commerce of that realm itself. Bound up with Great Britain and Spain and now with Italy - as she is, in the great and difficult task of preserving order and security among the restless Moslems of Northern Africa, it was most imperative, moreover, that she should control Morocco so that the European hold over the upper portion of the Dark Continent might be efficient and complete.

Backed, then, with the consent of the Powers and the support of England, France entered promptly and energetically, but thoroughly in accord with the spirit of her agreements with the Powers, upon the work of reform within the Shereefian Kingdom. At first she was unable to make any headway, owing to the civil war which broke out in the spring of 1907 between Abd-el-Aziz, the reigning Sultan, who had become unpopular by reason of his incapacity as a ruler and his inordinate proclivity for foreign support and things European, and his brother, Mulai-el-Hafid, an avowed opponent of all foreign interference. The French declined to intervene in the struggle; but contented themselves with occupying the harbor of Casa Blanca and the district of Chaouia at one end of the realm and Oudjda at the other, in order to protect the lives and property of Europeans. Finally, in August, 1907, Mulai completely defeated his brother and forced him to abdicate. The Powers, acting upon the advice of France and Spain, refused to recognize Mulai until he had secured control of the whole country and given his adhesion to the treaty of Algeciras and his promise to observe all the other official obligations of Morocco. After considerable delay, he was induced to accept the inevitable and was officially recognized as Sultan in December, 1908,7 but it was not till February, 1910, that France was able to secure from Mulai-el-Hafid a treaty recognizing her special interests in Morocco and agreeing to accept her assistance and loans in order to place his government on a stable basis.

8

• See Franco-Spanish note to the Powers, September 14, 1908, and note sent to Mulai Hafid by the Powers, November 18, 1908, SUPPLEMENT, pp. 101, 103.

7 See final note of recognition of Mulai Hafid, December 17, 1908, SUPPLEMENT, p. 105.

8 Finally signed in Paris on March 4, 1910; see terms in Documents Diplomatiques, 1910, Affaires du maroc, V, p. 343; SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, Vol. 6, p. 43. A similiar treaty was concluded between Spain and Morocco on November 16, 1910; see terms in SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, Vol. 6, p. 54.

Before the movement to carry out this agreement was well under way, difficulties arose once more between several of the chieftains and the Sultan's Government, owing to the reimposition of certain taxes that Mulai-el-Hafid had promised on his accession not to levy and to the tyranny of his prime minister. On January 14, 1911, Lieutenant Marchand and several comrades were slain by the Zaer tribesmen near Rabat; and soon several tribes were in open revolt. The movement spread. A brother of Mulai-el-Hafid was proclaimed as a rival Sultan; and in a few weeks a great portion of the country was in arms. The warring factions converged on the capital, defeated the Sultan's forces, and finally besieged him in Fez. On May 21, 1911, the French relieving column, composed mainly of local levies, reached the beleaguered sovereign; and the revolting tribesmen were dispersed without difficulty. A number of chieftains whose grievances were real and whose complaints were fully justifiable, were won over by conciliatory measures and friendly treatment. The offending vizier was dismissed from office; and the French entered energetically upon the task of restoring order and security in the country.

Just at this interesting and critical moment, the German Government decided to send the warship Panther to Agadir. Their ostensible and publicly announced purpose was to afford proper protection to certain German traders and German commercial interests in that neighborhood. Their real object was something quite different. The French Government had taken great care to keep all the Powers posted concerning all their movements in Morocco and their advance to Fez, and to see that each step in their program was in strict conformity with the stipulations of the treaty of Algeciras. There were no serious grounds for complaint on the part of any of the European states; but it was evident from the course things were taking that, through no fault or aggression on the part of the French officials, the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco had become inevitable. Everyone, the Germans included, felt that this was the only possible solution of the problem. "France was the only Power which could restore order in Morocco," said Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in his opening speech to the Reichstag on this question on November 9, 1911. "The greater the freedom given to France, the greater the security and the responsibility for order." But

the German leaders were of the opinion that it should not be permitted to take place without an official protest on their part for two reasons. In the first place, it would be a reflection on their diplomatic acumen and a blow to their national pride, if a matter of so great importance to the European states was finally adjusted without their co-operation, or without their advice having been sought. In the second place, by making the protest they would be in a position to take advantage of a rare opportunity to make political capital out of a situation, that might accrue to their advantage in the shape of increased commercial rights and privileges, or even territorial gains, in Morocco or elsewhere in Africa.

In the early stages of the French advance to Fez, the German Foreign Office had called the attention of the French Government to the fact that such action would result in the establishment of a protectorate in Morocco. The French on the other hand, in their communications to Germany, general circulars to the Powers, 10 and instructions to General Moinier, emphasized clearly the great necessity for the expedition, to protect the lives of resident foreigners and European consuls and to preserve the Shereefian Government, and stated that the occupation of Fez was only to be temporary. The Germans, however, reserved the right to resume complete liberty of action, as soon as the French forces were established at the capital.

