by the widow of a decedent that she will take his body to a certain place for burial, unless his mother assigns Duress a policy on decedent's life to her, is not such duress as will vitiate the assignment: Jewelers' League of City of New York v. De Forest, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 88. Easements, Necessity The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has lately ruled, that when one conveys to a railroad company a right of way through his land, so as to cut off access Ways of to a part thereof, he has a right of way of necessity over the land conveyed: N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 38 N. E. Rep. 27; but the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held, that no right of way from necessity exists across the remaining land of a grantor, when the land to which such right of way is claimed is surrounded on three sides by the sea: Kingsley v. Gouldsborough Land Imp. Co., 29 Atl. Rep. 1074. The same has been held in the case of a grant of an island: Lawton v. Rivers, 2 McCord (S. C.), 445; Turnbull v. Rivers, 3 McCord (S. C.), 131. Evidence, The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Johnson v. State, 16 So. Rep. 99, reasserts the principle of evidence, abundantly supported by the cases cited, that when a declaration of the deccased, made when he is not in fear Declarations of immediate death, is subsequently reaffirmed by him when he believes death to be imminent, or "in the consciousness of impending dissolution," it is admissible as a dying declaration, though not re-read to him at the time of reaffirm ance. The same doctrine was held in Peo. v. Crews, (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 367. Of course, if the declaration is read over to the deceased before its reaffirmance, there is no doubt as to its admissibility: Million v. Com., (Ky.), 25 S. W. Rep. 1059. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently decided, that photographs, taken three hours after the com Photographs mission of a homicide, showing the condition of the premises on the discovery of the crime, and satisfactorily verified, are admissible, though the killing be admitted, as they may naturally be expected to aid the jury in understanding the situation of affairs at the time and place of the commission of the crime: Com. v. Robertson, 38 N. E. Rep. 25. Extradition The Supreme Court of New York, following the Rauscher Case, 119 U. S. 407, holds that under the extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britafn, a person extradited from England for assault with intent to murder, cannot be convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm. The judge who delivered the opinion (on habeas corpus, at special term) expressly declined to pass upon the question as to the effect of a conviction of a less crime involved in that upon the accusation of which extradition was had, on the ground that under the New York statute the latter crime was not included in the former, and that, therefore, that question did not enter into the case. He declined to discharge the prisoner, however, and remanded him to await the decision of the general term on the legality of the conviction: Peo. v. Hannan, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 370. It is to be hoped that that decision will be against the prisoner, in order that the questionable decision in the Rauscher case may have a thorough re-examination, and, if possible, a reversal. See remarks upon this case in an article entitled, "The Right to Try an Extradited Criminal for an Offence other than that Specified in the Extradition Proceedings," in 28 Am. L. Rev. 568. Political Judge Morrow, of the District Court for the Northern District of California, has recently held, in the case of the Salvadorian fugitives, In re Eseta, &c., 62 Fed. Rep. Offences 964, that the jurisdiction of a judge, sitting as a committing magistrate in a case in which fugitives are charged with extraditable crimes, is in no way affected by, and he will not inquire into, the manner in which the persons so charged came or were brought into the United States; and in In re Ezeta, &c., 62 Fed. Rep. 972, that the committing magistrate has jurisdiction, and it is his duty, to determine whether the offence charged is political, and not subject to extradition; that offences committed by officers of the party in possession of the government, during the progress of an attempted revolution, and the existence of active hostilities between the contending parties, are political, and not extraditable; and that offences within the jurisdiction of military law, which for the time being supersedes the common law, are not extraditable. Fraud, The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has ruled in Simmang v. Harris, 27 S. W. Rep. 786, that a sale of land will not be rescinded on the ground of fraud merely because Rescission the grantor, in the abstract of title furnished the vendee before the sale, omitted a portion of a will, which is claimed to restrict the title of the grantor to a life estate, when the will is on record, and the construction of the part omitted involves a technical knowledge of the law. Game The Supreme Court of Minnesota has ranged itself on the side of those who claim that the laws forbidding