Lewis v. Hillsboro Roller Mill Co., (Tex.), 27 S. W. Rep. 338. So, also, a guardian ad litem is not a party to the suit, but an officer of the court; and a surrogate is not disqualified to act on the probate of a will, because his brother has been appointed guardian ad litem of an infant party: In re Van Wagonen's Will, 69 Hun. 365; S. C., 23 N. Y. Suppl. 636.

Jury

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, when jurors, after agreeing on a verdict, and before its return, go into a saloon, and are there treated by lawyers for both sides, such conduct is no cause for a new trial, since both parties are in pari delicto: McLaughlin v. Hinds, 38 N. E. Rep. 136. Quere, as to the effect if one lawyer stood more of the expense than the other, or if one, on the plea of having no money, got the other to stand the whole treat?

Lease,

The Chancery Division of England has recently decided, that a covenant in a lease that the lessee will not carry on a business similar to that of another tenant of the Covenant same lessor, is not violated by maintaining a lunch counter for the sale of tea, coffee, pastry and cold meat, without a license for the sale of intoxicants, while the other tenant carried on a regular licensed restaurant, for the sale of all sorts of eatables and liquors, the former establishment being also much smaller, and the prices considerably lower: Drew v. Guy, [1894] 3 Ch. 25.

Mandamus,

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has lately passed upon a rather unusual state of affairs, arising from a modesty one does not look for nowadays in a public official. Acceptance of The office of governor of that state had become Office vacant, and the duty of filling the vacancy devolved upon the president of the Senate, who, however, refused to accept. But the court held that he might be compelled by mandamus to perform the duties of the office: Barnard v. Taggart, 29 Atl. Rep. 1027. This is in line with the rule which holds that mandamus will lie to compel the acceptance of a municipal office by one who, possessing the necessary

qualifications, has been duly elected thereto: Peo. v. Williams, (III.), 33 N. E. Rep. 849.

Award of

The Supreme Court of Washington holds, in conformity with the general rule, that a municipal corporation will not be compelled by mandamus to award a contract to Contract the lowest bidder for city work, even though such contracts are by law required to be let to the lowest bidder: Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 37 Pac. Rep. 695. A fortiori, when there is no such statutory obligation, mandamus will not lie: State v. Lincoln Co., 35 Neb. 346; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 147; State v. Dixon Co., 24 Neb. 106; S. C., 37 N. W. Rep. 936.

According to the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Scoville, 62 Fed,

Master Rep. 730, the wanton and malicious use of the and Servant steam whistle of a locomotive, by servants of a railroad company, who are in charge of the locomotive, while it is in motion on a regular or authorized run, is an act within the scope of their employment, so far as to charge the company with liability for injuries caused thereby.

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Gregory v. Lee, 30 Atl. Rep. 53, has ruled, that when a minor contracts for the lease of a room, and leaves after occupying

Minors it for part of the period covered by the lease, he

cannot be compelled to pay for the remaining time; because, granting that the room was a necessary, the contract therefore was still liable to be rescinded at the election of the minor, and was in fact so rescinded by his ceasing to occupy the room.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holds, that when a municipal body has lawful authority to issue bonds or other negotiable securities, dependent only upon Municipal Corporations, the adoption of certain preliminary proceedings, Estoppel and the adoption of those proceedings is certified, on the face of the bonds, by the body to which the law entrusts the power, and upon which it imposes the duty, to ascertain, determine and certify this fact, before or at the time

of issuing the bonds, such a certificate will estop the municipality, as against a bona fide purchaser of the bonds, from proving its falsity, in order to defeat them: Nat. L. Ins. Co. of Montpelier v. Board of Education of City of Huron, 62 Fed. Rep. 778.

Contracts,

Injunction

While, as we have seen, the Supreme Court of Washington denies the right of the lowest bidder on a municipal contract to maintain mandamus to compel the award of the contract to him, it acknowledges the fact that if such bidder be a tax-payer, he may sue as such to enjoin the performance of a contract awarded to a higher bidder, though his action is prompted by other considerations than his liability to excessive taxation: Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 37 Pac. Rep. 695. This decision is an extension of the doctrine asserted in Mazet v. Pittsburg, 137 Pa. 548; S. C., 20 Atl. Rep. 693. The Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware has lately held, that coasting on the streets of a town is a public nuisance, irrespective of an ordinance of the city council Negligence declaring it to be such; and that the neglect of the police to abate the nuisance will not render the town liable to one injured by a person coasting, while passing along the street: Wilmington v. Vandegrift, 29 Atl. Rep. 1047.

