After discussing the question of an "International Armed Force" to serve simply and purely as a police power, of which he approves, he has a "Last Word" on the general situation of the day, the rivalry in armaments, the prodigious burdens laid by them on the peoples, the ruin which awaits the nations at the end of the race, if the whole course of things is not changed. He continues: "There remains indeed much to be done to facilitate the march of the law of nations towards peace." But though the way may be long and the obstacles many, the end, he believes, will at last be attained if we continue our course courageously under the guidance of the "Shining Star of Truth."

There are two brief annexes to the work, one giving the text of the Juridical Protest, already mentioned, against the war in Tripoli, and the other the brief speech made by the author before the First Commission of the Hague Conference of 1899.

The high character of the work is sustained from the beginning to the end, and it is an unusually important contribution to the study of the manner in which international law may be made to promote the coming of the era of good-will, justice and peace.

BENJAMIN F. TRUEBLOOD.

La Neutralizzazione. By Dr. Aldo Baldassarri. Rome: Topografia Fratelli Pallotta. 1912. pp. viii, 165.

This little treatise is devoted to the study of the relations created between states by neutralization, using the word in its more restricted sense as applied to the deliberate neutralization by treaty in permanence, or for an unlimited term, of a state or part of a state. The somewhat closely related case of neutralization of national or international organizations, such as the hospital service in case of war, is merely glanced at, and the greater part of the work is given to an historical analysis of the several treaties upon which the principal cases of territorial neutralization are based.

The author justifies his enterprise by pointing out that the subject has hitherto been treated somewhat as a curiosity of international law, and that it has not in fact even yet found a settled and systematic place of its own in works devoted to that science.

The truth is that the examples of neutralization are as yet of very limited number, so limited that it is not altogether easy to infer principles of general application from the details of treatment arising out of special circumstances. It is in fact a comparatively new device tend

ing to remove certain incitements to war or to reduce in some degree the destructive effects of war, should it break out. It has already proved its value as an immediate solution of pressing and dangerous questions, and it is no depreciation to say that the ultimate strength of this kind of fireproof construction in case of a general conflagration is as yet unascertained.

A contract in the form of a treaty is at the foundation of every case of neutralization: we must then examine the obligations assumed by each of the parties, that is, on the one hand, the neutralized state, and on the other, the neutralizing states. The cases of Switzerland and Belgium afford the standards for comparison, and, indeed, it is not unlikely that the entire idea is in its main features a result of the historical position of Switzerland in Europe. For centuries previous to 1815, the Confederation of Cantons had held its independence, had made a definite policy of neutrality in all European wars, and had by its geographical conditions been enabled on the whole to maintain this position. At the Congress of Vienna, the Powers recognized this attitude, assented to it, and, admitting it to be for the advantage of all concerned, practically became joint guarantors of the continuance of the status quo.

What then are the obligations of the neutralized state? First, no doubt, abstention from war against the neutralizing states, the other parties to the contract; but the case of Switzerland, Dr. Baldassarri thinks, makes it very evident that more than this is inherent in the very idea of neutralization; what was understood and secured in that case at least was adherence in the future to the traditional attitude of the Confederation of neutrality in all European wars. The obligation to abstain from war necessarily infers abstention from all offensive alliances; on the doubtful point of the right to enter into defensive alliances, the author decides in favor of the right, always assuming that the obligation undertaken by the neutralized state does not infer warlike measures on its part.

The obligations assumed by the neutralizing towards the neutralized state can be readily summed up in the one duty of absolute respect for the rights and integrity of the latter as it now exists. This obligation is also a mutual one as between the several neutralizing states themselves. Thus a violation of neutrality on the part of one state is not only a wrong done to the neutralized state, but an injury to all the others which joined in the act of neutralization. Whether such a viola

tion must necessarily as a duty be resented depends on whether an actual guaranty was given or whether the neutralization was merely assented to.

The neutralization of parts of states as, for example, of the Suez Canal, presents special problems, depending on the circumstances of each case, and this is even more the fact when we come to deal with what Dr. Baldassarri calls imperfect neutralizations, the special examples selected by him being the treaties between Buenos-Ayres and Chili as to the Straits of Magellan, and the case of the Panama Canal Zone. These neutralizations are described as imperfect for the reason that they arise out of a treaty intervening between two nations mainly concerned, but inasmuch as other nations which may eventually be more or less directly concerned have not adhered or assented to the terms of neutralization, an anomalous situation might under some circumstances present itself in which the obligation assumed by one of the treaty parties would be inconsistent with the ordinary obligations of a neutral. Thus, according to the author's reading of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, in the event of a war between Great Britain and Japan, while Great Britain, as one of the parties to the treaty, could have no ground for objection to the use of the Canal by the warships of Japan, the latter would under the ordinary rules of international law be in a position to call the United States to account for failure in the duties of a neutral in permitting British warships to pass through the Canal. In this view, it is only in case the other Powers which have any practical concern in the matter should assent to the treaty that the neutralization could be considered perfect.

