any well matured plans for either offence or defence. Admiral Cevera's correspondence, characterized by the author as "pathetic in the light of later events," makes it manifest that both statements were true as regards Spain, and the whole narrative abounds with evidence to the same effect as regards the United States. Fortunately for us, the deficiencies of the United States were by no means so great as were those of Spain.

As illustrations of the lack of naval strength on the part of the United States may be cited: the frequent withdrawal of vessels from the blockade of Havana and the west of Cuba for more pressing duties elsewhere, often necessary to an extent that impaired the efficiency of the blockade, the impossibility of reinforcing Dewey in the Philippines without robbing the North Atlantic of much needed capital ships, and the lack of suitable scouting vessels for use in the moves looking to the location and interception of Cevera's fleet. As to absence of plans, no better illustration is needed than the want of correlation between the army and the navy, only too evident in the joint operations at Santiago, of which the author says, "But this arose, not from want of good will, of which there was plenty, but from want of any general staff system in both the war and navy departments, which prevented that intimate understanding and mutual study of conditions as they arose; Reflection on what might have been the consequences had the condition of our adversary been different is painful.

On the walls of the armories of the Republic of Venice was inscribed the following: "Happy is the nation that in time of peace prepares for war." Time with its ever increasing resort to pacific methods for settlement of international disputes, has neither subtracted from the truth of these words, nor made it less the part of wisdom for a nation to adopt and adhere to a consistent policy for the national defence. The gratifying increase of the navy since the Spanish-American War, the establishment of the General Staff for the Army, the organization of the General Board for the Navy, and of the Joint Army and Navy Board, show that the United States has not been unmindful of the lessons taught by the conflict with Spain; but recent Congressional action impels one to ask, is not more required lest we forget; would not the establishment of a Council of National Defence, on the lines recommended in the annual reports of both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, be a step in the right direction?

Throughout the two volumes, notably in the discussion of the naval

battle off Santiago, Admiral Chadwick has adhered to his conception of history, "to hold back no syllable of the truth, neither to magnify our own exploits nor depreciate those of the foe", and in so doing has built up, not unconsciously perhaps, a just tribute to the officer to whose memory the volumes are dedicated; an officer who by reason of his abilities, and his achievements in the face of almost overwhelming difficulties, merits a high place in America's list of naval commanders. JOHN P. MERRELL.

Les Grands Traités politiques. Recueil des principaux textes diplomatiques depuis 1815-jusqu'a nos jours avec des commentaires et des notes. By Pierre Albin. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1911. pp. xii, 570.

This is a very useful volume. Though much less complete and comprehensive and therefore less attractive to students of international law than Dr. Strupp's Urkunden zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts, it will perhaps be found more serviceable for diplomatists, journalists, and men of affairs.

In the avertissement, the author thus states his purpose:

We have tried to collect and to classify methodically in the smallest possible volume the greatest possible number of treaties of a political nature concluded since the Treaty of Vienna. We have put aside all treaties, conventions, or arrangements having a commercial, judicial, or administrative character.

The six books (livres) into which the work is divided deal respectively with Western and Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, America and Oceania, and International Arbitration. Each of these books is divided into sections, mainly on a geographical basis; thus, Book I falls into parts dealing separately with Belgium, Luxemburg, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, Italy and the Holy See, Norway, and Special Agreements. For example, the section on the German Empire contains the Treaty of Vienna (1864) relating to the occupation of the duchies Schleswig and Holstein; the Treaty of Prague (1866); the Preliminaries of Versailles and the Treaty of Frankfort (1871); and the Treaty of Vienna (1879) relating to the origin of the Triple Alliance.

It will be seen that the selections are made from a political or diplomatic rather than an international law or historical point of view. Many important treaties and documents are necessarily omitted. One interested in the Monroe Doctrine will hardly feel content with that portion of the text of President Monroe's message relating to this sub

ject and the selections from the Clayton-Bulwer and Hay-Pauncefote Treaties cited in the note on pp. 512-513. The student of the history of the United States may be gratified to find the text of the Treaty of Paris (1898) with Spain: but he will be disappointed to discover in the section on American rivers the treaties relating to the navigation of the Parana and the Uruguay instead of those dealing with the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence.

It is, however, a matter of no small convenience for the student even of international law to have in a place readily accessible the important treaties relating to such countries as China, Morocco, and Thibet.

The book is well-furnished with alphabetical, chronological, and analytic tables. It contains nearly one hundred treaties accompanied by useful historical notices and commentaries.

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

A Short History of War and Peace. By G. H. Perris. New York: Henry Holt & Co. London: Williams and Norgate. 1911. pp. 256.

