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This has been adopted as the correct view in a majority of the courts that have had occasion to pass on the question : Magner v. Peo., 97 Ill. 320; State v. Randolph, 1 Mo. App. 15; S. C., 3 Cent. L. J. 187; N. Y. Ass'n for Protection of Game v. Durham, 19 J. & S. 306; Roth v. State, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 62; S. C. aff., 37 N. E. Rep. 259; and the same rule has been applied to game killed in the state and kept in cold storage: State v. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524; and to trout artificially propagated: Comm. v. Gilbert, 35 N. E. Rep. 454.

In refreshing contrast is the terse epigrammatic language of Chief Justice Paxson, in Comm. v. Wilkenson, 139 Pa. 298; S. C., 27 W. N. C. 160; 21 Atl. Rep. 14; to the effect that the object of the act being the preservation of game within the commonwealth, the court could not assume that it was intended to preserve game elsewhere; and that it would be a forced construction to hold that it was intended to exclude from the markets of the state game killed in other states, where, by the laws of those states, the killing was lawful. This view has been adopted by the courts of Michigan: Pro. v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325; S. C., 39 N.W. Rep. 1; and of Massachusetts: Comm. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410. See also, Allen v. Young, 76 Me. 80.

There is a stronger objection to this doctrine, however, than that stated above. Many, if not all, of the statutes on this question punish the possession of game out of season; and it is submitted, that any law forbidding the possession of an article by a person into whose hands it has come lawfully, is an interference with the right of personal property beyond the power of any legislative body.

The judicial scrutiny of gambling transactions seems to grow steadily more severe, and any qualification of the conGaming Con- tract, which affects the absolute ownership of the

tract vendee, or evinces an intention to settle on the basis of differences in price, is eagerly seized upon as a badge of illegality. The Supreme Court of California, in the most recent case on the subject, Sheeky v. Skinn, 37 Pac. Rep. 393, has ruled, that an agreement between vendor and vendee for

the sale of stock upon payment of a part of the agreed price, with a stipulation that it should be retained by the vendor as security for the balance, and only be delivered upon full payment, and that the vendor should have the right to sell it at any time, without notice to the vendee, if it should so depreciate in the market as to be worth less than three times the unpaid balance, is a sale on margin and for future delivery, and void; and equally that an agreement that the defendant should act as agent for plaintiff in buying stock for her from third parties, and pay the whole price therefor, two-thirds of which was advanced by the plaintiff, with a stipulation that the stock should be held by the defendant until the balance was paid, and as collateral security for the balance due on other stock, the title to remain in defendant while so held by him,—was a sale on margin. This case seems very near the border line.

Guardian and

It has been decided by the Surrogate's Court of Cattaraugus County, New York, that when a minor, ten years old, has been brought up by a married woman, who Ward has treated him as a son, and to whom he is very much attached, the custody of the minor will not be taken away from her and given to his guardian: Wentz's Estate, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 211.

Injunction

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has very justly ruled that when subscriptions have been secured for the purpose of building a church at a particular place, as a memorial to a certain person, an injunction will issue to restrain the church society from tearing down that building, and removing the material to a different place, for use in a building to be erected by such society at the latter place: Cushman v. Church of Good Shepherd, 29 Atl. Rep. 872.

In the case of The Willamette Valley, 62 Fed. Rep. 293. the District Court for the Northern District of California has decided an interesting question as to the conflict Jurisdiction of jurisdiction between the state and federal courts, by holding that a steamship owned by an insolvent corpora

tion, and in possession of a receiver of the property of the corporation appointed by a state court, but employed by him in transporting merchandise and passengers in connection with the usual business of the corporation, between a port in the state and a port in another state, is not exempt, by any rule of comity, as in custodia legis, from maritime liens incurred in such other states, and seizure to enforce such liens by libel in the federal courts.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas has just decided, that when a lessee of a quarry agreed to pay a certain royalty on all rock sold, to furnish the lessor with copies of all con

Lease Forfeiture

tracts to deliver rock, to work the mine in a workmanlike manner, and to do a reasonable amount of work, and also agreed that a failure to perform any of these agreements should, at the option of the plaintiff, forfeit the lease; when the lessee used the quarry for two years, furnished no copies of contracts, and did not pay all the rent, but performed all the other covenants, while the plaintiff demanded no copies, till a short time before bringing action, and demanded and received rent many times after a failure to pay according to the terms of the lease; and when the lessee tendered copies of the contracts and all rents due at the commencement of the action—that under such circumstances the plaintiff must be considered to have waived his right to a forfeiture: Little Rock Granite Co. v. Shell, 27 S. W. Rep. 562.

