§231. not to aid directly or indirectly, and within certain limits to prevent a State or private persons from aiding, in places under his control, the enemy of the belligerent in matters immediately bearing on the war. If a wrong is done, the remedy is of course international. In the other case the parties are the belligerent State and the neutral individual. They are, and can be, bound by no obligations to each other. The only duty of the individual is to his own sovereign; and so distinctly is this the case, that acts done even with intent to injure a foreign State are only wrong in so far as they compromise the Nation of which the individual is a member. At the same time, the only duty of the belligerent State is to beings of like kind with itself; and it is merely bound to behave in a particular manner to the neutral individual, because of the international agreement which sets limits to the severity which may be used in repressing his noxious But within these limits the belligerent is irresponsible. He exacts in his own prize-courts the penalty for infraction of the rules which he is allowed to enforce; and if he inflicts a wrong, it is for him to repair it." * the State for neutrality by duals. 231. As with the usages of war, so with Responsibility of regard to the belligerent rights in relation to the breaches of obligations of neutrals, the liabilities of the private private indiviindividual is often confused with those of the State, which latter alone is a party in an international dispute, and the natural distinction between national and private acts is not always kept clearly in view. Some writers on International Law regard States and private individuals as occupying in common the same position with regard to bellig * W. E. HALL. Pages 67-69. Mr. Hall's opinion. erent rights in the condition of neutrality as in war. Others are less consistent and proclaim the solidarity of the State and the individual only in war, which suits the purpose of defending the capture of inoffensive private property on the high seas,—while in the case of neutrality they accept the doctrine of the separability of the individual from the State, and they put this forward as an argument in favour of free neutral commerce on the part of private individuals. But it is obvious that one and the same theory must govern the relation between States and private individuals with regard to the liabilities entailed by neutrality as well as with regard to belligerent rights in war. The same principle which protects private property in war, when not engaged for any hostile purpose, condemns it when, in the case of neutrals, it partakes of the hostile character of contraband of war. * "This distinction between usages affecting national and private acts, says Mr. Hall, is deeply rooted in the habits of Nations. At no time since the rules which make up International Law assumed definite shape, has there been any room for question as to the existence or nature of an authoritative practice in the matter. But the usage was shaped in the first instance by the blind working of natural forces, and its permanence is more due to their continued operation, than to the clearness with which its principle has been defined by legal writers. It has been, and still is, usual for them to confuse neutral States and individuals in a common relation towards belligerent States; and in losing sight of the sound basis of the established practice, they have necessarily failed to indicate any clear *HEFFTER. § 148. BLUNTSCHLI. §§ 779 and 780. CALVO. Vol. II. § 169. boundary of State responsibility. This want of precision is both theoretically unfortunate, and not altogether without practical importance. For it has enabled Governments, from time to time, to put forward pretensions, which, though they have never been admitted by neutral States and have never been carried into effect, cannot be often made without endangering the stability of the principles they attack. But the common sense of statesmen has generally met such pretensions with a decided assertion of the authoritative doctrine, and state papers are not wanting in that clearness which is deficient in the writings of jurists." 4°. State Responsibility for Acts of Private Individuals. The Treaty of Washington of 1871. sibility regulated Law and § 232. In the preceding paragraphs we have state responnoted that private individuals of neutral States are by Municipal allowed to continue their commerce with bellig-International erents without involving the responsibility of their respective States and this on the principle of the distinction which is admitted to exist between national or State acts and the doings of private individuals. As a general rule, State acts do not per se always bind the private in * W. E. HALL. International Law. Edit. 1880. p. 69. "Or de même que l'état de guerre ordinaire n'est qu'une relation de gouvernement à gouvernement, et non une relation de particulier à particulier, de même aussi, l'état d'hostilité qui résulte de la rupture de la neutralité, opérée par le fait d'un gouvernement neutre, ne doit, dans la vérité des principes, réagir que sur ce gouvernement et non sur les particuliers. Si les particuliers inoffensifs sont dès lors traités en ennemis et cessent d'être protégés par les lois de la neutralité, c'est par une suite de l'abus de pouvoir qui impose le même traitement aux sujets inoffensifs du gouvernement ennemi. Réciproquement, de ce qu'un sujet neutre aurait rompu la neutralité et se serait mis en état d'hostilité personnelle contre un belligérant, on ne doit pas en conclure que la neutralité est rompue à l'égard du gouvernement neutre qui n'a pas pris fait et cause pour sont sujet, et qui ne s'est pas approprié le fait d'où vient la rupture. Le sujet neutre peut seul dans ce cas être traité en ennemi par le belligérant. MASSE, Droit Commercial. Ed. 1874. Vol. I. p. 168. dividual; neither can acts of private individuals compromise the State unless there be special circumstances. By this principle the limits of State responsibility in neutrality is theoretically laid down, and the liability of the private individual in war is in the same way defined. But, in the same manner as in war, the property of private individuals of belligerent States may under certain circumstances be involved in the belligerent acts of the State and then partake of the enemy character, which, in ordinary circumstances, is inherent in State or public property only, so in neutrality the State, though distinct from the private individual, can sometimes be compromised by private acts. Hence the practical uncertainty which always remains with regard to the limits of State responsibility in relation to acts of private individuals. Beside municipal laws, as the United States neutrality laws of 1838 * and the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 (see Appendix E) †, the modus vivendi, during neutrality, is often regulated beforehand by international treaties. An instance of this mode of international agreement with regard to the responsibility of the neutral State, when the other party is engaged in war, is the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States of America called the Treaty of Washington. This Treaty contemplated the adjustment by arbitration of the differences occasioned by the wellknown cases of the Alabama and other vessels of the Confederate Government, which preyed on the commerce of the Federal States during the late civil war in the United States. This latter Government brought a claim against that of Great *KENT. Vol. I. Lect. VI. 122. + PHILLIMORE. Vol. I. Edit. 1879. p. 553, et seq., quoted above, in this Volume, on pages 183, et seq. . XXXIV 232 Britain for alleged breaches of neutrality of the latter State in allowing certain vessels to be built and equipped and also in assisting the progress of those vessels. To meet these claims, after various negotiations, on the conclusion of the civil war, the Treaty of Washington (having a retrospective effect) was signed at Washington, 8 May, 1871, between Great Britain and the United States, referring the various questions to five arbitrators, one being chosen to each of the following Governments, viz. Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. These arbitrators met at Geneva in Switzerland, on December 15, 1871. It was stipulated by Art. VI of the above Treaty as follows: "In deciding the matters submitted to the arbitrators, they shall be governed by the following three rules, which are agreed upon by the high contracting parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such principles of International Law not inconsistent therewith, as the arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case: 66 'A neutral Government is bound "First. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike uses. "Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or |