It may perhaps be questioned whether the distinction between the so-called perfect and imperfect neutralization is of very great importance. If it has any real basis, it lies mainly in the introduction into the treaty of an element somewhat in derogation of the ordinary rule of international law and therefore requiring assent by the other parties before it can be considered as binding on them. As a matter of fact, every case of neutralization has its own peculiar stipulations and conditions and it may perhaps be most usefully regarded as a new and as yet only partially tried device for the solution of knotty problems, the full possibilities of which will be proved only by experiment. As yet, it can be best illustrated by the historical method to which Dr. Baldassarri has in the present case for the most part adhered.

JAMES BARCLAY.

Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die clausula rebus sic stantibus. By Dr. Jur. Erich Kaufmann. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1911. pp. xii, 321.

This little monograph is divided into an introductory and four additional chapters. In his preface the author observes that there are two modes of dealing with the problem of the clause rebus sic stantibus usually held to be implied in treaties - the doctrinal-historical and systematic methods. He has chosen to adopt the latter mode of treatment.

In his second chapter the author does, however, present us with some "Historical Evidences." In this connection he discusses the limitations imposed by the Paris Treaty of 1856 upon Russia on the Black Sea, the repudiation of the free status of the harbor of Batum through the Russian Ukase of 1886, the renunciation of the London Protocol of 1852 by Prussia and Austria, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908-09. But we need a much more impartial and comprehensive study of historical instances than is furnished in this chapter.

The third chapter (pp. 45-56) is devoted to a refutation of the theory of Dr. Jur. Bruno Schmidt, whose important monograph Uber die volkerrechtliche clausula rebus sic stantibus was published in 1907. Dr. Schmidt indeed admitted that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has played a certain part in the practical international life of states, but denied to it a positive sanction in international law. In other words, Schmidt held to the doctrine of pacta servanda sunt as the positive rule or principle of international law, though he appears to admit exceptions in practice. This controversy is conducted on both sides mainly on theoretical premises and seems to lead to barren results.

In the remaining chapters, Dr. Kaufmann attempts to establish his thesis on highly abstract and theoretical grounds, based partly on analogies in private law and so-called doctrines of political theory or philosophy. For example, he discusses such problems as the "succession" theory, the concept of the individual, the "Voraussetzung," the concept of law, etc., etc.

We confess to very little interest in these matters, at least in this connection. What we should like to see is a real investigation of historical precedents and their criticism in the light of the international welfare and of admitted principles of law and equity. This is a subject of vital importance, especially in view of the happy progress which is being made in the direction of the judicial settlement of international disputes.

As an example of irrelevancy and of that belatedness which appears

still to be characteristic of some German publicists, we cite the following passage from p. 146:

"Not the 'association of men of free will,' but triumphant war is the social ideal: triumphant war as the final means to every highest aim. In war the State reveals itself in its real essence; war is the State's highest achievement; in war the State attains its fullest development."

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

International Law. By L. Oppenheim. Vol. II, War and Neutrality. 2nd ed. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1912. pp. xxxvi, 711.

The second edition of Professor Oppenheim's well known work has already received a cordial welcome at the hands of those who have appreciated his thoughtful and scholarly treatise from the time of its first appearance in 1905-1906. In the preface to the revised edition of this second volume the author calls attention to the fact that a number of new topics have been discussed, notably the questions whether enemy subjects have persona standi in judicio, and whether trading with enemy subjects is permitted. Several chapters of the earlier edition had to be entirely rewritten, owing to radical changes introduced into some branches of international law since 1906.

The chief merit of the present volume is the singular skill with which the author presents the results of the Second Hague Conference and of the Declaration of London. His remarks on the proper method of handling the agreements reached at those two Conferences are very judicious, and it would be well if they could be kept in mind by writers who are inclined to treat those agreements as settled law. They have not yet been generally ratified, and in consequence, says Professor Oppenheim, "the task of the writer of a comprehensive treatise on International Law is very difficult: He must certainly not treat the rules in these unratified documents as law, but, on the other hand, he must not ignore them. For this reason the right method seems to be to give everywhere the law hitherto prevailing, and to give also the changes in the law which are proposed by these unratified documents."

It may be pertinent to ask under what conditions the conventions of the Hague Conferences and the Declaration of London will warrant being considered settled law? Not only will it be necessary that these agreements shall be ratified by the great body of states, and that they shall be ratified without the important reservations which at present