of the highest standard existing between the contracting parties, in other words, the agreement must be based on the standard of national morality and civilization of the party most advanced in morality and civilization, for those who have attained to the higher moral standard cannot under any consideration stoop to the lower one without polluting their moral conscience and retreating on the road to civilization (comp. §§ 11-14). These principles determine the mutual duties of States.

With regard to the attitude which a civilized State ought to assume towards uncivilized Nations and the mutual confidence which ought to exist between equally civilized States, in accordance with the Moral Law of Nature, we cannot give better evidence, in support of our exposition of the general principles given in Part I of this work, than by quoting from the recent remarkable work of Professor Lorimer, the Institutes of the Law of Nations, the following passages.

"The moment that the power to help a retrograde race forward, towards the goal of human life, consciously exists in a civilized Nation, that civilized nation is bound to exert its power; and in the exercise of its power, it is entitled to assume an attitude of guardianship, and to put wholly aside the proximate will of the retrograde race. Its own civilization having resulted from the exercise of a will which it regards as rational, real and ultimate, at least when contrasted with the irrational, phenomenal and proximate will of the inferior race, in vindicating its own proximate will, it is entitled to assume, that it vindicates the ultimate will of the inferior race.---the will, that is to say, at which the inferior race must arrive when it reaches the stage of civilization to which the higher race has attained. But

the obligation and the right of a civilized Nation to interfere with a retrograde race, even where such interference might be for the benefit of the latter, is limited by the proviso, that, in so doing, it does not so burden its own resources as to cause a greater loss of the means of progress to itself and others than it confers on the retrograde race. This latter proviso seems more generally to be forgotten in our own day than the duty which it defines."

"But, says Prof. Lorimer further, time is an element, in the action of civilizing influences, the importance of which is not always sufficiently kept in view. Neither warlike nor peaceful contact acts immediately,-nay, the first generation subjected to the influences of either is frequently inferior to that which preceded it. The pagan temple is in ruins, and the Christian Church has not been built. The old rude rule of life has been abrogated, and no better rule has yet taken its place. In many cases it becomes a question of the utmost delicacy, whether appeals to the reason, the conscience, and the selfinterest, even of savages, through missionaries, traders and neighbouring settlers, be not more potent than the closer contact and more direct guidance which results from political subjection if unaccompanied by actual colonisation. It is too true that colonisation often acts as an improving influence only by improving those subjected to it off the face of the earth; but its action admits of being so regulated by the mother country as that it shall ultimately assign to her retrograde children the position for which they are suited by the characteristics of the race to which they belong, and the stage of progress which they have reached, or, in the case of old communities, at which they stand for the time

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being. The great difficulty always consists in understanding those whose circumstances differ from our own often more widely than their characters."*

With regard to the relations of mutual confidence which ought in general to subsist between civilized States, Professor Lorimer makes the following further remarks.

"The normal relations of States are relations neither of hostility nor indifference, as is alleged, not very justly perhaps, to have been the ancient opinion, nor of mutual jealousy and distrust, which is still too much the modern opinion, but of amity and reciprocal confidence. This is the logical inference from the doctrines of Natural Law which we have elsewhere established. It is on this inference that all the doctrines of the Law of Nations rest, and its conquest, as a conscious starting point, is justly regarded as the greatest achievement of science in this department of inquiry. The much profaned principle of fraternité, when thus understood, brings the whole moral hemisphere within the range of scientific vision, and holds out to us a prospect of its practical exploration. Expanding from the person to the family, from the family to the State, and from the State to the community of States, the doctrine that 'love, which worketh no ill to its neighbour,' is the fulfilling of the law,' by bringing the law of Nations within the range of ethics, is preparing it gradually to assume the character of a positive jural system. But mutual good will by no means implies mutual interference or even co-operation, in ordinary circumstances. On the contrary, the capacity for self-support and self-government being, as we have seen,

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* PROF. JAMES LORIMER, LL.D. The Institutes of the Law of Nations. Vol. I. p. 227.

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conditions of recognition, non-interference may be enunciated as the primary duty which separate communities, simply as such, owe to each other. That, in the normal relations of jural entities, the negative takes precedence of the positive principle, is a maxim of universal application in jurisprudence, which follows as a corollary from the subjective origin which we have assigned both to rights and duties. As the first subjective right of every separate rational entity is the right to the unfettered exercise of the powers which God has conferred on him, and his first subjective duty is to exercise these powers in his own behalf, so, in like manner, the first objective right which this entity must acknowledge is the right of others to be relieved by his personal efforts of the burden of his support, and the first objective duty towards him is the duty of permitting him to energize for this purpose. Now separate States are such rational and responsible entities. It is on this ground, as we have seen, that their right to recognition. rests, and in their case, consequently, just as in the case of individuals that are sui juris, the rule must be in favour of non-interference. As time rolls on, and the experience of ages accumulates, the importance of this rule, not only for the sake of those in behalf of whose liberties it is invoked, but of those on whose ambition, or philanthropy, or restlessness, its restrictions are imposed, comes to be more and more clearly admitted. The interest of each is felt to be the interest of all; and the interest of each, with few and often doubtful exceptions, will be better promoted by leaving him to follow the bent of his own genius than by any rules that we can impose upon him, or even by any aid that we can afford him." *

* PROF. LORIMER. The Institutes of the Law of Nations, Vol. I. p. 230, et seq. IDEM. Institutes of Law. p. 101, et seq. 212 and 235,

The interdependence of States.

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As explained above, in Chapter III, with regard to States as well as with regard to individuals, every right implies a correlative duty. Accordingly all international rights are bound up with corresponding obligations.. Hence proceeds the interdependence of States. *

From the point of view of humanity and civilization, the normal condition of Nations appears to be a relationship of mutual goodwill and peace. From the necessity and the desire to secure this natural relationship, devolve various measures, including even war, when the state of equilibrium is disturbed and all peaceable incans are exhausted.

The obligation of a State to render justice to all others, says Halleck, is a perfect obligation, of strictly binding force, at all times and under all circumstances. No State can relieve itself from this obligation, under any pretext whatever. It is an obligation, according to Vattel, 'more necessary still between Nations than between individuals; because injustice has more terrible consequences in the quarrels of these powerful bodies politic and it is more difficult to obtain redress. The same rule applies to all the duties of a State which result from the perfect international rights of others, for whatever one Nation has a perfect right to demand of another, that is the other absolutely bound to surrender. The rule is absolute, and cannot be evaded by any technicality, sophistry, or under any other pretext. Whatever one State can claim as its perfect right, that it is the absolute duty of the other to concede. To refuse it, under any pretext whatsoever,

* Souveränität ist nicht absolute Unabhängigkeit, noch absolute Freiheit eines Staates, denn die Staaten sind keine absolute Wesen. sondern rechtlich beschränkte Personen. BLUNTSCHLI. Völkerrecht. $ 65. Prof. LORIMER. The Institutes of the Law of Nations. Book III. Chapt. I.