comparison with its condition in the time that had preceded it. But it was not to be expected that the savage and suspicious races in the independent hills should at once accept the new order of things, abandon their predatory habits, and look upon the English successors of their old enemies as their friends. Expedition after expedition was necessary to show each tribe, in turn, the strength of the British Government, and the folly of resisting it by force of arms; while, the lesson having been taught, no effort was spared to encourage friendly feelings and to show the mountaineers that all the Government insisted upon was the peace of the border. This ensured, the hillmen were as free to go and come and trade within British territory as our own subjects. That this policy was successful is proved by the fact that in the six years previous to 1876 only one expedition into independent territory was necessary, and we were able truthfully to report to the Secretary of State that the frontier tribes were slowly but surely losing their suspicion of, and dislike to, the British Government. The change is gradual, but if we look back twenty, or even ten, years, we see how substantial has been the progress made. They are still savage, fanatical, and ignorant; but they have learnt to believe in the fairness of our intentions, and so far appreciate our rule that they leave their hills in large numbers, abandon their predatory life, and settle quietly in British territory.3

The system of the Punjab Government in dealing with the independent tribes was unsystematic, or it would have failed. It dealt with each case on its merits as it arose, and each tribe was treated with regard to its special characteristics. The Biluch tribes on the Dera Gházi Khan border were far more amenable to control than the Afghans to the north. They inhabited a less difficult country, their nature was far less fanatical and savage, and they were more or less governed by powerful chiefs, through whom it was possible to exercise over them a practical influence. The western Afghans, on the contrary, were governed by committees or councils of the section of the clan, their constitution was eminently democratic, and tribal power never remained for long together in the hands of the same headmen. Among the Afghans to the north of the Peshawar district there were, on the other hand, many influential chiefs whose aristocratic and hereditary right was only tempered by assassination. Those opponents of the Forward Policy who urge that the system of administration which is associated with the name of Sir Robert Sandeman is inapplicable to districts like Swat, Bajour, Dir and Chitral, seem to me to be hardly reasonable, for there is no part of the Afghan border where there is so plentiful a crop of powerful Khans, who can generally be bribed or persuaded to keep on friendly terms with the Government if we scrupulously abstain from interference with their internal affairs. It is tribes like the Afridis, • Punjab Frontier Memorandum, 1876.

Orakzais and Waziris, the most powerful and turbulent on the border, who cannot be controlled through tribal leaders who do not exist, and it is wise to have as little to do with them and their territory as possible. The Khyber and the Kohat passes, both of which lie in Afridi country, are important military and commercial roads, which the Afridis understand must be kept open and under Imperial control; but the arrangements for their management have worked fairly well, and it will probably be necessary to renew them when the present excitement has subsided, for the Khyber is too unhealthy for our troops. But Sir Robert Sandeman's policy with the southern tribes was no more than that of the Punjab Government which he served: of dealing with each race according to its tribal peculiarities, and of utilising every legitimate means of influence which came to his hand. He was generally successful in the south, because he thoroughly understood the people with whom he had to deal; he was a man of great readiness and resource, and the mixture of resolution and geniality which formed his character won the respect and attachment of the Biluch chiefs. He had no other system, and the attempt to employ the Biluch method with the western Afghans has always ended in failure. No doubt it may be said that the policy of the Punjab Government towards the tribes was neither ambitious, brilliant, nor thorough. This may be admitted. But it was, on the whole, successful, and it was cheap. With the exception of the Umbeylah expedition, which was a jihad campaign, stimulated by the Wahabi fanatics and refugee mutineers of Sittána, all our frontier expeditions probably cost less than the occupation and relief of Chitral.

The Forward Policy which is now in favour is not a cheap one. It is, on the contrary, extremely costly, so costly, indeed, that unless it be speedily reversed it will lead India to bankruptcy. And the question, like all the large questions concerning India, is mainly financial. To lighten taxation, to develop the industrial resources of the country, to render the people prosperous and content, to relieve them from the dread and danger of famine, to feed and clothe them better, to give them cheap and speedy justice-these are the aims which an enlightened Administration must endeavour to attain. No spirited frontier policy which is pursued by the sacrifice of these beneficent objects can be called successful, and the Government and the English people will have to decide which of the two they will choose. They certainly cannot have both.

One of the causes of the enormous cost of the present policy is due to the withdrawal of the Frontier Force from the local Government and placing it under the Commander-in-Chief. This was done about ten years ago, the Punjab Government having successfully resisted it in 1876. It cannot now be undone, though I could easily prove that the force has lost in efficiency, especially in the important matter of transport, the animals and their gear and the drivers being

far less efficient than before the transfer. But the radical evil is that, the Commander-in-Chief having behind him the Treasury of the Government of India, military expeditions are conducted on the most extravagant scale, every regiment in the regular army is eager to join in the rush for distinction and service, and an army is collected, as now, of 60,000 men, sufficient to repel the attack of a European Power. Either the Government are aware that their irritating measures of interference have excited a general and concerted rising of all the frontier tribes, or the present preparations are out of all reasonable proportion to the difficulty. But when the Commander-in-Chief, who knows as little of the frontier tribes as the Viceroy, demands an army, the Government at Calcutta, having no local knowledge behind them which is not eager to spend money rather than save it, is powerless to make a stand for economy. Such was the policy of Russia in Central Asia until a strong Foreign Secretary insisted on taking all power of initiative from the military party.

Another cause of the immense cost of recent expeditions is the vicious system of scattering military posts over independent territory far from support, like those in Chitral, Kuram, and Samána. In time of peace these posts are useless for all purposes of civilisation-they waste valuable troops required elsewhere, and are a cause of chronic irritation and discontent. In time of war they require an army to relieve them. If there be one cardinal principle in frontier warfare, it is to have no military post which you are unable to safely maintain or speedily relieve. It is discreditable, in the highest degree, to allow our forts and posts to be besieged, captured and burnt by halfarmed savages. In the old days, if the tribes raided our territory we punished when and where we chose. We were not foolish enough to play their game, and leave them the whole initiative, giving them the power of attacking isolated positions, which we were compelled to defend in haste by marching an army into a desolate wilderness of mountains, in the hottest and most pestilential season of the year, which the tribes naturally choose for their campaigns. Is there any soldier of light and leading, not irretrievably committed to the Forward Policy, who will declare himself in favour of placing isolated outposts in the heart of a difficult and hostile country? What does Lord Wolseley think of it, or Sir Donald Stewart, or Sir Redvers Buller? I am not a military man, but it seems to me that questions of strategy must to some extent be governed by common sense, and, judged by such a standard, the present military policy would disgrace a Sandhurst cadet. