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if one railroad claims that another which is about to cross its 'tracks has no right to do so, and undertakes to prevent by force of arms the workmen of the first company from crossing their tracks, an injunction can be obtained restraining both parties from altering their position until the question of right has been sctried. As to questions of a man's use of his own property which injures the property of others, we can mention a man being restrained by injunction from carrying on a business on his property which is il nuisance to the adjoining cowners or to the community. But it is urged that the under. lying thought of all these instances is, that the man who is restrained by injunction, is acting as he does under a claim of right in property: did that by su doing, lu hus enabled onc who dispulcs that right, to bring him into a cri'il court to determine the disputed question. Pending that determination, the property being peculiarly under the care of the court, can be protected by injunction, which the court has the summary right to enforce by commitment for contempt. Debs and the Chicago strikers of last sum:ner made no claim to legal interest in property. Their actions were cither innocent or criminal. It is alle that they were criminal. The constitution provides that no man shall bc judged guilty of a crime without indictment and trial by jury and all its attendant incidents.
This view of the case is that which appeals to the writer. The circumstances of the Chicago strikers either did or did not leave the administration of criminal justice and the preserving of social order within the ordinary power of the criminal court and thc cxccutive branch of the government. If, as is probable, the executive arm of the government, backed by the ordinary processes of the criniinal courts, was. nut sufficient to protect property and lisc, then the case should have been trcated, as on those facts it was, an exceptional case, and martial law declared. There seems to us to have bcen no necessity to strain the principles of the procedure of the civil courts, and to make a precedent which will be used over and over again to undermine the most valuable of the safeguards of individual liberty—the trial by jury.
The Annotations are prepared by the following Editors and Assistants :
Hon. lirorge M. Dallas, Delitor. Assistants : Andenius Stewart,
llenry .S. Smaltz, John A. McCarthy, William Sanderson Furst. Department of Cox-TITUTIONAL LAW. Prof. (hristopheros li. Tiedeman, Editor. Assistants: Wm. Draper
1.ewis, Wm. Struthers Ellis. Department or Muster. CORPORATIONS.
Ilon. John F. Dillon, II. D., Editor. Issistant: Mayuc R. Long.
streth. Depirtment of liquity.
Richard ('. McMurtrir. LL. D., Editor. Assistants: Sydney G.
Fisher, John Douglass Brown, Jr., Robert P. Bralford.
Welrilir M. Bigelow, 1941., Iiclitor. Assistants: Benjamin H.
Lowry, Alex. Durbin l.nuier, l'atrick C. B. O'Donovan.
Angelo T. Frrolley, Esq., Eilitor. Assislants : Lewis Lawrence
Smith, Clinton Rogers Woodruff, Maurice G. Belknap, H.
Charles F. Brach, Jr., Esq.. Editor. Assistants : Lawrence God.
kin, Owen Wister, Victor Icovy, Cyrus E. Woods.
Morton P. Henry, fisq., Filitor. Assistant: Horace L. Cheyney.
Frank 1. Prichard, Esq., Editor. Assistants: H. Gordon Mo
Couch, Chas. C. Binncy, Chas. C. Townsend, Fraocis H.
Bohleu, Oliver Boyce Judson. Department of INSURANCE.
George Richards, Esq.. Editor. Assistants : George Wharton
Popper, Luther E. Hewitt, Samuel Kahn Loucheim. Department of CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Prof. firo. S. Graham, Editor. Assistants; E. Clinton Rhoada
C. l'ercy Wilcox, Department of l’atent Law.
licurka llorulnx, Fisq., Elitor. Assistant: Hector T. Fenton. Department of I'RODKI T".
llon. ('lement B. Prurunr, Blitor, Analstanta: Alfred Roland
IInix, W'. A. Davis, Jox. 'T. Tnylor. Department of MEDICAL. JURINIRUDENCE.
Hon. Marxlall 1). Ewoll, LL. D., Klitor. Assistants: Thomas
E. D. Bradley, Milton o. Naramorc.
llou. Wm. S. Andman, Klitor. Assistasits: Howard W. Page,
Charles Wilfred Conard, Joscpli Howard Rhoals, William
Henry Loyd, Jr., Edward Brooks, Jr., Samuel D. Mallack.
Charles F. Eggleston.
ALEXANDER DURBIX LAUKR, PATRICK C. B. O'DONOVAN.
City NATIONAL BANK OF DAYTON v. KUSWORM.' SUPREME
COURT OF WISCONSIN.
