It, therefore, follows:

Regarding enforcement by the "boycott," provided only in Article 16, that it may take place only when a nation "resorts to war;" and, even then, only when "in disregard of its covenants (obligations) under Articles 12, 13 and 15."

As war is permitted under these Articles in certain circumstances, and as the criterion regarding submission is its justiciability-a test, because of the indefiniteness of which the United States Senate has refused to ratify peace treaties the "boycott" cannot "automatically ensue.' The fact of such a breach, must first be established (but no conjecture can be made by what body); and furthermore, for this purpose, a unanimous decision (as provided under Article 5, this action, not being governed by an express exception to that rule) must be had, despite the fact that the delinquent Member has not lost its seat in the Council or in the Assembly.

All that can happen to a delinquent that does not submit to arbitration and takes no step in the matter, is to suffer the report of a recommendation unfavorable to it, under Article 15, if the complaining nation chooses to apply to the Council or Assembly, for an inquiry. No power is conferred on the Council in this Article to order a "boycott" or any other punishment, and other extraordinary consequences would follow:

If the report were unanimous, the Members of the League, and not the delinquent nation, would incur an obligation; as they "will not go to war with (against) any party to the dispute which complies;"

If the report were not unanimous, the Members would "reserve to themselves the right to take such action as

they shall consider necessary." If, therefore, the rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, were applied, the Members would curiously not be as free to act when unanimous, as when not.

If any action were taken, it would not be done through the Council, or the Assembly, but directly by the nations as Members. How often could a sufficiently large number of them to make a boycott effective, arrive at an agreement to impose it, if called upon to act after the commission of the offense-not war, against a nation friendly perhaps to many of them, and too, when no provision is made in the Covenant for their meeting as Members of the League.

The delinquent Member could only be expelled from the League, under the last paragraph of Article 16, for a refusal to carry out an award in case it had submitted to arbitration.

Therefore, under the Covenant, not only the "boycott" is almost wholly an illusion, but also all other effective means of compulsion.

ANNEX VII

FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SENATORS

The Dangers that the Covenant with the Reservations, Would still Present.

"THE COVENANT "

AS AN ACHIEVEMENT OF DIPLOMACY

For a nation to obtain all that it desires by negotiation, is to show great diplomacy; to do so with such skill that those with which it is negotiating are not aware of what it is accomplishing, is consummate art; but diplomacy can overreach itself.

Fiction could not have presented a more favorable situation for British Lords, the most experienced masters in this game, than was spread before them at the Paris Conference. They met there a number of nations which could easily be ignored on the ground that they had not contributed, or contributed actively, to the results of the war; others which, while having done so, were heavily indebted to them, and yet were looking to them for immediate succor; and America, with certain humanitarian pretensions that could not be overlooked, as dependence must be placed upon her for material aid. America, however, was represented in effect by only one person, and he was without experience in Old World politics, would seek counsel from none of his colleagues, and possessed British tendencies and pure British blood. They came with the reputation of always having secured, through

these means, other peoples to fight their wars and of then retiring the holders of the dominant position. They had been maintaining for their nation the position of the Mistress of the Seas, requiring others to confer with them as to changes in ownership of non-British territories and to submit to inspection in her ports before crossing the seas and they had no intention of losing this advantage by subjecting their acts to the jurisdiction of outside bodies or of any which they did not control.

When they perceived that the demand of America and of their own people for the formation of a league of nations must be heeded, they began to co-operate; but resolved to see to it, that, if such a union must be formed, they would at all times direct its management, and that it should not be given any authority that could ever be exerted against them. They recognized the possibilities that such a union might afford in morally strengthening their control over their colonies could they but extend among nations the practice of colonial domination as they had done by helping to install America in the Philippines and of their great chances of quietly securing the German colonies, by furthering all claims of their Allies for reparation and vengeance directly against Germany, and moving quickly while attention was fastened on the Conference and the quarrels that were certain to arise in it.

The first great diplomatic move was to eliminate from the real negotiations all nations but four, as that reduced the task of belaboring many delegates into the acceptance of their views in the formation of the draft to be finally rushed through the Conference.

The easy substitution of members in the drafting committee, or Commission, made it possible for a large part