held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, a few months carlier, in Ellis v. Reynolds, 58 N. W. Rep., 483, with the further ruling, that if the voter does not make the oath required, though he is in fact within the terms of the act as to disability, his vote should not be counted, though no fraud is intended. The Pennsylvania Ballot Law is weak, in not requiring oath as to disability; yet it has been held that even under it, officers of election might, and should, in case of doubt, examine the voter on oath as to his good faith in alleging his disability: In re Election Instructions, 2 D. R. (Pa.) 1. But in another case, in the same state, In re Beaver Co. Elections, 12 Pa. C. C. R. 227, it was ruled, that the voter was the sole judge of his disability. Locality may have had something to do with this difference of opinion, the latter decision coming from the vicinity of Senator Quay's home. It was also held, in the former of these Pennsylvania cases, that the act only contemplated actual physical disability, such as blindness, paralysis, infirmity or decrepitude, inability to read, etc., and did not include drunkenness, or ignorance of the proper method of marking, due to neglect by the voter to inform himself on that point. The general practice of election boards in Pennsylvania, however, is to allow the voter assistance on his mere request.

Eminent

The Court of Appeals of New York has recently decided, in accord with the best authority, that the occupation of a rural highway, the fee of which belongs to the Domain abutting owners, by a telegraph company, for the erection of its poles, is an additional burden to the easement for a highway, for which the owners of the fee are entitled to compensation: Ecls v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 38 N. E. Rep. 202; affirming Ecls v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Hun. 516; S. C., 20 N. Y. Suppl. 600. To the same effect are Blashfield v. Empire State Telephone & Telegraph Co., 18 N. Y. Suppl. 250; S. C., 24 N. Y. Suppl. 1006; 71 Hun. 532; Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Ind. 36. Other courts, however, have held a contrary doctrine: Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 79; Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co.,

88 Mo. 258. The most recent case to this effect is Brown v. Eaton, (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep 145, in which the court declared that it was difficult to see any distinction between the use of a highway for electric railway poles and for poles erected for the use of a telegraph or telephone company; in wilful ignorance of the manifest distinction that the former is a use for travel, the latter not. Such arguments are their own best refutation.

Evidence, Privileged Communica tions

The District Court for the Northern District of California, after reviewing the authorities, has wisely concluded, in In re Storror, 63 Fed. Rep. 564, that telegraph messages, in the hands of a telegraph company, are not privileged communications, so far as the company is concerned, and their production will be compelled by subpoena duces tecum, in aid of an investigation by a grand jury of supposed criminal acts of the senders and receivers of messages, with which the company and its officers are not in any way concerned.

False

According to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, a person, who by his "conduct" falsely represents himself as the agent of a railroad company, and procures money from Pretences another on the strength of employment which he promises him, obtains the money by a "false pretence, statement or token," under Gen. Stat. Ky., c. 29, art. 13, § 2: Comm. v. Murphy, 27 S. W. Rep. 859.

Forgery

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has lately given one of those decisions, based on the technical rules of the old common law, that are apt to afford more comfort than discouragement to the criminal classes, by holding, in State v. Taylor, 16 So. Rep. 190, that where the defendant has signed the name of a number of drawers to a note, and signs an addendum to the note, stating that he is their authorized agent, he cannot be convicted of forgery, as an apparent agent cannot be convicted of that crime, though he has no authority in fact; and the falsehood lies not so much in the forgery of the instrument, as in the false assumption of

authority as agent. But the expression of the court that the defendant was not guilty of making the instrument, and therefore not within the definition of a forger, leads one to suspect that they confounded the meaning of the word "making," as used in the definition of forgery, with its much narrower meaning as applied to a promissory note. At any rate, the doctrine needs a legislative reproof.

Fraudulent

The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Ware v. Purdy, 60 N. W. Rep. 526, holds that a voluntary conveyance to the wife and children of the grantor is not fraudulent as against Conveyances existing creditors, though not recorded, when the grantor is solvent at the time, and the deed is made by him in view of possible injury to his business of liquor selling from prohibitory legislation then pending, provided that enough property is retained by him to pay existing debts. Quære, as to the effect of such a conveyance as against subsequent creditors. The Supreme Court of Indiana maintains the same general doctrine, in Emerson v. Opp, 38 N. E. Rep. 330. The latter court, however, also holds, that the mere joinder by the wife, for the purpose of conveying her inchoate interest, in a conveyance, fraudulent as against creditors, of real property of the husband, through a trustee, to himself and his wife, to hold by entireties, does not form such a consideration as will support the conveyance; and the wife who so joins is affected by the fraud of the husband, whether she had knowledge of it or not: Phillips v. Kennedy, 38 N. E. Rep. 410.