License

In Fish v. Capwell, 29 Atl. Rep. 840, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds, in opposition to the general view, that an instrument purporting to convey all the standing wood on a certain lot of land, “with two years from date hereof, to cut and remove said wood," does not convey any interest in the land, but is a merc license or executory contract, revocable at any time before the wood is cut, and is revoked by the grantor's conveyance of the land to another. This may be true as to contracts in which the consideration is a royalty on the wood cut; but could not be justly applied to the sale of standing timber for a lump sum. In that case the contract would be executed by the pay

ment of the consideration, or if payable in futuro, perhaps by the very fact of its being so fixed and determinate; and while it is unnecessary to hold that the buyer had an interest in the land, he would have the right of ingress and egress to cut and remove his property, just as in the case of a sale of standing grain, or potatoes in the ground.

Master and

The House of Lords, in Hewlett v. Allen, [1894] App. Cas. 383, has laid down a rule that will be of great interest to all those concerned in the [in]voluntary relief associaServant tions that have been established in connection with many large corporations. The plaintiff, on entering the service of the defendant, had signed an agreement to conform to all the rules and regulations of the defendant's works, one of which was that all employés should become members of the sick and accident club. In accordance with the rules of this club, weekly payments were made to the club treasurer by the firm on account of each employé, and from the fund thus established relief was given to members in case of sickness or accident. The plaintiff received each week a ticket, showing the gross amount of wages due her, and a weekly deduction on account of the payment to the club, the balance alone being paid her. She never required and never received any relief from the fund. After leaving the employ of the defendant she brought an action to recover the amount thus retained, alleging that it was in violation of the English statute, providing that "the entire amount of the wages earned by or payable to any artificer... shall be actually paid to such artificer in the current coin of this realm and not otherwise." But the lords held, affirming [1892] 2 Q. B. 662, that the retention of the club dues was not unlawful, on the principle that any payment made by an employer, at the instance of a person employed, to discharge some obligation of the employé, or to place the money in the hands of some person in whose hands the person employed wishes it to be placed, is as much a payment in current coin" as if put in the hands of the employé himself.

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The District Court for the District of Maryland has recently held that a stevedore, bringing the baggage of a passenger on

board a steamship, and placing it where requested by the passenger, is not exercising an independent employment, but is performing a duty which rests on the ship; and it is the duty of the ship's officers to see that risk of accidents to persons on board is avoided: Unitus v. The Dresden, 62 Fed. Rep. 438.

In the opinion of the House of Lords, the failure of a station master to detain a train at the request of a passenger, in order to give an opportunity for arresting persons by whom the passenger has been robbed, and for the recovery of the property stolen, crcates no cause of action against the company: Cobb v. Great Western Ry. Co., ||1894] App. Cas. 419.

The Supreme Court of Washington has lately afforded a curious instance of the judicial propensity to give an unsound reason for a just decision. In Anderson v. Guincan, 37 Pac. Rep. 449, that court held, that a substitute, hired by an employé, stands in the place of the latter, with all of its responsibilities and liabilities, so far as the master is concerned, and a fellow servant with the employé is a fellow servant with the substitute, though no contractual relation exists between the substitute and the master, and though the employé alone is responsible for the wages of the substitute. This doctrine is wholly untenable. It would lead to monstrous results if an employé could thus, by his own act, burden the master with responsibility for the acts of a substitute of whose employment he is ignorant. The master was not liable in the case under discussion, it is truc, but because there was no privity between him and the substitute, not because the other servants of the master were fellow servants of the substitute. Or, if this view be preferred, the substitute was a mere licensee, or perhaps a trespasser, to whom the master owed no duty. On the other hand, if the master is ever liable to third persons for the acts of such a substitute, it is not on the ground that the act of the substitute is the act of the master, but that the master, in allowing the substitute to act, though ignorant of the fact of his acting, failed to perform a duty with which he was charged.

The Superior Court of New York City has reasserted the doctrine, abundantly substantiated by the cases cited, that the

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