Moore's Arbitrations, p. 2419.) Again, this government has, after beginning, discontinued the formal and official prosecution of a case for reasons regarded as sufficient by the Department of State (Case of the "Haytian Republic" against Haiti, see Moore's Digest, Vol. VI, p. 1016, and generally p. 1026) and it arranges settlements of claims.

Finally, that this government, by presenting a claim diplomatically to another, thereby takes over, assumes responsibility for, and becomes the owner of it, has always been the consistent doctrine of the Department of State and it has uniformly acted in accordance therewith. (Moore's Digest, Vol. VI, §§ 1055–1060, p. 1012 et seq.)

Since a claim for injury to its national is thus presented by one sovereign to another sovereign, it necessarily follows, as already suggested, that the determination of the validity and amount of the claim is an international (as distinguished from national or municipal) adjudication, and is made under and in accordance with the applicable rules and principles of international law. Therefore, the function of international arbitration in such cases, as also of pure diplomatic adjustments when the settlement of a claim takes this form, is the determination of the questions of validity and amounts as between sovereigns, and not the determination of questions regarding the private ownership of the award under the applicable rules and principles of the national municipal law in force in the country to which the award is paid. This is true whether the international award has been made in a lump sum, the passing upon individual claims being assigned to a local commission, as, for example, the French Indemnity of 1831 (Frevall v. Bache [1840] 14 Pet., 95); the Chinese Indemnity of 1858 (The Caldera Cases [1879] 15 Ct. Cls., 546); and the Alabama Claims Commission (Williams v. Heard [1890] 140 U. S., 529), or whether the award is not a lump sum, but is an award in an individual case and made by an international commission which is organized for the express purpose of passing upon the individual claims, as, for example, the awards by the commission sitting under the Convention with Mexico of 1868 (Frelinghuysen v. Key [1883] 110 U. S., 63), and the commission sitting under the Convention of 1871 for the settlement of Civil War Claims with Great Britain (Phelps v. McDonald [1878] 99 U. S., 297). Obviously this fact will usually be covered and made entirely clear either by the statute creating the local commission, or the treaty or protocol creating the international commission; for example, the protocol in the Alsop Case submitted to the Amiable Compositeur the question,

as between the Governments of the United States and Chile, "what equitably due the claimants." 'Case

amount, if any, is

of the United States, p. 1.)

THE FUND WHEN RECEIVED IS A NATIONAL FUND, IN WHICH CLAIMANTS HAVE NO STRICT LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RIGHTS

From these principles it follows naturally that the award when received after the determination of its validity and amount belongs to the nation and constitutes a national fund. This proposition was contested by the claimants in certain cases cited in the preceding discussion, but the court declined to acquiesce in the contention. The true doctrine on this point was set forth by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Heard ([1890] 140 U. S., 529) when the court said:

"It was held in United States v. Weld (127 U. S., 51), that this award was made to the United States as a nation. The fund was, at all events, a national fund to be distributed by Congress as it saw fit. True, as citizens of the United States had suffered in person and property by reason of the acts of the Confederate cruisers, and as justice demanded that such losses should be made good by the government of Great Britain, the most natural disposition of the fund that could be made by Congress was in the payment of such losses. But no individual claimant had, as a matter of strict legal or equitable right, any lien upon the fund awarded, nor was Congress under any legal or equitable obligation to pay any claim out of the proceeds of that fund.

* * There was, undoubtedly, a moral obligation on the United States to bestow the fund received upon the individuals who had suffered losses at the hands of the Confederate cruisers; and in this sense all the claims of whatsoever nature were possessed of greater or less pecuniary value. There was at least a possibility of their payment by Congress-an expectancy of interest in the fund, that is, a possibility coupled with an interest."

While this particular statement was made in a case dealing with the ownership of a portion of a lump-sum award (the Alabama Claims fund) there appears no doubt but that the principle is equally applicable and controlling in cases where awards are made in the names of individual claimants by international commissions. For example, in La Abra Silver Mining Company v. United States ([1899] 175 U. S., 423) where an international commission had made an award in favor of or in the name of the plaintiff company, the Supreme Court said:

"The money in the hands of the Secretary of State was paid to the United States by Mexico pursuant to the award of the Commission. That tribunal dealt only with the two Governments, had no relations with the claimants, and could

take cognizance only of claims presented by or through the respective governments. No claimant, individual or corporate, was entitled to present any demand or proofs directly to the Commission. As between the United

States and Mexico, indeed as between the United States and the American claimants, the money received from Mexico under the award of the Commission was in strict law the property of the United States, and no claimant could assert or enforce any interest in it so long as the Government legally withheld it from distribution."

That the fund received in such cases is a national fund is further shown by the fact that the government has always exercised the right to reopen awards for the purpose of determining if they were improper or unjust and of refunding whatever sums it seemed inequitable to retain, and this has been done in spite of the protests and legal and other proceedings of claimants.

[This government, by new conventions, reopened international awards in favor of its citizens in connection with the United States and Venezuelan Commission of 1867-68 (Moore's Arbitrations, p. 1659 et seq; I Senate For. Rel. Committee Reports, p. 471 et seq); and in connection with the awards of the Mixed Venezuelan Commissions of 1903, one case, the Orinoco Steamship case, being resubmitted to an arbitral tribunal (see record of tribunal) and another, the Orinoco Corporation, being settled by diplomatic arrangement. (And see also Gibbes case and others under the United States and Colombian Commissions of 1857 and 1864, Moore's Arbitrations, pp. 1361 et seq., particularly 1396 et seq; Gibbes case, 13 Op. Atty. Gen'l. p. 19.) Congress has referred to the Court of Claims questions involving the validity of international awards. (The Weil and La Abra cases, Moore's Arbitrations p. 1324 et seq.) The Senate alone has investigated claims passed upon by domestic commissions. (Moore's Arbitrations, pp. 1255 et seq., 1263.) The Secretary of State of his own volition has reopened for examination claims passed upon by an international arbitrator. (Pelletier and Lazare cases against Haiti, For. Rel. 1887, p. 593 et seq., Moore's Arbitrations, p. 1749 et seq.)

