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insolvent, its assets should be gathered at the domicile and 654 bencficial organization doing business in several states becomes insolvent, and a receiver of all its estate is appointed by a court of the state in which it was incorporated, a receiver appointed in one of the other states is not bound to pay over to him the reserve fund held by its branches in that state, though claimed by the general receiver for general distribution among certificate holders, but those funds should be retained for distribution in their own state, on the election of the certificate holders to treat the contract as rescinded and demand a return of the payments thereon. The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow a similar claim made by a general receiver appointed for the state against local receivers, unless the former could show that their authority extended to the local branches, and that the property in the hands of the latter belonged to the Supreme Sitting and not to the local branches: Weiner v. Sturgiss, 29 Atl. Rep. 613. These decisions, however, are rather questionable innovations on the general rule in such cases. which is, as truly said by Hamersley, J., in his dissenting opinion in the Connecticut case, that when a corporation is chartered by a single state, and does a lawful insurance business in other states, through agencies, and becomes
there distributed according to the principles of equity.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Nebraska v.
Iowa, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 396, has lately reasserted
the general rule, that when the middle of a stream is the boundary between two estates, and the water under mines the bank on either side, so that it caves in, the owner of the land stands the loss, and the middle of the stream is still the boundary, but that if the stream makes itself a wholly new bed by cutting across a bend or neck, the middle of the old bed remains the boundary, though dry: Bouvier Stricklett, 59 N. W. Rep. 550. And the Supreme Court of Indiana has ruled, that land described as bounded by the line of a railroad extended to the line of rails, if the grantos
could convey so far, and not simply to the right of way: Reid v. Klein, 37 N. E. Rep. 967.
The constantly mooted question as to the liability of common carriers with connecting lines has been considerably
elucidated by the published decisions of the past
month. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that such carriers do not become joint carriers by establishing joint or through tariffs or rates, but the one receiving the goods becomes the agent of the others to contract for carriage over their respective lines: Wehmann v. Minn., St. P. & S. M. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 546. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has decided that when connecting carriers are partners in the transportation of freight, the initial carrier cannot by contract limit its liability for injuries to through freight to such injuries only as occur on its lines: Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilbanks, 27 S. W. Rep. 302; and the Supreme Court of Michigan has taken the ground that when a shipper knows that his goods must be delivered to a connecting line, and agrees that after the goods leave the receiving road it shall be treated as a forwarder only, the receiving road will not be liable for a conversion by the connecting line: McEacheran v. Mich. Cent. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 612. Apropos of the general subject of liability, the Supreme Court of Minnesota also held, in the case from that state last cited, that a stipulation that a common carrier should be relieved from liability needs a consideration to make it binding; that the mere receipt of goods and undertaking to carry them is not such a consideration; and that no abatement or concession in rates, when forbidden by law, can form a sufficient consideration: Weh. mann v. R. R., supra. But the Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that a statute, which provides that a common carrier shall be liable for any loss caused by its own negligence, or that of any connecting carrier, does not prohibit a carrier from contracting with the shipper against liability beyond its own line: McCann v. Eddy, 27 S. W. Rep. 541.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the board
of county commissioners is a corporation, capable of taking
a devise for the establishment of a home for the
benefit of worthy homeless people and orphans: Comrs. of Rush Co. v. Dinwiddie, 37 N.. E. Rep. 795.
The same court has also ruled that in considering the constitutionality of a statute, the court has no right to take into
consideration its justice, advisability and policy:
Statc cx rel. Smith v. McLellan, 37 N. E. Rep. 799. The Supremc Court of New Hampshire holds that, when the constitution provides that the housc of representatives shall be judge of the returns, election and qualifications of its members, no court is authorized to order or advise the clerk as to whose name shall be placed on the roll : Bingham v. Jewett, 29 Atl. Rep. 694 ; the Supreme Court of Minnesota, that a statute which requires street railway companies to protect motormen from the wcather by an inclosure for that purpose, is constitutional : Statc v. Hoskins, 59 N. W. Rep. 545; and the Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Dept., that a statute amending a statute already superseded by an amending statute is valid when the evident intention was to amend the amendatory statutc, and not the amended statute: Peo. v. Upson, 29 N. Y. Suppl. 615. With this last casc may be compared an annotation on the effect of an amending statute, in i Am. L. Roy & Rev. (N. S.), 566-571.
