judicial duty, i.c., to consider not only the acts of State legislatures and the laws of the land, or of the State, but, as paramount law which could not be disregarded, the Constitution of the United States. There is a great deal of force in this argument, and it is by no means the least valuable of the many interesting and important suggestions which abound almost on every page of the essay.

That Mr. CoXE intended, had he lived, to supplement this argument from the non obstante clause, with many others to prove that from a textual commentary of the Constitution one would arrive at the conclu sion that the framers expressly intended that the judiciary should become, what they have since become, the interpreters of the Constitu tion, is evident. But this part of his work, as is said by Mr. MEIGS, the compiler, is so incomplete, that the exact line of his argument cannot now be made out, and any attempt to make a resumé of it would fail to do justice to what the author had in mind. Therefore, in one sense, Mr. COXE failed to disprove Mr. MCMURTRIE's position that it is only by inference that we can come to the conclusion that a court has the power to declare an act of the legislature invalid. On the other hand, it may be said that he has probably put in the hands of a successor enough arguments, suggestions and material to enable such successor to accomplish the object which the author desired to attain.

There is one part of Mr. CoxE's essay, and one reason for his writing it, which we have purposely left out from this review until now, because we believe it would only serve to confuse the reader, as it confused us, when we read his work. This is, his deductions from the reasoning of the Court in the last of the legal tender cases, to wit: Juilliard v. Greenman. The Court maintained, if we have read that case aright, that since the United States government was the government of a sovereign and independent nation, it had all the powers which a sovereign and independent government ordinarily would have had which had not been expressly taken away by the Constitution, or which was not directly repugnant to the framework of our Federal State. The limitations we have mentioned are just as important as the general statement that the Federal government has all the powers of a sovereign government in respect to finance and defence.

The author, however, seems to have read the decision in the case as intending to confer upon Congress all the powers of the British Parliament; that nothing which any foreign nation has done the United States could not do, provided it is not probibited. Thus, it is not expressly prohibited from declaring that the courts of the United States can hold a law of the United States void, therefore an act of Congress which declares that the Supreme Court and other courts shall not declare hereafter any of its acts unconstitutional is, if the argument in the case be sound, a valid act. We think that all persons, in going over this chain of reason. ing, will cry out “non sequitur." It does not follow that because the court in the case of Juillaird v. Greenman bore in mind that it was the powers of a national government that they were considering, that they will forget from henceforth that we have in the United States a Federal government and a constitution, and it certainly does not follow, as would

seem to have been Mr. CoxE's position, that if you can prove that the Constitution of the United States expressly gave to the courts the power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, that therefore the decision in the later legal tender cases was wrong. Had the learned author lived to revise his manuscript and complete his work, we believe that more mature consideration would have led him to see that in spite of the fact that the legal tender cases and his disagreement with the decision of the court led him to undertake the work, that decision really had nothing to do with the main thought of the essay. We cannot help thinking, also, that he would have changed the form of the whole and made it, less a controversy in which he all through he maintains a certain proposition, and more distinctly what it really is, of one phase of the judicial power and its control over legislation before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

The executors of Mr. COXE and the able constitutional lawyer, Mr. MEIGS, have done an invaluable service to all lovers of constitutional law in publishing the results of the work of one who was at once an erudite scholar and a profound thinker."

As a final word to our readers, we should like to say that to one who is at all interested in the subject of this work, it will be invaluable. It may be incomplete, but it is none the less a mine of information and uggestion.

INJUNCTION TO KEEP MEN AT WORK.

We notice in the papers that a Western Circuit Court of the United States has issued an injunction restraining certain laborers who are the employees of a railroad in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Court, from going on what is technically termed "A Strike."

