dominion on this western continent. A little later, in the Revolutionary struggle as we have already seen, it was the one great hope of Maine that Canada and Nova Scotia would form a part of the new nation. When, therefore, the war closed, leaving British possessions on the northward and eastward of her territory, now the State of Maine but then a part of Massachusetts, the boundary line was not a matter of slight importance on this side of the border. Though Maine had not a single settler within the limits of the disputed territory for many years after the treaty of 1783, she understood clearly the value and importance of that territory, extending northward almost to the river St. Lawrence, which treaty rights had secured to her. Her strenuous maintenance of the rightfulness of her claim is a most forceful witness to this fact.

The statement that there were British subjects in the territory claimed by Maine, and that on this account also Great Britain had rights which should have been recognized by Maine, requires little attention. These British subjects were French settlers largely if not wholly. They were Acadians, who, having been sent into exile, had found their way back to places with which they were acquainted in their earlier communications with Quebec. In the very beginning of the boundary controversy, long before Maine became a state, it was conceded by the British that these settlers were on American soil. In 1799, Edward Winslow, a New Brunswick Loyalist, secretary of the St. Croix commission, referring in a letter to the award of that commission, wrote: "As it is we lose not a single British settlement. A few miserable Frenchmen at Madawaska, on the route to Canada, fall within their [Maine] territory." Indeed, up to the time of the treaty of Ghent, in 1814, the British admitted that these French settlers were living on American soil, and held it to be of no importance that they were there.

But Maine's claim, it is also added, covered territory that was "invaluable to Great Britain," and so, though Maine had a legal right to the disputed territory, other rights should have been recognized by the State of Maine. But the territory was deemed

important also to the State of Maine. George Evans, in a speech in the national House of Representatives February 7 and 8, 1838, asserted its importance. "We have seen," he said, "with what tenacity Great Britain clings to the object of obtaining a 'small portion of waste territory,' only as a means of communication between the provinces-doubtless a measure to her of great importance and strength, and just in the same proportion, a measure to us, if yielded to, of insecurity and weakness.'

was a view which had again and again found expression by the people of Maine. In it there was not even the remotest hint that Maine was playing the part of Shylock. If Great Britain desired to secure better communications between Canada and the maritime provinces, why should not Maine receive in return Grand Manan and Campo Bello? Such exchanges were suggested during the controversy-territory for territory-and it was not Maine that stood in the way of their acceptance. When such an exchange was brought forward in the Ashburton-Webster negotiations, Lord Ashburton asserted that he had no authority for yielding a single foot of British territory, and declined to listen to the suggestion.

As has already appeared in these pages, Maine was ready to yield what she regarded as hers by right, notably in the reference of the boundary question to the king of the Netherlands, and also at the time of the Ashburton-Webster negotiations. She could yield territory for equivalents, but even the national government could not take it from her without her consent. Unquestionably in the negotiations with reference to the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay, she would have been glad if an arrangement could have been made for an exchange of territory wanted by New Brunswick and Canada in order to improve their communications, if, by the exchange, she could have secured Grand Manan and Campo Bello, which naturally belong to Maine. Even in the final settlement, when Maine bowed to the larger interests of the national govern

'Speech upon the Subject of the Northeastern Boundary, Washington, 1838, 34.

ment and accepted the loss of territory, it was on the promise of an indemnity, not that she cared for the money offered by the national government, but as a matter of principle consistently maintained throughout the controversy. As Professor Ganong, referring to the Ashburton-Webster settlement, says: "Maine was in part compensated by a large sum paid her by the United States; though it must by no means be inferred that this prompted her decision, for her stand in the matter had unquestionably been taken upon principle, and her consent was given for the good of the Union."'1

This is true. At no period of the long controversy did Maine act a Shylockian part. Neither selfishness nor avarice characterized her actions. Her course was consistent and patriotic from the beginning of the controversy to its close; and it was because of her firm and intelligent action that the extreme British claim was not pushed to a successful termination."

1Evolution of the Boundaries of New Brunswick, 346, 347.

2 This matter is more fully considered by the writer of this volume in a paper entitled, The Attitude of Maine in the Northeastern Boundary Controversy, read before the Maine Historical Society, January 2, 1903, and printed in Vol. I, Third Series of the Society's Collections, 353–368.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE FINAL Settlement.

THE decision of Commissioners Barclay and Holmes, ren

dered November 24, 1817, as joint commissioners with

reference to the national ownership of the islands in

Passamaquoddy Bay, did not define the course of the international boundary line among the islands whose ownership they declared. Accordingly irritating differences of opinion early arose among interested parties connected with one or the other of the two nationalities, and these differences naturally became increasingly irritating, especially with the increase of population in the vicinity of the boundary. In order to provide such a definition, therefore, and so to bring the northeastern boundary controversy to a final settlement, the second article of the convention of July 22, 1892, arranged by the United States and Great Britain, reads in part as follows: "The high contracting parties agree that the governments of the United States and of her Britannic Majesty in behalf of the Dominion of Canada shall, with as little delay as possible, appoint two commissioners, one to be named by each party, to determine upon a method of most accurately marking the boundary line between the two countries in the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay in front of and adjacent to Eastport, in the State of Maine, and to place buoys, or fix such other boundary marks, as they may determine to be necessary." In order to carry this authorization into effect Thomas C. Mendenhall was appointed commissioner on the part of the United States, and W. F. King, on the part of Great Britain. The commissioners, in entering upon the task assigned to them in connection with this appointment, agreed that a liberal interpretation of their duties would require, or at least permit, the marking of the whole extent of the undefined boundary from

the mouth of the St. Croix River to the open sea beyond West Quoddy Head, in the State of Maine, and Liberty Point on Campo Bello Island in the Province of New Brunswick. As such action would prevent all further controversy as to the boundary, the commissioners established the necessary ranges for the delimitation of the line, finding themselves, as the work proceeded, in agreement in regard to the interpretation of the treaty of 1783, and of the commissioners under the fourth article of the treaty of Ghent in 1814, except as to two parts of the boundary line. First, they were unable to agree "as to that part of the boundary line which passes by and is adjacent to Pope's Folly Island"; and second, "They were also unable to agree as to the definition or location of that part of the line which passes by and is in the vicinity of Lubec Channel Lighthouse."'1

The commissioners, finding themselves thus in disagreement at certain parts of the line, submitted individually in December, 1894, certain propositions, neither being willing to accept those of the other. Later, the secretary of state in Washington, Mr. Gresham, was consulted by Mr. Mendenhall, who explained to the secretary the points at issue between the two commissioners. In accordance with Mr. Gresham's advice, Mr. Mendenhall drafted a joint report showing agreement by the commissioners upon points not in controversy, while separate reports, it was stated, were to be presented upon contested issues. This draft was not satisfactory to Mr. King, who, August 20, 1895, objecting to the impression given by Mr. Mendenhall that the commissioners differed only with regard to two portions of the line, namely at Pope's Folly Island and at the Middle Ground, submitted a draft of his own which, after a reference to differences that had arisen between the commissioners as work under their

1Appendix to Evidence and Argument in Behalf of the United States of America, 2. This pamphlet, published by the government, contains the argument and documents presented in accordance with article one of the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, April 11, 1908 (relating to the international boundary line through Passamaquoddy Bay), by Chandler P. Anderson, Harry Mighels Verrill, Frederick Hale and Charles D. Booth.