the possession of game out of scason apply to game killed lawfully, either in the state of sale, and kept in storage, or imported from a state having a different close season: State v. Rodman, 59 N. W. Rep. 1098. The cases on this subject are collected in 1 Aм. L. Reg. & Rev. (N. S.) 751. Garnishment The Supreme Court of Alabama has very properly decided in a recent case, that when a police officer illegally arrests a person, and takes possession of his money and effects, these are not subject to garnishment in the hands of such officer by a creditor of the person arrested, there being no contractual relation between the officer and such person: Cunningham v. Baker, 16 So. Rep. 68; and the Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled, that a "commercial traveller," whose business it is to travel and sell goods for his employer, though employed and paid for his services by the day, is not a "day laborer," and his wages are not therefore exempt from garnishment under Ga. Code, § 3554 In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa, when two persons are charged in the same indictment with murder in the first degree, the conviction of one of murder Homicide in the second degree will not prevent the trial of the other for the crime as charged in the indictment: State v. Lec, 60 N. W. Rep. 119. Insurance In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, as expressed in Havens v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 27 S. W Rep. 718, the words "wholly destroyed," used in reference to a building, in either a statute or an insurance policy, must be taken to mean that the building is totally destroyed, as such, though there is not an absolute extinction of all its parts, and that a building is none the less "wholly destroyed "because part of the machinery had been removed therefrom pending repairs, and stored in another building, not exposed to the fire. There is a very valuable article on the effect of these words, in relation to insurance, by M. C. Phillips, Esq., in 33 Cent. L. J. 319. Interstate The Supreme Court of Alabama, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537; S. C., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 687, has Rendition lately reaffirmed the rule that a person extradited from another state of the Union may be tried on a charge other than that on which he was extradited, without first being tried on the latter, or given a chance to return to the state which surrendered him: Carr v. State, 16 So. Rep. 150, 155 One would have thought that the decision of the Supreme Court would have settled this question finally, especially as it was so thoroughly consonant with principle and with the weight of prior authority. But it seems to be a stock subject of exception in all cases to which it applies, something like the general exception in civil cases, “because the judge failed to charge in favor of the defendant." The general rule has also been upheld recently in State v. Kealy, (Iowa), 56 N. W. Rep. 283. on the authority of State v. Ross, 21 Iowa, 467, a case of kidnapping; a conviction of petit larceny has been held valid where the defendant was surrendered on a charge of grand larceny: State v. Walker, (Mo.), 24 S. W. Rep. 1011; and a similar conviction for a less crime was held legal in Comm. v. Johnston, (Pa.), 2 D. R. 673; S. C., 12 Pa. C. C. 263. It has been ruled, in Minnesota, that the mere fact of interstate rendition will not exempt the defendant from civil prosecution while detained under such proceedings, though, of course, it would be different if the rendition process were a mere contrivance to bring the defendant within the reach of civil process; and that the principle of public policy which exempts a witness or party appearing voluntarily from the service of civil process in such cases, in order to further the ends of justice by encouraging such appearance, does not apply when the presence of the party is compulsory: Reid v. Ham, 56 N. W. Rep. 35; S. C., 54 Minn. 305. The cases on the subject will be found collected in an article on this and kindred subjects, in 28 Am. L. Rev. 568. tion Both the Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Civil Appeals of the same state agree, that a judge is not disquali fied from hearing a case, merely because his Judge, Disqualifica- brother, who is attorney for one of the parties, has a contingent interest in the result of the suit, due to his having agreed with his client for a contingent fee: Winston v. Masterson, 27 S. W. Rep. 691, 768. This is a very sensible view of the matter, much more reasonable than the decision in Howell v. Budd, 91 Cal. 342; S. C., 27 Pac. Rep. 747, where it was held that the sons of a judge, who agree to try a case for a contingent fee, are parties within the meaning of the statute, sufficient to disqualify their father from trying the case. There is no affinity between the blood relations of the husband and the blood relations of the wife; and hence the brother of the husband may lawfully preside at the trial of the wife's brother for the commission of a crime: Exp. Harris, 26 Fla. 77. A judge, the brother-in-law of a stockholder of a corporation, who is also its president, is not disqualified by that relation to try a suit to which the corporation is a party: |