the law upon the Bench, we cannot have in too great degree and the State is to be congratulated that so many of its judges have possessed these characteristics. The decision of Britton v. Turner, in Vol. 6 N. H. Reports, at page 481, on the entirety of contracts indicates these qualities and is greatly to be commended.

The biographies are interesting also as marking the change which has manifested itself in the profession within the last thirty years. In the carlier days the important questions of law arising from the necessity of adopting the common law to the affairs of our new country offered a field in which the ablest lawyers of New Hampshire labored faithfully and well.

As a result the decisions of New Hampshire courts are a high authority upon points of common law practice and procedure and upon the fundamental principles of the law of contracts, torts, equity and real estate.

But with the establishment of these fundamental principles and their crystallization into decisions repeatedly sustained, the profession has ceased to find within the State a field which could develop and occupy the best abilities of its members.

For the main occupation of the lawyer to-day is the protection of property rights already established. The great questions of public rights and to an extensive degree also of private rights have been passed upon and defined in all the States. Questions as to commercial rights and powers are in the main the sources of activity upon which the lawyer in any State can depend for occupation. And in the smaller States or one where the growth of business has been comparatively small or confined within narrow channels, there have not arisen new questions of property rights or questions upon which depended large financial interests.

The only exceptions have been those of railway or manufacturing corporation law, and there the precedents in other States have been clear and well established. As a consequence young men of promise have not been attracted into the profession from other States, but on the contrary young men of promise in the State have been attracted out of it, and so as a further consequence the decisions of its courts and the

arguments of its lawyers are not of the importance or interest that they have been.

But as portraits of men who from small beginnings and with few advantages worked themselves up into commanding position among their cotemporaries, they are interesting, and it cannot be gainsaid that the lawyers whose labors are here described were men who fearlessly, faithfully and with signal ability discharged the duties which they were called on to perform.

The printing, paper and binding are unexceptionable, as is usually the case with work from the Riverside Press. Manchester, N. H.

G. W.

THE ANNUAL Of the Law of Real ProperTY. Edited by TILGHMAN E. BALLARD and EMERSON E. BALLARD. Vol. 2. Crawfordville, Ind.: The Ballard Publishing Co. 1893.

Legal literature has reached the point where compendiums of particular branches of the law, if well done, have an assured place. The second volume of the Messrs. BALLARD's work brings the law of Real Property down to the present year, continuing from Volume I begun a year carlier. As we said, in reviewing the first volume, the only true test of the success of such a production is the demand for it, and there is every evidence that this one has already met with that success.

Volume II contains a smaller number of cases reported in full than the previous volume. It is to our mind a mistake to insert the full report of any cases. The real use of a work of this kind is to direct the practitioner to the authorities for which he is in search, not to reproduce those authorities. It is upon the reports themselves that a lawyer must ultimately rely. The province of compendiums is to guide him by a short cut to his goal. The Ballard Annual does this far better than any mere digest can do, for on account of its elaborate arrangement and index, and especially the fact that something more than dry and insufficient syllabi are given, a far more correct estimate is given of the importance of the original cases, and whether or not they are applicable to the point being studied.

W. S. E.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER

AND

REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER, 1894.

THE LEGAL SIDE OF THE STRIKE QUESTION.

By ARDEMUS STEWART, Esq.

The strike is one of the most prominent elements in the problem of the relation of capital to labor-cspecially prominent in view of the occurrences of the past few months—and therefore one of the most important phenomena of our present social condition. A state of affairs that permits a few men to dictate whether or not the business of a whole section of country shall continue or cease, and that renders a presumably intelligent body of men the slaves of the dictators, is surely of no ordinary consequence in a theoretically free country, to say nothing of the disastrous results to the individual inhabitants of the region affected. And when to this is added the wanton trampling on the rights of others, the reckless destruction of property, and the criminal disregard and violation of the sacredness of human life, that have characterized the more recent strikes in a higher degree than any preceding, it is clear that the problem demands most carnest attention from every patriotic citizen, and that our national existence depends in no small measure upon its satisfactory solution. As a broad question, this belongs to the domain of the student of political economy; but in view of the fact that the rampant growth of the evil has been due in large degree to a misapprehension of its legal bearings, as well as to criminal negligence on the

part of the constituted authorities, a survey of the legal questions involved would seem to be both timely and profitable.

cause.

In its simplest form, a strike is the mere refusal of an employé, or rather, of a body of employés, to work for the employer for whom they have contracted to work. In that case there is nothing criminal. Every man has a right to work for whom he pleases, and to refuse to work if he pleases; subject, however, to damages for breach of contract. The morality of a strike, however, depends entirely upon its If for any breach of contract on the part of the employer, or because the contract is an unfair one, it is perfectly justifiable; but if on the other hand, the contract was fair, and the employer has performed his part of it in good faith, a breach by the laborer is equally unjustifiable. For instance, if the employer has taken advantage of the necessity of the employé to hire him at a price too low to afford him a fair subsistence, or if he refuse to pay him wages due, a strike with the object of forcing him to fair terms, or to pay those wages, would be proper. But if the terms of employment are fair, and the wages are duly paid, a strike for the purpose of obtaining higher wages, less hours of work, the employment of only a certain class of laborers, and the like, is wholly inexcusable, even if not within any legal prohibition.

But there is another phase of the question. A mere strike is not the most efficient means of bringing an employer to terms. He can, as a general rule, hire other laborers, and go on with little or no inconvenience. Accordingly, what is known as the boycott has been devised, which consists in preventing the use or sale of the goods manufactured or produced by the employer; and is frequently enforced by causing a strike among the employés of those who use or buy his goods. This carries the matter a step farther; and is a naked interference with the personal rights of the employers, without the shadow of an excuse on the part of the strikers, except that the end justifies the means. This, in so far as those concerned may be considered as conspiring together, is open to the animadversion of the law. Such acts

are not, as was very forcibly said by Justice Beach of New York, in a recent case, as yet unreported, "indicative of strife between capital and labor, but of one between order and disorder, or between right and wrong. They impair and seriously affect the constitutional privilege to pursue lawful business without hindrance or molestation, and that privilege must be fully protected and firmly upheld."

Finally, there is another form of strike that has not yet had time to reach a complete development and show its full possibilities; but fortunately for the welfare of the nation, it probably never will until the insane portion of the population outnumbers the sane. This is the so-called “sympathetic" strike, which appears to consist in a cessation of work, for no other reason than that thereby the interests of the people at large may be so imperilled that they will rise on their dignity and compel some employer, between whom and his employés a difference exists, to accede to the demands of the latter. It supposes no grievance on the part of the striker, no dispute between him and his employer; but is utterly causeless and irrational. It is difficult to bring it within the purview of the law, as it is so senseless a proceeding as to have never entered the mind of legislator or judge until the labor leaders sprung it upon their attention; but its instigators, if not the strikers themselves, are guilty of criminal conspiracy.

The recent Chicago strike passed through all these stages, and its history shows very clearly their nature and operation. It began with a strike pure and simple. Some employés of the Pullman Car Company were not satisfied with their wages, and stopped work. Then, in order to render that strike successful, the leaders of the American Railway Union endeavored to prevent the use of Pullman cars, by ordering its members to strike on all roads using them. That was a boycott. Then, that not having the desired effect, the members of the union on roads not using Pullman cars were ordered to strike. That was a sympathetic strike. Then all the labor unions in Chicago were ordered to strike, under the silly impression that the people would be so injured