Goodwill

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately ruled, in J. G. Mattingly Co. v. Mattingly, 27 S. W. Rep. 985, that when one purchases the goodwill and firm name of a business, he is entitled to receive letters and telegrams addressed to that firm name, and to the advantage resulting from business transactions proposed in them by the customers of the old firm.

The Common Pleas of New York City and County, in

Banser v. Banzer, 30 N. Y. Suppi. 803, has held, that an estate by entireties can only be created by a conveyance to husband and wife, and that, therefore, a conveyance to the wife by the husband's

Husband and
Wife,
Entiretles

co-tenant will not create such an estate.

In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, since the passage of the married women's acts, enabling a married woman to contract with third persons as if she Partnership were sole, a wife may form å partnership with her husband, so as to bind her property for the payment of partnership debts to strangers: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Alexander, 27 S. W. Rep. 981.

There is a very decided conflict of opinion on this latter subject; but the mass of authority, if not the weight, seems to be against the view of the Kentucky court. That view has been accepted in Michigan, Vail v. Winterstein, 94 Mich. 230; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 932, and in Vermont, Lane v. Bishop,65 Vt. 575 S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 499, but rejected in Arkansas, Gilkerson-Sloss Co. v. Salinger, 19 S. W. Rep. 747; in New York, Kaufman v. Schocffel, 37 Hun, 140; Lowenstein v. Salinger, 17 N. Y. Suppl. 70; in South Carolina, Weisiger v. Wood, 36 S. Car. 424; S. C., 15 S. E. Rep. 597, and in Washington, Board of Trade of Seattle v. Hayden, 30 Pac. Rep. 87. In one recent case, in South Carolina, Vannerson v. Cheatham, 19 S. E. Rep. 614, the court claimed that entering into a contract of partnership would be a contravention of the statutory prohibition against becoming liable to answer for the liability of another; but this is absurd, as the liability of a firm is that of each of the members individually, not that of each for the others. There seems to be no good reason why a wife should not become partner in a firm, either with her husband, or with any one else. At any rate, no valid objections have as yet been urged against it.

The right to take and use the ice on streams and ponds seems to be a matter that is never settled. It is a most curious phenomenon, that one of the earliest decisions on the subject, one that has been

Ice

deservedly hooted at, Mill River Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462, should have received two adherents within the last year, and one of them, apparently, entirely independent in its origin. In Eidemiller Ice Co. v. Guthrie, 60 N. W. Rep. 717. the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled, (1) That the owner of a mill, who has the right to maintain a pond, or flow back the water of a stream on the land of another, and to use such water to operate his mill, possesses, as to the water, the dominant right, and while not the actual owner of the ice which forms on the pond, is entitled to have it remain there during the time, and whenever, its so remaining will be or is useful and necessary to the legitimate exercise of his right to use the water as motive power for the mill, or to successfully operate the mill; but the owner of the land, if upon a navigable stream, may make any use he desires of the ice which forms over and above so much of the bed of the stream to which his ownership extends, as does not interfere with or injure the rights of the mill owner; (2) That if the owner of the mill and dam subservient thereto wantonly and unnecessarily draws water from, or lowers the water in the pond, and by so doing injures or destroys the ice privileges of the owner of the land bordering on the pond, he thereby renders himself liable in damages to the riparian owner; but the damage is not irreparable, and an injunction will not lie to restrain him from so drawing off the water. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, following its former decision, held some time ago, in Howe v. Andrews, 62 Conn. 398; S. C., 26 Atl. Rep. 394, with which the first part of the decision above is in harmony, that the riparian owner can not cut the ice on a mill pond, when its removal will cause an injury to the right of the mill owner. No better comment can be made on this doctrine than the language of the court in Brookville & Metamora Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 581, and Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Cush., (Mass.), 186. There is an annotation on the general subject of property in ice, in 32 AM. L. REG. 166.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina,.