Powers,

The Queen's Bench Division has decided, that a bungalow, constructed of wood and corrugated iron, erected on a piece of land, for the purpose of exhibition and sale, not Buildings used or occupied, nor intended to be used or occupied on the spot where erected, is not a wooden structure, or erection of a movable or temporary character, under the English statute, and does not require a license for its erection : London County Council v. Humphreys, Ltd., [1894] 2 Q. B. 755.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota has also recently rendered an interesting decision in regard to the powers of municipal corporations over property within their limits, in City of Sioux Falls v. Kelly, 60 N. W. Rep. 156, to the effect that: (1) A municipal corporation possesses only these powers, viz. those granted in express terms; those necessarily and fairly implied, or incident to the powers expressly granted;

and those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable. (2) The right of a person to exercise dominion over his own property, and to build upon and improve the same, in accordance with the general laws of the land and municipal ordinances applicable alike to all citizens of a city, is secured by the fundamental principles of the constitution; and he cannot be compelled by the municipal government under which he lives to hold that right subject to the power of granting or refusing a permit to build upon or otherwise improve his property, vested in a city building inspector, from whose decision there is no appeal. (3) According to these principles a municipal ordinance, which prescribes that before any person can erect any building, or any addition thereto, within the city limits, he must first apply to and obtain from the city building inspector a permit, to be granted or refused at his pleasure, providing for no appeal from his decision, and subjecting the owner to a ́ penalty in case he builds without such permit, violates the constitutional rights of the citizen, in that it makes the right of the owner of property to improve and use the sanie dependent upon the decision of the city building inspector, and is therefore void. This, of course, applies only where, as in the present case, there is no express grant of a power to pass such an ordinance. There can be no question as to the ability of the legislature to confer such power.

According to the Appellate Court of Indiana, when the public have been accustomed to travel a well-defined road across the land of a private person, though no Negligence right of way by user has been acquired, the owner is liable for injuries caused by stretching a barbed wire, not visible after dark, across such way, without anything to warn travellers of its existence: Morrow v. Sweeney, 38 N. E Rep. 187. The Supreme Court of Vermont has recently announced a very salutary doctrine, in Judd v. Ballard, 30 Atl. Rep. 96, to the effect that it is actionable negligence for a person, while adjusting the handle of a loaded revolver, to hold it so that an accidental discharge will injure another;

and that if he does so hold it, he will be liable for any injury that may result.

Nuisance

The decision of the Court of Appeals of England, in Lemmon v. Webb, [1894] 3 Ch. 1, will prove very interesting to all owners of real estate, but more especially to those whose property is of limited extent. In that case, large boughs of old trees standing on Lemmon's land had for more than twenty years overhung Webb's land; but finally Webb, without giving Lemmon any notice, cut off the boughs to the boundary-line. Lemmon then brought action against Webb, alleging that the latter had no right at all to cut off anything that had overhung his land more than twenty years, and that even if he had the right to cut the branches off, he was not entitled to do so without first giving notice. But the court held that the mere fact that the branches had overhung Webb's land for more than twenty years gave no right to have them remain in that position, and that notice was not necessary, as Webb did not go on Lemmon's land for the purpose of cutting them off.

The Supreme Court of Alabama is of opinion that an agreement by which one party is to furnish lumber Partnership and market the same when sawed, and the other party is to saw it on halves, makes a partnership: Lee v. Ryan, 16 So. Rep. 2.

Assets

The Chancery Division holds, that when an action is pending for the dissolution of a partnership, on the ground that the defendant partner is of unsound mind, the court will grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering in the conduct of the partnership affairs, so as to injure the business and assets of the firm: J. v. S., [1894] 3 Ch. 72.

Following the weight of authority, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently decided, that when stock in a corporation has been pledged, and the shares transferred on the books to the pledgee, a bill in equity will lie to redeem the stock upon the refusal of the

Pledge