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or less probability that national honor can never be affected; for, through the most various accidental circumstances, a controversy may develop into a question of honor. But this fact is in my judgment of little or no importance, since I should favor referring all questions of honor to arbitration. On the other hand, the case is quite different in regard to vital interests. For instance, how could a prize question ever affect all the basic foundations, that is to say, the vital interests of a state?

The fact that the stipulation concerning vital interests is to be presumed as forming part of the treaty, even when not expressed, can certainly refer only to agreements of a general character and concerning a large group of controversies; it cannot, however, refer to special kinds of conflicts that in the opinion of the parties can never affect their vital interests. Therefore, I do not agree with Zorn, 17 who states that the prize court agreement implicitly contains the stipulation concerning vital interests. This view could be justified only if, by the prize court agreement, such controversies as might affect the vital interests had been submitted to arbitration. But this is not the case. The meaning of the agreement is not: We submit these vital interests (that is to say, prize questions) unreservedly to arbitration; rather, it is: Prize questions can never affect vital interests; therefore, in such questions, the stipulation regarding vital interests cannot be taken in consideration.

This last point is made even clearer when we realize that in the enumeration of groups of controversies which never affect vital interests, we are not at all concerned about further restricting, but solely about interpreting the particular stipulation.

(2) The more the status of the territory of the states tends to become permanent, and especially as the earth becomes more completely partitioned among the nations, the fewer will be the colonial questions which make up at the present time such a large number of the questions affecting vital interests. Again, as international traffic develops, and customs-boundaries between the nations disappear, fewer purely economic questions affecting vital interests will arise among the nations. Also, the attainment of the fair goal which Senator La Fontaine, one of

17 Cf. Zeitschrift für Politik, II, p. 361. I find that Zorn does not draw a sharp enough distinction between the stipulations concerning national honor and vital interests.

the oldest and most deserving peace advocates, sketched in beautiful words at the Geneva World Peace Congress of 1912, might in this connection prove of great significance. La Fontaine, in concluding his address of welcome, spoke as follows:

We must also proclaim the international rights of man. The freedom to circulate, to associate, think and to possess must belong to every man over the fair circle of the whole world. The absurd legend that nations are restricted to their national territory and hostile to strangers must be brought to an end; the idea of Germany for the Germans, France for the French, China for the Chinese is a relic of past ages. This question. of conflicts between the peoples, one of the most serious, if not the most serious, rests on misconception and error. In the place of hatred and envy I invite you to put this expression of liberation and concord: the earth for mankind.

(3) This last view-point has already opened a new road to us, which will also take us nearer to the great goal: it is the gradual codification of international law, and above it all the fixation of certain fundamental laws. 18 It will, of course, not suffice to develop the material law only. Formal law also must be further unfolded. When, for instance, the territory of a state is guaranteed, an arbitral court might, in spite of this fact, disregard this fundamental principle; this can be prevented only by creating legal agencies against arbitral decisions. The completion of arbitral jurisprudence is, therefore, included also in this development.

(4) But the completion of arbitral jurisprudence will very likely prove less important, because the creation of a real international jurisprudence and of an International Court of Justice is a question of only a short time. And when we shall have such a court, the states will then be, better than hitherto, insured against legal errors. It will then also be possible to submit more controversies than heretofore to arbitral settlement. The states will also more frequently realize the good results of this way of settling disputes and be induced to refer more to such a


All these elements will contribute more and more to the end that some day all controversies will be settled through the intermediation of an impartial tribunal.

18 Cf. de Jong, "Völkerrechtskodifikation und Genfer Friedens-kongress," in Friedenswarte, 1912, p. 329.

But, at the close of this essay, the question might well be asked: Is it not true then, in accordance with what has been said, that questions of vital interests can at present be decided by the sword alone? Are not all efforts made to settle all these great controversies through pacific means, exerted in vain?