A wife may avoid her contract, extorted by a threatened criminal prosecution of her husband, on the ground of duress; and the fact that after she had signed the contract, the plaintiff gave her the notes forged by ber husband, together with others given by him as security there for, to be giren to the husband, which she accordingly did, and the notes were thereupou destroyed by him, does not estop her from aroiding her note extorted at thc time under threats of prosecuting the busband.
DURESS. 1. “Duress, in its more extended sense, means that degree of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary
firmness:" Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205. It does not neces-• sarily imply that the mcans used should be in themscives unlawful, but includes the use of lawful mcans in an unlawful: manner, or for an improper purposc; and, on the other hand, cven if the mcans used should be improper, as for instance thc threat of a basclcss prosecution, there is no duress, unless the threat so operated on the mind of the person threatened as to deprive him of the free excrcise of his will. In some of its maniscstations, durcss is hardly to be distinguished from undue influence: Lighthall v. Muore, Colo. App. 554; and it extends not merely to thc case of thrcats, but includes, the "Reported in 59 N. W. Rep. 564.
abuse of one's legal position as owner by title of possession, in order to force the real owner to admit or satisfy an unjust claim, of which the unwarranted detention of property by a pleelgee or bailee will serve as an example.
II. Durcss at common law was divided into duress by impriso:ment, and duress per minas, or by threats. To these may be added a third, also recognized by the common law, but not accorded thc dignity of a separate existence,—duress of goods. This docs not seem to belong properly under cither of the preceding divisions; and is now admitted to form a distinct branch of the law of duress.
III. Duress by imprisonment consists in the use of imprisoment, lawful or unlawful, to force the party imprisoned into cxccuting a contract. If the imprisonment be unlawful, the circumstances under which the contract is made cannot clotho it with validity. It makes no difference whether the overtures for the agreement come from the onc party or the other. The imprisonment being illegal, the contract is equally so, whether formed at the suggestion of the prosecutor, or at the request of the defendant: Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 50%; Ostoru v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365. When, after a person hius procured the arrest of another on a criminal charge, which did not justify his arrest, and after his discharge has procured bis arrest again on an order in a civil action for fraud, where an arrest was not warranted, he procures from that person, while he is imprisoned, after several months' confinement, and on the promise to obtain bail for him, which is done, a relcase of himself, and the suretics on the bond given for the order of arrest, the release is given under duress, and will not bar an action on the bond to recover damages for the imprisonment: Lassarone v. Oishci, 21 N. Y. Suppl. 267. But an arrest and imprisonment on lawful process, used in a proper manner, and only for a lawful purpose, is valid, and cannot be construed as durcss: Noalloy v. Greenough, 25 N. H. 325; Edily v. Herrin, 17 Me. 338; even though no cause of action really existed, if the prosecution was instituted bona fide and upon probable cause: Prichard v. Sharp, si Mich. 432; Clark v. Turnbull
, 47 N. J. L. 265. A note or other security given
to release the defendant in such a case from prison, may be void as given to compound a felony ; but it cannot be awarded on the ground of duress.
If, however, the arrest and imprisonment are merely for the purpose of enforcing a civil liability, such is an improper use of criminal process, and a security obtained under such circumstances cannot stand : Scibor v. Price, 26 Mich. 518; Phelps v. Zuschlag. 34 Tex. 371. “A contract obtained by duress of unlawful imprisonment is voidable, and if the imprisonment is under legal process in regular form, it is nevertheless unlawful as against one who procured it improperly, for the purpose of obtaining the execution of a contract, and a contract obtained by mcans of it is voidable for duress : " Morse v. Woodworik, 155 Mass. 233 ; S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 525.
IV. Duress per minas is the most fruitful branch of this themc; and its varieties are endless. It has been most excel. Icntly defined and explained in a lengthy opinion by Knowlton, J., in Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233 ; S. C., 29 N. E Rep. 525, already cited, which is well worth quoting more at length:
" The rule as to duress per minas has now a broader application than forinerly. It is founded on the principle that a contract rests on the free and voluntary action of the minds of the partics, meeting in an agreement which is to be binding upon them. If an influence is exerted on one of them of such a kind as to overcome his will and compel a formal assent to an undertaking when he does not really agree to it, and so to make that appear to be his act which is not his but ancther's, imposed on him through fear which deprives him of selfcontrol, there is no contract, unless the other deals with him in good faith, in ignorance of the improper infiuence, and in the belief that he is acting voluntarily.
"To set aside a contract for duress it must be shown, first, that the will of one of the parties was overcome, and that he was thus subjected to the power of another, and that the incans used to induce him to act were of such a kind as would over. come the mind and will of an ordinary person. It has often been held, that threats of civil suits and of ordinary proceedo