its revenue officers administer the estate as if it were the property of Government, and finally return it cleared of encumbrances to the owner. It is a system which, if funds were set aside for the purpose, could be greatly extended, even to the dealing with the properties of all embarrassed landlords, though in the case of persons owning fractional shares in joint undivided properties there would be much difficulty. Two things are needed. First, money; not money to be spent and lost, but money to be invested at some small interest and eventually to be repaid to the State. Secondly, legislation, which would restrict the power of landowners who had availed themselves of Government assistance to encumber their lands afresh.

There are other measures for the relief of indebted landowners which have been put in practice in certain particular tracts of country. It would take too much space to give their details even very briefly, and they would be hardly intelligible then to persons not having some intimate knowledge of Indian affairs.

The case, I would say, is this: That, as stated by my friend Seth Rughbur Dyal and by the press, grave discontent does exist among the landholding classes of Upper India. That such discontent is mainly, if not entirely, due to our system of land administration, under which landowners may be and are constantly disposessed of their dearly loved ancestral lands at the pleasure of their creditors. That such discontent could be removed by such measure of legislation as would be welcomed by the great majority of the population and would be accepted as fair even by the trading classes. That the ultimate cost of the scheme to Government would be very small. The expenditure on a very small frontier war would suffice for the capital necessary to finance a province in this respect, and that capital would be used, but not lost.

As Seth Rughbur Dyal has stated in his pamphlet the Government of India has the subject under consideration, but it has been under its consideration for the last thirty years without practical result. If the FRIENDS OF INDIA, who now devote their time to embarrassing the Government of India in regard to grievances sometimes imaginary and not often of any importance, would give their attention to this practical subject that Government might give up its hesitation, and take heart to deal decidedly with the question.

Unfortunately that class in India which alone seems to have the ear of a party in British public life is the class which profits by the extravagance and indebtedness of the Indian landowners. Take the list of the supporters of the National Congress' in any district of Upper India, and the great majority will be found to be lawyers or men whose kinsmen are lawyers. Is it too much to suppose that the lawyers of India do not desire to put an end to a state of things which is so profitable to their profession?

GEORGE ADAMS,

Indian Civil Service (retired).

INDIA

II

IS THE BRITISH RAJ' IN DANGER?

England's power and wealth, and in the long run her whole position as a great Power, depend on her possession of India. The question how far this possession is secured against dangers from within and from without is, therefore, one of the weightiest of our time. England's position in India is indisputably more imperilled now than ever; that is the impression that forces itself upon the attentive observer of the more recent development of Indian affairs.

The Hamburger Nachrichten, Aug. 17, 1897.

NOTHING has more surprised me than the remarks of many German, Russian, and other Continental newspapers in regard to the position of affairs in India. When serious Continental organs of public opinion, such as the Hamburger Nachrichten, publish passages like those quoted above, it is time that their errors should be thoroughly exposed and their lies nailed to the counter. Is the British rule in India in danger? If so, is it more imperilled now than ever?

I will take up the question suggested by the Hamburger Nachrichten and examine how far British India is secured against dangers from within and from without. Let us first examine the latter portion of the question. I maintain that India has never been better prepared to meet a foreign invasion than she is to-day. She has a fine army, which can compare favourably with any European or Asiatic army that could be brought to oppose it on the northwestern frontiers of that country. The only Power which can be said to entertain serious thoughts of invading India is Russia. Great Britain has secured herself against any possible invasion by Russia in two ways. First, by keeping a large, efficient, and loyal army, and by establishing what is known as the Scientific Frontier. Secondly, by the maintenance and support of the friendly State of Afghanistan. The large army is indisputably loyal and efficient, while the Scientific Frontier, for whatever it is worth, is even in a stronger condition than before. In that branch of defence, therefore, there is no change.

But it may be said that recent events prove that the policy of

Afghanistan is changed. I will dwell at some length on this important question. The modern history of Afghanistan is the history of her ruler the Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan. He is bound in solemn promise to remain a loyal friend and ally of the Queen of England. On the other hand, the Queen is bound to support and defend him if his country be attacked by any foreign Power. Has the Ameer proved himself to be worthy of the great trust placed in him by England? On the whole I believe the question can be answered in the affirmative. No doubt many points of difference have arisen between Cabul and Simla since the Ameer's accession to the throne, but none of these points were such as could not be settled by diplomacy. In order to strengthen the Anglo-Afghan alliance, Lord Dufferin invited the Ameer to India in the year 1885. The ruler of Afghanistan and the Viceroy of India met together at a great Durbar at Rawal Pindi. In the presence of many princes, chiefs, and civil and military officers assembled to do him honour, the Ameer made a speech, at the end of which, pointing to his sword, His Highness said, 'With this sword I shall destroy the enemies of England.' This speech created no little sensation throughout Europe.

During Lord Dufferin's viceroyalty no doubts were entertained in regard to the Ameer's loyalty. In the year 1894 the Government of India desired to send a mission to Kabul for a satisfactory solution of certain matters in dispute between the two Governments. Lord Roberts was selected by the Viceroy to head this mission, and it is an open secret that the Ameer hesitated to receive the Indian Commanderin-Chief as the guest of his nation, because he thought the presence of Lord Roberts in Kabul would recall many unpleasant memories to the Afghan mind.