The statute of frauds continues to receive its full share of attention. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided that
the verbal promise of A to B, to indemnify him if
he will become surety for C for a debt of the latter to D, is not a promise on the part of A to answer for the debt of C within the statute: Minick v. Huff, 59 N. W. Rep. 795; and the Supreme Court of Michigan, that a written order to insert an advertisement is such a written contract as to exclude cvidence of a contemporanсous parol agreement that if the advertisement did not suit, it could be discontinued at any time: Cohen v. Jackoboice, 59 N. W. Rep. 665. On the general subject of contracts, the Appellate Court of Indiana has held, in opposition to Davis v. Shafer, 50 Fed. Rep. 764.
that a cuntract of subscription which provides that the subscribers would pay the buildicr of a factory a certain amount, and stating the amount of their respective subscriptions thereto, is several, not joint: Davis & Rankin Mfg. Co. ?'. Booth. 37 X. E. Rep. 818. The Supreme Court of Michigan has decided that an order taken by the plaintiff's agent from defendant for the purchase of goods from the plaintiff, subject to plaintiff's approval, was a unilateral contract, subject to countermand by defendant at any time before acceptance, though the order cxpressly stated that it was not so subject; that a letter from defendant to plaintiff, reciting that plaintiff had received an order from defendant for an article, and asking him to hold it until further notice, was a countermand; and that mailing a postal to defendant accepting the order, before receiving notice of the countermand, made the contract complete: Peck v. Freeze, 59 N. W. Rcp. 600. The Supreme Court of Indiana, following the weight of authority and rejecting Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, has adopted the doctrine that a water company, that agrees to supply water to a city to extinguish fires, is not liable to a private person whose property is destroyed in consequence of its failure to furnish water, as he is not a party to the contract: Fitch v. Seymour Water Co., 37 N. E. Rep. 982. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has repeated the well-settled rule that a wise may avoid her contract, extorted by a threatened criminal prosecution of her husband, on the ground of duress: City Natl. Bk. of Dayton v. Kusworm, 59 N. W. Rep. 564; and the Supreme Court of Nebraska has ruled that the defence of insanity may be set up to an action on a contract, without restoring what thc insane person receives thercunder, if its restoraion in specic is impossible: Rca v. Bishop, 57 N. W. Rep. 555.
The court last mentioned has also decided that when the officers of a corporation are shown to have abused their trust,
to the great damage of the corporation, in the Corporations
interest of another corporation, of which they were and still are managing officers, any stockholder of the corporation wronged may bring an action in his own name for the.
benefit of that corporation against the other corporation for redress of such grievances and for an accounting between the two corporations; and may join both corporations as defendants: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & Mallory Constr. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 838. The Supreme Court of Michigan has come to the conclusion that when three persons agree to build a railroad, and form a corporation for that purposc, two of them to furnish the capital, the third to have general charge of the construction, and the road to be sold when built and the pro-ceeds equally divided, the third person could bind the corporation for supplies uscd in constructing the road, though not acting by any corporate authority: Mich. Slate Co. v. Iron Range & H. B. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 646; and that an injunction should not issue at the suit of a receiver to enjoin a creditor, who has garnished certain funds of the debtor corporation, from proceeding with his suit, as he has a right to be heard in such proceedings as to his right to the funds garnished: Baldwin '. Hosmer, 59 N. W. Rep. 669. On appcal from an order appointing a receiver, the Supreme Court of Washington does not consider itself limited to the jurisdiction of the appointing court, but will deterniine whether the order appealed from was authorized by the law and the facts: Roberts v. Wash. Natl. Bk., 37 Pac. Rep. 26. According to the Supreme Court of California, an indictment of an officer of a corporation for making false entries, if it set out the entrics in hacc verba, and allege them to be falsc, nccd not statc wherein they were false : Peo. v. Leonard, 37 Pac. Rep. 222; and the Supreme Court of Texas has decided that a private corporation may be sucd for causing death, under a statute which provides that an action for damages may be brought “ when the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness, or default of another": Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency, 27 S. W. Rep. 126.
The Supreme Court of Indiana holds to the doctrine that a deed to the "heirs" of a living person is void for uncer
tainty as to grantees: Booker ®. Tarwater,