(The writer next suggested to Mr. Carnegie the desirability of inviting William T. Stead to America to aid the arbitration cause, which he did; and, in 1907, Mr. Stead appeared at the Carnegie Hall Congress and subsequently toured the country, inspired the people everywhere and started the formation of societies in all of the leading cities.)

In 1907, the writer arranged a number of these arguments, including those regarding the infeasibility of establishing courts with permanent judges, to be sent to the Delegations of the Several Nations at the Second Conference of The Hague and sent them (in a small blue book) only after obtaining the approval of the Department of State at Washington, as the American Delegation had begun to work for such an institution.. The result is mentioned further on; and, it is considered, fully sustains the position.

The impelling motive for such action was the belief, that time would only be wasted in the adoption of a system established on lines which, it was apparent from the outset, would lead but to disaster and only mislead Americans and all alike, in the belief that the matter had been definitely adjusted and that all could cease further efforts. Foremost along those lines was the introduction of a distinction in representation in a court having to do with matters of justice, based on the size of a nation, thereby opening the way in the society of nations for contentions analogous to those that have taken place among the peoples of all countries to achieve equal consideration, and which have given rise to magna chartas, revolutions, etc.

Furthermore, it was proposed that the jurisdiction of the courts should extend only to disputes such as would

never be the subject of a war: namely, those that the contestants would voluntarily submit to the court, for the nations were already arbitrating such cases, without a permanent court.

Little progress was made in the cause of international arbitration during the following eight or nine years, as the subject was looked upon as academic and utopian; but, from the spring of 1914, many practical men have interested themselves in it and not a few of the very ablest are in favor of the Isolation Plan.

New York, July, 1917.

THE ISOLATION*

(or non-intercourse)

PLAN

CLAIMS

The following claims are made for this plan;

1. It would be adaptable to all classes of cases.

2. It would not derogate from the sovereignty of any nation.

3. It would present the least possible opportunity for domination by any nation.

4. It would lend no encouragement to alliances between nations.

5. It would afford an absolute equality between large and small nations in matters of right.

6. The mode of constituting the (arbitral) courts is the most complete device to assure impartiality.

7. It would permit of the employment in the court of the most eminent minds of the day.

8. It would permit any number of arbitrations to proceed at one time, thereby obviating delays in reaching a cause on a calender.

9. It would be wholly scientific in that it would combine the essential features, and none but such.

10. The sanction would be the most drastic; and yet, not armed force.

11. The application of the sanction would not be directed toward the support of any side of the contention.

*The word Isolation was latterly adopted by the writer instead of "non-intercourse,' as the latter does not permit of direct translation.

12. The function of the body that would administer it would simply be to establish a fact which should be determined in less than a day.

13. The punishment would be so severe, certain and thoroughly known in advance, that no nation would ever allow itself to arrive at a position where it would be condemned to undergo it.

14. General disarmament would afford the necessary assurance that dependence would be placed in the system, which dependence can never be established while any degree of armament is permitted, save, of course, for internal police purposes and the prevention of piracy on the seas. 15. It would necessitate practically no expense. 16. It would make war budgets unnecessary.

17. It would afford the only means for the nations to remain solvent after the great war and avoid internal turmoil.

18. Its adoption could be effected without any change to the organic or constitutional laws of the several nations.

19. General disarmament would accomplish the chief objectives of the opposing sides in the great war: the abolition of British navalism and German militarism: the only objects which can be worth the price of the war. 20. General disarmament would afford the only kind of a peace that would deserve the qualification "perpetual.' 21. It could be introduced almost immediately; as a code of international law, which could only be worked out after years of conferring, and so, might be dragged along until differences arose which would make the whole combination impossible—would not be a pre-requisite (although certain fundamental principles should be defined at the outset).

22. It combines also the means by which a few of the Great Powers could force all of the others to disarm and conform to the Convention.

Interdependence

One of the great effects of the war has been to render almost superfluous discussions which otherwise would have continued for years: for instance, those relating to the desirability of some judicial organization for the maintenance of international order, of some force more effective than moral sanction, or public opinion, back of it, and of general disarmament.

Even the advantages of war in fostering a virile race and in unsettling old institutions, whereby new and improved ones may take their places, are no longer upheld, so appalling have been the shocks which the sacrifices of life, health, morals, happiness and property have occasioned.

Attention will fortunately soon turn to the problems of reconstruction in a way that will abolish war.

Confidence, however, in treaties or conventions having for their object the establishment of peace, "perpetual peace," has been so shattered, that it is inconceivable that nations will again go through the form of preparing and executing another one, which, at the same time, will permit of the retention of armaments. No one would consider it genuine; but, should general disarmament be included, even the most incredulous could not fail to regard the instrument with a new respect, if not with a firm belief in its efficacy.

General disarmament, it is recognized, cannot be accomplished, unless there is an effective plan for settling all