But as soon as the Government of India suggested the name of Sir Mortimer Durand, the Ameer freely gave his assent to the proposal, and the mission started for the capital of Afghanistan. The cordial reception which it received at the hands of the Ameer and his nation was the theme of conversation in several Courts of Europe at that time. Sir Mortimer moved about freely without escort in Kabul and expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with the Ameer's hospitality. What is known as the Durand Convention was then drawn up, to the mutual satisfaction of the two Governments. So pleased was the Government of India with the Ameer's conduct that it increased his annual grant from twelve to eighteen lacs of rupees. In order still further to cement the alliance, the Government of India invited the Ameer to visit England and make the personal acquaintance of the Queen-Empress. Owing to personal reasons the Ameer could not accept the invitation in person, but arranged to send his son Sirdar Nasrullah Khan, with numerous precious presents, to London. It is asserted that Nasrullah Khan is

a person of no importance in the eyes of the Ameer, and that the Ameer sent him here as a slight to England. No greater mistake could be made. The Ameer, and indeed all the nobility of Afghanistan, have the highest opinion of the learning and morality of that Prince, and he is generally referred to as the scholar of the Royal Family. Moreover he possesses a cool and imperturbable temper-an essential quality for a diplomatist. It must also be remembered that there is no law of primogeniture in Afghanistan; all the sons of the sovereign being treated alike in the eye of the law. The only distinction recognised is that of merit. The cordial reception which was accorded to the Prince by the Queen and the nation was gratefully appreciated by his father. But it is an open secret that before the Shahzada left these shores a kind of hitch occurred between the Ameer and the British Government. The Shahzada was desired by the Ameer to ask a favour of the British nation. That was a permission to establish an Afghan political agency in London. As everybody knows, the British Cabinet decided to refuse the request, and thus to a certain extent defeated the very object of the Shahzada's visit. The refusal must have given some annoyance and irritation to the sensitive nature of the Ameer, but his Highness dropped the idea without manifesting resentment of any kind.

It will be seen from the above that there has been nothing hitherto between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan which would give rise to suspicions in the mind of the minutest observer. But since the tribal rising on the north-western frontiers of India some people have suddenly begun to suspect the Ameer's policy. These wiseacres first take it for granted that the Ameer has become the enemy of England, and then spin out various theories to account for the enmity. One of the most romantic theories telegraphed by the Indian correspondents of some Indian papers is that the Ameer contemplates the invasion of India, and that nothing will please His Highness more than to live in history as the deliverer of the Indian people. I should have thought it beneath contempt to notice this theory had it not been discussed in serious English newspapers. Those who know anything about Afghanistan know for certain that the army and the resources of that country, however powerful they may be for defensive purposes, are altogether inadequate for an attack on any of its powerful neighbours. The Ameer knows his strength and his interests too well to enter upon a mad and suicidal course of the above kind. It is said that he has withdrawn his agents from India, which means war with England. The Ameer has three or four commercial agents in different parts of India, and it is quite possible that he may have summoned them to Kabul for reasons not inconsistent with the maintenance of peace. The idea of withdrawing agents before declaring war is purely occidental, and I doubt very much

if His Highness would be so punctilious in the observance of diplomatic etiquette did he ever declare war against any of his neighbours. Another ingenious theory says that the Ameer has changed his policy towards England because of inspiration from Constantinople. This is 'made in Germany,' and no doubt the wish is father to the thought. The Vossische Zeitung, in its issue of the 17th of August, says: Afghanistan is playing a false game; that is a fact to be counted on. There is a strategic hand in the game, that of Ghoolam Haidar Khan. Behind him again looms the Ameer of Afghanistan, and still further off the Commander of the Faithful in Stamboul.' The Porte has lost no time in categorically denying the rumour that the Sultan and the Ameer have made common cause, against England. It is true that some notables from Afghanistan visited Constantinople and that they were well received. But the enemies of the Ameer and the Sultan should not make too much capital out of that incident. Every year thousands of Afghans visit Mecca and Medina, and now that locomotion has become so cheap and so easy between Jeddah and Constantinople it should be no wonder that some of these Afghan Hadjis visit Stamboul to see the Guardian of the Kaaba and visit the shrine of St. Sophia. This year particularly many Hadjis visited Stamboul in order to have a glance at the victorious Turkish army. But granting for a moment that there was personal exchange of visits between some notables of Kabul and Constantinople, does that fact per se prove that an alliance between the Sultan and the Ameer is formed to the detriment of England? I trow not. The best alliance is the alliance of self-interest and preservation. Is it the interest of the Ameer to risk an open rupture with the British Government, to lose his pension, to endanger his dynasty, and to undo all the good that has been done to Afghanistan through him during the last eighteen years? And why? Merely because the concert of the six Great Powers, of which England is one, does not allow the Sultan to have his own way. If Abdur Rahman ever thought of doing a good turn to his brother monarch of Turkey, his best course would be to use his friendly influence openly and freely with his ally the British Government in favour of the Sultan. The Ameer and the Sultan both would gain more by such means than by any overt or covert defiance of England. It is admitted by all who know, that Abdul Hamid and Abdur Rahman are second to no statesman either in Europe or in Asia in skilful diplomacy. Do British politicians therefore seriously believe that two such monarchs would deliberately plan out and follow a course which would inevitably bring immense harm to both of them? If they really do, the world gives them more credit for shrewdness and common sense than they actually deserve. I maintain that British India is secured against dangers from without.

I shall now proceed to examine the second question, namely, Is