It will be noticed that, in the title of this book, "war" precedes "peace". War to bring about peace seems paradoxical. Yet it seems undoubtedly to be true, as the author says, that war is often a process of evolution - an explosive process which occurs when the progressive movement of the human molecules towards a reorganization making for equality of opportunity and a betterment of the law, is unduly held back by the forces of standpat-ism and vested interests. Mr. Perris traces this process, showing the gradual sweep of the progressive movement over the world accompanied by explosions when the crucible was shut up too tightly. He begins with the dawn of history and comes down to the present time. Even the military emperor of antiquity is seen as a progressive when he rules with an iron hand over the small communities which lie exhausted after centuries of strife and bloodshed. The peace which he compels is fictitious to some extent, but it is better than incessant war. Enforced peace through great areas leads to trade, and trade to money, money to the power of the purse, and the power of the purse to a general extension of the credit system. The military empire under these influences disintegrates into self-governing trading and money-loving states, jealous of each other, warring with each other by commercial prohibitions and regulations, and by armies and navies, and mutually guaranteeing each other so that contracts may be faithfully observed and "credit" kept. The world then comes under the

control of "the credit economy," which in turn leads to the diffusion of knowledge generally and to a new and higher philosophy, organization and law.

Under the system of "the credit economy", peace is sought to be obtained by the application of the principle of "the balance of power." All the states agree that if any one attempts to alter the status quo, its surrounding neighbors will throttle it into submission and compel it to observe the status quo. This system ultimately leads to a "concert" of the Powers, and this, in turn, in some cases, to federation.

When war is considered in the light of an explosive process in evolution, and when it is considered that all the world is never at the same stage of evolution, and that these processes of organization and reorganization are going on in different stages and at different rates of advance in the different states and nations, the wonder is that wars do not arise oftener, and that we have as much peace as we have without stagnation. Such books as this of Mr. Perris are helpful to the cause of "peace as a practical proposition." If wars are only explosions due to confining the mental and spiritual gases too closely, the true way to peace is to provide an improved organism and better machinery and rules for the body-politic, and to equip the machinery with more efficient checks and safety-valves so that these mental and spiritual gases may be dissipated into the air at times when the draught is too great and the fire under the crucible becomes hot. Mr. Perris believes that an "organization of peace" is already beginning to evolve, and is hopeful that by gradual improvements in the existing organization of the world, war may ultimately be abolished. We know that improvements in political and social organization have put an end to men continually fighting with their neighbors; and the conclusion seems inevitable that the only thing which will reduce the area and amount of the destruction done by war, and ultimately perhaps abolish it, is the improvement of the political organization which now exists in a crude and hardly perceptible form, binding together all the peoples and nations of the world in a "solidarity", if not yet in a unity.

Perhaps it is not too much to say that Mr. Perris's book is a treatise in political science. The same historical and scientific method of study is applied to the whole of human society as is applied by political scientists to the study of the town, the city, the state, or the nation. Moreover the purpose is the same, the improvement of the existing organization so as to make it more economical and efficient.

The brevity of the book, its excellent style, the wisdom shown in many of the inferences and conclusions, all commend it as one of the most useful and truly progressive which has recently appeared.

A. H. SNOW.

Traité de Droit Public International. A. Mérignhac. Troisième PartieLe Droit de la Guerre. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. pp. 596.

This, the third volume of A. Mérignhac's Public International Law, treats in its first part of the common law of war irrespective of the field of operations, following with a discussion of such features as apply particularly to war on land. The work beside illustrating, as might be expected, in many of its phases the ability of its author, is entirely up-todate, a reasonable degree of attention being devoted to those features of the subject which have developed within a very few years, such as wireless telegraphy and aerial navigation. It embraces everything of value in the production of the author published in 1903, and now out of print, relating to the laws and customs of war upon land according to modern international law and the codification of the Conference of The Hague of 1899, and includes the results of the further codifications of the Conference of 1907. As to the subject of aerial warfare, he notes a natural subdivision between so much of it as pertains to war on land and so much as pertains to war on sea, reserving the latter for discussion in connection with a volume yet to be issued relating to the laws of maritime warfare.

So long as warfare between nations is recognized as legitimate and civilized, it is of course well that its rules should be systematized, and this work is admirably done, from the usual standpoint, by M. Mérignhac. His work is a valuable repository and has the advantage of being the most modern upon the subject.

It is the opinion, however, of the present reviewer that the time is fast approaching when there should be logically an entire recasting of the laws of war. If it be admitted, as now is universally done, that the normal and preferable state of nations is one of peace and the abnormal and injurious state is one of war, our treatment of war, through its laws, should bear a rough resemblance to our treatment of disease. This, in the first place, we try to prevent, and if it comes, to minimize its effects, both upon the patient and upon his neighbors. Our laws of