins, the principal case (Ky.), 26 S. W. Rep. 389. Accordingly the name Congress: Congress Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291; aff. S. C., 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 348; Bethesda : Dunbar v. Glenn, 42 Wis. 118; and Blue Lick: Parkland Hills Blue Lick Water Co. v. Hawkins, supra, have been held valid trade-names, and protection granted against others who attempted to use them, to the injury of the owners of the springs. In these cases, as in the "Worcestershire Sauce" case; Lea v. Wolff, I Thomp. &C., (N. Y.) 626; S. C., 46 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 157; 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 1. And the "Stone Ales" case: Thompson v. Montgomery, 41 Ch. D. 35; Montgomery v. Thompson [1891], App. Cas. 217; the use of the place name has become secondary, and denotes the product itself, rather than the place of its production.

VIII. But while the name of a place may not be used singly as a trade-name, to the exclusion of others doing business there, it may be so used in connection with other words, either the name of the dealer or manufacturer: Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere, 54 Ill. 439; or an arbitrary word or combination of words, as “Maryland Club:" Cahn v. Gottschalk, 2 N. Y. Suppl. 13. And in the same way an arbitrary use of a geographical term, to denote an article that is not in reality, nor in the nature of things could be manufactured there and sold at the place of sale, will make it a valid trade-name, as

"Vienna" bread:

(N. Y.) Pr. 92.

Fleishmann v. Schuckmann, 62 How.

IX. The results of the preceding discussion may be thus summarized: 1. A geographical term cannot be used as a trade-name to the exclusion of others doing business in the same place, and using it in good faith to designate the place of manufacture of their goods or their place of business. 2. But it may be so used as against any one who attempts to make a fraudulent use of it to the injury of the first user, whether he be an outsider or be engaged in business at the place in question. 3. When the name of the place has become so associated with the product as to lose its local force and acquire a secondary meaning denoting the special product, it will be considered a valid trade-name. 4. When so associated with other words or combinations of words, as to acquire a fanciful or arbitrary meaning, it is a good trade-name. 5. When used arbitrarily, without any possible reference to locality, it is also a good trade-name.

R. D. S.

NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES.

Demonstrative or specific legacy.

Questions as to whether a legacy is demonstrative or specific are often very difficult to answer. An illustration of this will be found in the case In re Pratt, L. R. (1894) ↑ Ch. 491. Testatrix bequeathed to her nephew "800 pounds invested in 21⁄2 consols," she did not have at the date of the will any 21⁄2 consuls, but had 1800 pounds 234 consols in the name of her deceased husband and herself.

It was contended that the case was exactly covered by Mytton v. Mytton, L. R. 19 Eq. 30, where the words were "the sum of 3000 pounds invested in Indian security," and the legacy was held to be demonstrative. Justice NORth would not say that this decision was wrong (although rendered by the unlucky Vice Chancellor MALINS) but preferred to find a distinction in the use of the word "sum" in Mytton v. Mytton. If, however, the distinction was too fine a one (as it appears to us) the learned judge had ample authority for holding the legacy specific: McClellan v. Clark, 50 L. T. (N. S.) 616; Page v. Young, L. R. 19 Eq. 501, and others to the same point. Upon the will itself, independent of the authorities, the legacy was clearly specific.

Trust-Gift by will in pursuance of promise.

We read with interest the decision in Hofner's Estate, 161 Pa. 331. Testatrix by last will left a legacy to a church, and died May 26, 1892, two days after the execution of the will. There was a prior will dated December 1, 1892, a codicil to which, executed April 12, 1888, contained an identical gift. It appeared in evidence that testatrix had received a legacy from her sister Elizabeth in 1888, who had intended to leave her property to the church, but changed her mind and left

her property to testatrix, receiving her promise that she would never use it but would dispose of it according to Elizabeth's wishes. The promise was made after the execution of the will.

The Supreme Court found the Orphans' Court of Philadel phia County in error in holding that, as the legacy was identical with that in the codicil, the legacy was not avoided by the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 332. The first and last will were entirely inconsistent.

The gift, however, was sustained on the ground that the promise of testatrix to her sister raised a trust in favor of the object, in favor of which the will would have been changed but for that promisc. As Justice DEAN would put it upon the principle of the Golden Rule, and although there was no fraud on the part of testatrix, there was none the less a trust. Justice MITCHELL, in dissenting, vigorously remarks: "I do not understand that equity, even under the benign administration of the longest footed chancellor, undertakes to enforce moral obligations in the length and breadth of the Golden Rule, and it is important that we should keep its boundaries carefully marked. If it was to be enforced as an obligation, the church should be required to file its bill, prove the consideration, the contract or trust, and the failure to perform as in other cases."

The decision of the court appears to have been a good natured effort to save the gift to the church. But the theory is hardly sustained by the evidence. There is absolutely nothing to show that Elizabeth even intended to alter her will when the promise was made.

Orphans' Court-Religious use.

We are tempted to go back to Knight's Estate, 159 Pa. 500, and note the decided enlargement of the definition of a religious use as understood by the law of Pennsylvania. Testator left $1000 to the Friendship Liberal League, organized under the General Incorporation Act of April 29, 1874. "for the purpose of uniting the persons so to be incorporated socially, for the improvement of their intellectual and moral condition by the dissemination of scientific truths by means of literature,