An injunction to restrain men from working is in plain terms an order on them to continue to work. This order, if it is correctly reported, goes much farther than any court has heretofore undertaken to go. The decisions of Judges TAFT and RICKS in the Ann Arbor cases, which will be found examined at length at page 481, Vol. 32 of the AMERICAN LAW REGISTEP AND REVIEW, though they have a serface similarity, and are some of the steps leading up to the present decision, are in reality very different. Judge TAFT in that case decided that he could restrain by injunction, Chief ARTHUR, of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, from issuing a telegram ordering the employees of a particular railroad to refuse to handle interstate freight coming from another road. Judge RICKS decided that a man could not remain in the employ of a railroad and refuse to carry interstate freight. He had his choice of getting out or of carrying the freight. There was no attempt on the part of either judge to order an employee to perform his contract of service. There is a wide difference between ordering a man not to do an act which will interfere with interstate freight and ordering a man to continue to work for a particular employer. The fact that all the employees of the road intend to go on a strike in a body and that their act would cripple the road, does not seem to us to alter the legal aspect of the case.

The evil which may result from this extension of the equity powers

of a court is very well illustrated by a decision of Judge BREWER'S. when he was on the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas. A certain road was in the hands of a receiver. There was a strike on the road. Judge BREWER issued an order prohibiting the strikers from interfering with the running of trains. After the order had been issued, the officers of the road complained that A. B. and C. had violated the court's order. The court investigated the facts and put the men in prison for a contempt of the injunction. The practical effect was to deprive the accused of the right of trial by jury. We believe that all these commitments for contempt on injunctions to restrain crime are unconstitutional.

The power of a court to commit for contempt is the outcome of the necessity for some peremptory power to enforce implicit obedience to the orders of the court made in the conduct of a case. To use this power to enforce criminal: tatutes is a gross abuse.

Violations of such injunctions, as we have elsewhere pointed out, should be tried in the ordinary way, the only effect of the injunction being to increase the penalty because the person who commits the crime has bad warning.

To return to the more recent decision. Here it seems that because the receiver is an officer of the court and the property technically in the possession of the court, all the employees of the road are to be treated as if they were members of the United State army and had surrendered their will into the hands of the Federal judiciary The number roads in the hands of receivers makes this decision of great moment and fraught with serious consequences. Without going into an extended argument here, we would like to throw out this suggestion. If the majority of roads in this country are going to pass, through the form of receiverships, under the control of one of the departments of government, the only department under which they should not come is the judiciary. The judiciary is our only safeguard against the acts of executive officers contrary to law. But if a judge is to be turned into a manager of railroads and an executive officer, we have no safeguard. If the judge as an executive officer commit a wrong, we can only appeal to the judge, as a judge, to right the wrong. At one time it might have been said that the receiver was the government executive officer, and the judge corrected, in his judicial capacity any wrong which he did. But this is largely a pleasing fiction. A few days ago we read in the paper that the employees of a certain railroad petitioned the court to order the receiver of a road not to reduce wages any more. The receiver in the Western case obtains an injunction from a Judge to prevent his employees leaving. The court, therefore, is turned into the real executive for the property of the road and its conduct. Our contention is that the legislative and executive departinents of the government are the only departments which should manage property in the hands of the government. If the government is to run the railroads of the country, and the employees of the railroad are to be directed and treated as officers and servants of the government, then it is better that we should know it at once, and place the control of the railroads in that department of government to which it belongs, to wit: An elected congress and not an appointed judiciary.

U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. Rep., 748 (1885).

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(All legal works received before the first of the month will be reviewed in the issue of the following month. Books should be sent to Wm. Draper Lewis, Esq., 738 Drexel Building, Philadelphia, Pa.)

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS. BY WILLIAM A. KEENER. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1893.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By THEOPHILUS PARSONS, LL.D. Three volumes. Eighth edition. Edited by SAMUEL WILLISTON. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1893. (Reviewed in this number.)

A TREATISE ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. By DWIGHT ARVEN JONES. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1892. SUNDAY-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FIRST DAY OF THE WEEK. By JAMES T. RINGGOLD. Jersey City, N. J.: Frederick D. Linu & Co., 1891.