Moreover, funds received from foreign governments in settlement of American claims, have been returned to foreign governments because investigations made by this government showed that the claims were for one reason or another improper. (La Abra and Weil cases, supra; Brig Caroline, a claim against Brazil, For. Rel. 1874, p. 95, Senate Ex. Doc. No. 52, 43rd Cong. 1st Sess., I Senate For. Rel. Committee Reports, p. 484.) Indeed in all these three cases Congress appropriated public moneys to make up for that part of the awards which had been already distributed among claimants. Moreover, in the Caroline case the Secretory of State appears to have refunded part of the money without congressional authority, and he similarly practically waived payment of any indemnity in the Pelletier and Lazare cases, supra.

When lump sums have been awarded to the United States in settlement of claims, this government has consistently returned all sums in excess of the losses actually suffered. (Chinese Indemnity 1858, Moore's Arbitrations, p. 4627 et

seq; Boxer Indemnity 1901, For. Rel. 1907, p. 174; Japanese Indemnity 1864, For. Rel. 1888, p. 1069, Moore's Digest, Vol. V, p. 749.)

Moreover, in distributing awards Congress has invoked and acted upon the same principle, giving the fund to whom it chose and cutting off from participation those whom it wished. For example, in appropriating money to meet the "French Spoliation" claims, Congress first charged the Court of Claims to determine the then present ownership of the various claims, after which and upon receiving the report of the court, it appropriated money to pay the claims but provided that it should go to the next of kin of the "original sufferer," specifically excluding assignees under bankruptcy proceedings and all others who did not represent the next of kin. (See 26 Stat., 897, 908; for interpretation of this statute, see Bagge v. Balch [1896] 162 U. S., 439.) Again, in dealing with the Alabama Claims award, Congress provided that the commission might award attorneys' fees to those appearing for claimants before the commission, but declared that

"all other liens upon, or assignments, sales, transfers, either absolute or conditional for services rendered or to be rendered about any claim or part or parcel thereof provided for in this bill heretofore or hereafter made or done before such judgment is awarded and the warrant issued therefor, shall be absolutely null and void and of no effect." (18 Stats., sec. 18, p. 245; for interpretation of this statute see Bachman v. Lawson [1883] 109 U. S., 659.)

BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS HAVE CERTAIN PLENARY POWERS OVER SUCH FUND AND THE DISTRIBUTION THEREOF

When the fund in settlement of claims is received from the foreign government, either as the result of diplomatic adjustment or of international arbitration and following the determination of the validity and amount of the claim, the national jurisdiction attaches thereto and normally it is thereafter dealt with in accordance with the rules and principles of national municipal law and not international law.

Such a fund so received at once becomes subject to the exercise of two powers-that of the executive or political branch of the government and that of the legislative branch. Roughly the jurisdictions of these respective powers are as follows:

Control by the executive

After the fund is received from the foreign government, the political branch of the government still deals with it in so far as there may be

international questions involved, such for example as the refunding of the award if obtained by means of fraud or imposition, or the making of provision for the resubmission of cases to arbitration (in the exercise of which power, the Senate obviously may be involved). In these matters it would seem that the powers of the executive are more or less plenary. The question has never, so far as has been observed, been adequately discussed, though it received some attention by the Supreme Court in connection with the various La Abra and Weil cases. In Frelinghuysen v. Key ([1883] 110 U. S., 63), where complainants sought to compel, by mandamus, the distribution of the Weil award by the Secretary of State, who was withholding such sums pending the action of the Senate on a treaty providing for a rehearing of the cases, the court, in denying the writ, said:

"All we decide is, it was within the discretion of the President to negotiate again with Mexico in respect to the claims, and that as long as the two governments are treating on the questions involved, he may properly withhold from the relators their distributive shares of the moneys now in the hands of the Secretary of State."

There was also involved in this case the interpretation of a statute of Congress with reference to the powers conferred and duties imposed thereby on the executive. Section 1 of this statute provided:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of State be, and he is hereby, authorized and required to receive any and all moneys which may be paid by the Mexican Republic under and in pursuance of the conventions between the United States and the Mexican Republic for the adjustment of claims, concluded July fourth, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and April twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six; and whenever, and as often as, any installments shall have been paid by the Mexican Republic on account of said awards, to distribute the moneys so received in ratable proportions among the corporations, companies, or private individuals respectively in whose favor awards have been made by said commissioners, or by the umpires, or to their legal representatives or assigns, except as in this act otherwise limited or provided, according to the proportion which their respective awards shall bear to the whole amount of such moneys then held by him, and to pay the same, without other charge or deduction than is hereinafter provided, to the parties respectively entitled therteo. And in making such distribution and payment, due regard shall be had to the value at the time of such distribution of the respective currencies in which the said awards are made payable; and the proportionate amount of any award of which by its terms the United States is entitled to retain a part shall be deducted from the payment to be made on such award, and shall be paid into the Treasury of