Meanwhile, difficulties had arisen with regard to the application of the commercial and economic provisions of the Franco-German agreement of 1909. The French wished to interpret them in accordance with their general policy of free trade, adopted under pressure from England and Spain in 1904 and of the Powers at Algeciras; but Germany was inclined to insist on a narrower principle of economic monopoly of individual sections divided proportionally to the existing spheres of influence. In this connection, there arose the question of "compensations," economic or commercial, for the Germans, in case the French assumed political and territorial advantages. It is not known with whom the idea first originated; but it came out in the conversations between M. Cambon and

'Documents Diplomatiques, 1912, Affaires du Maroc, Vol. VI, pp. 179, 189-193, 221, 239, 247, 289.

10 Ibid., pp. 181, 219, 235, 261, 288, 303, 342-343.

H. Kiderlin-Waechter held in Berlin on June 11th 11 and at Kissengen on June 20th and 21st. "If we only talk of Morocco," said Kiderlin, "we cannot succeed." "You are right," replied Cambon. "If you desire to have some portion of Morocco, the conversation had better not begin. The French opinion would never allow it on this land. One might seek elsewhere." The idea of "compensation" was, however, new to the French ambassador who had no instructions along this line; but he agreed to bring the matter to the attention of his government. On June 22nd M. Cambon wrote to Paris, describing the whole interview in detail and asking for instructions, but added: "It is no longer open to us to draw back, and we must now decide what elements are to form the basis of further conversations." 12

It is well known that as early as May, 1910, France and Germany had opened conversations with a view of securing co-operation in trade and transport facilities in the Cameroons and the Congo; but no agreement was reached, although a tentative arrangement had been worked out just before the fall of the Briand-Pinchon Cabinet in February, 1911. M. Caillaux, minster of finance in the new cabinet, opened some secret negotiations with the German Foreign Office, which led them to infer at least that he and his friends were willing to concede some "compensations" in the French Congo, or elsewhere, to secure a final settlement of the Moroccan question. M. Caillaux became prime minister on June 28, 1911; and the Panther was sent to Agadir on July 1, to give Germany a good "handle" to use in the negotiations which were sure to follow.

As soon as the news of the German move on Agadir officially reached the French Cabinet, the French Foreign Office approached the British Government to learn its attitude in the matter. Finding that their views practically coincided, and being assured of a cordial and firm support by Great Britain, the French Government consented to open negotiations with Germany. Secret informal discussions, technically known as "conversations," on the Moroccan question ensued, lasting, with but one serious interruption, from the middle of July till the 4th of November. The diplomats of Wilhelmstrasse began by claiming that Germany was

11 Documents Diplomatiques, 1912, Affaires du Maroc, VI, pp. 349–350.

12 Ibid., 372-374; see also M. Selves' speech on Dec. 14, in the Chamber of Deputies, London Times for Dec. 15, 1911.

entitled, either to an "economic condominium" with France in Morocco, which would ensure to her an equal share with the French in the commercial and economic development of the land, or to "compensation" elsewhere, which she intimated might properly take the form of the cession of the whole of the Gaboon district and that portion of the French Congo lying between the Atlantic ocean and the Sanga river. In the event that the latter alternative alone was to be considered, Germany was prepared to turn over Togoland and a portion of the Cameroons to France in order to facilitate matters and equalize the larger transfer by France. The German contention for a position of special privilege in Morocco and the claim by the press of the Fatherland that their country was "fighting the battle of the world," seem not to have been well taken. By the Conference of Algeciras and her own promises, France was irrevocably committed to an "open door" policy of commercial freedom in Morocco; and Great Britain and France were enjoying over 72% of the trade of that country while Germany's share had not yet reached 13%.

France stood firm, refusing to admit that Germany possessed any special position of privilege in Morocco or was entitled by right to any "compensation" for giving France a clear field there, and insisting that the status quo of the Shereefian Empire must first be clearly and firmly established, before there could be any question of reward or "compensation" raised. Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd-George in England made forceful speeches declaring Great Britain's determination not to permit any encroachment upon her rights and interests in Northern and Western Africa. This firm attitude, combined with a financial depression in Germany which, on September 9th, almost resulted in a panic on the Berlin bourse, forced the Imperial Government to change front. The French financiers came generously and promptly forward with offers of assistance through the Swiss banks; and the day was saved. The French point of view was accepted as a basis; and, thereafter, the negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory, straightforward and business-like manner on both sides.

The program of France included three main points. First, France was to have a free hand in Morocco, in order that she might successfully establish order and security, create an efficient and responsible government, and promote the economic, political and moral development of the