MANUAL FOR INSPECTORS OF ELECTION, POLL CLERKS, Ballot Clerks AND VOTERS Of the State oF NEW YORK. By F. G. JEWETT. Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender, 1893.

THE LAW OF PUBLIC HEALTH and Safety, AND THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF Boards of HEALTH. By LEROY PAREER and ROBERT H. WORTHINGTON. Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender, 1892. SYPHILIS IN THE INNOCENT (Syphilis Insoatium). Clinically and Historically Considered, with Plan for the Legal Control of the Disease. By D. DUNCAN BULKLEY, A.M., M.D. New York: Bailey & Fairchild, 1893.

LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED. Book XIX. All Current Cases of General Value and Importance decided in the United States, State and Territorial Courts, with full annotation. By BURDETT £.. RICH and HENRY P. FARNHAM (Cited 19 L. R. A.). Rochester, N. Y. : The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 1893.

ELEMENTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. Compiled with, Reference to the

Latest Decisions of the Sacred Congregations of Cardinals. Adapted especially to the Discipline of the Church in the United States. By RKV. S. B. SMITH, D.D. Vol. 1. Ecclesiastical Persons. Ninth Edition. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1893. LAWYERS' REPORTS ANNOTATED. BOOK xx. All Current Cases of General Value and Importance decided in the United States, State and Territorial Courts, with full annotation, by BURDETT A. RICH, Editor, and HENRY P. FARNHAM, Assistant Editor, aided by the Publishers' Editorial Staff and by the Reporters and Judges of each Court. (Cited 20 L. R. A.) Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co., 1893.

A TREATISE ON TRUSTS ANd Monopolies, containing an Exposition of the Rule of Public Policy against Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade, and a Review of Cases, Ancient and Modern. By THOMAS CARL SPELLING. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1893. AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL Power and UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION, being a Commentary on Parts of the Constitution of the United States. By BRINTON COXE, of the Philadelphia Bar. Philadelphia: Kay & Bro., 1893. (See extended review of this work in Comments, infra, page 76.)

SHARP & ALLEMAN'S LAWYERS' AND BANKERS' DIRECTORY FOR 1894. January Edition. Published Semi-annually in January and July. Adapted for special use of Attorneys, Bankers, Merchants, Manufacturers and Business Men generally. Philadelphia: Sharp & Alleman, 1894.

A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, including Jurisdic tion, False Imprisonment, Writ of Error, Extradition, Mandamus, Certiorari, Judgments, etc., with Practice and Forms. By WILLIAM S. CHURCH. Second edition, revised and enlarged. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1893. (Reviewed in this number.)

REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL Rights by the Civil ACTION, ACCORD ING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE. A treatise adapted to use in all the States and Territories where that system prevails. By JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LL.D. Third edition. Edited by JOHN NORTON l'OMEROY, Jr., A.M. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1894.

GENERAL Digest of the DECISIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL COURTS IN The United STATES, ENGLAND AND CANADA. Refers to all Reports, official and unofficial. First published during the year ending September, 1883. Annual, being Vol. vin of the series. Prepared and published by the Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, N. Y., 1893.

TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY Relief, in EQUITY AND AT LAW. BY THOMAS CARL SPELLING. Covering Injunction, Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto, Certiorari. Containing an exposition of the principles governing these several forms of relief, and of their practical use, with citatic ns of all the authorities up to date. Two volumes, Svo. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co. AMERICAN RAILROAD and CORPORATION REPORTS, being a Collection of the Current Decisions of the Courts of Last Resort in the United States pertaining to the Law of Railroads, Private and Municipal Corporations, including the Law of Insurance, Banking, Carriers, Telegraph and Telephone Companies, Building and Loan Associations, etc. Edited and annotated by JOHN LEWIS. Vol. VII. Chicago: E. B. Myers & Co., 1893.