In my judgment we have even now at our disposal a peaceful and honorable way to settle questions of vital interest, that is to say, adjustment through diplomatic channels. More and more in the great questions of foreign relations, the nations will and must look not merely to their own respective interests, but take into consideration the fact that they are part of a community of states, that is to say, of one civilized community, in which they must all have consideration for each other. This consideration for the interests of the opponent must, of course, never lead to a sacrifice of the vital necessities of their own people. But in case the opponent stands ready to respect the conditions of our existence, for the sole purpose of increasing our prestige or of weakening and humiliating the other party, we must not exact more than is our due. If we ask that the opponent respect our vital interests, then we must leave his own unimpaired also.

There is now manifest in the faithful execution by the states of numerous non-political treaties a powerful sense of justice in the community of states which we must assiduously foster. It is the duty of the advocates of peace to point incessantly to that noble idea and call it to the attention of the states. In this way there is the possibility of settling through diplomatic negotiations all those controversies that cannot at present be adjusted through arbitration.



It is a truism that the science of law proper the science dealing with the national law of each nation is very different from the science of what is called international law. In the study of the law of the United States or the law of Great Britain, one finds the whole science based on the fact of the existence of a political society known as the United States or Great Britain, which formulates, applies and enforces the law which governs these nations in their internal relations. When one enters upon the study of what is called international law, one finds himself expected to accept as a fundamental proposition that there is no political society which formulates, applies and enforces the law which he is told governs all nations in their external relations, and that this law is formulated, applied and enforced among or between the nations. This difference in fundamentals leads to corresponding differences in the derivative notions. Practitioners of law proper take little or no interest in what is called international law. From their point of view, that which is called international law is only a collection of the rules of a highly interesting game, success in which depends largely upon "face" and personality; nor can it be denied that there is much to justify this opinion. Students of law reflect the attitude of mind of the practitioner, and the great majority of students end their legal education when they finish the courses in national domestic law, giving no consideration to the law which governs the actions and relations of the nations.

In recent years, the development of what is known as political science, which is the science dealing with the structure and working of political societies, has accentuated the difficulties of students who wish to gain some knowledge of the political and legal affairs of the world. They study the structure and working of the town, the county, the state, and the nation for the purpose of making these political societies more economical and efficient. They even go beyond the confines of the nation and study the structure and working of vast political organisms

like the British Empire for the same purpose. But when they seek to apply political science to the structure and working of the whole human society, they are confronted by a prevalent idea that beyond the limits of nations, or at least beyond the limits of political organisms like the British Empire, there is political chaos. They are taught that the nations are sovereign and independent, but that all the nations have the mutual attribute of solidarity. If the word solidarity is given its technical meaning, it seems not to imply a complete or a federal unity, but rather a mutual relationship of the persons or societies concerned under an implied contract of each with each, and with all, whereby all are the mutual guarantors of each other. In this technical sense, solidarity of the nations, seems, when analyzed, to imply a universal extension of the balance of power system, which for four centuries has drenched Europe with blood. If the nations are mutually guarantors of each other, it necessarily follows that if one nation becomes expansive or aggressive, "international solidarity" compels its surrounding neighbors to ally themselves so as to balance or overbalance the power of the aggressor nation, for the purpose of holding it in check. This is exactly the balance of power system. It leads to shifting alliances, ententes and concerts. The system in operation is essentially a military game, requiring the application of rules of strategy. It is the antithesis of political organization, and though it may ultimately lead to political organization through the exhaustion of the parties and their perception of the waste and inefficiency involved, it frequently involves a military dictatorship as an intermediate process.

But the march of events is modifying this technical meaning of solidarity, and the word is coming into popular use in a new and enlarged sense as implying an existing unity, federal in type, of the whole body of the peoples and nations of the world. This enlarged meaning of solidarity is apparently due to the effort of the public mind to find a word to express the altered views which people everywhere are beginning to have concerning human society as a whole. Educated and uneducated persons alike, familiarized by the public press with the doings of all the peoples and nations of the world through the processes of modern invention, now understand that the world is made up of political societies much resembling those to which they are accustomed. It is becoming

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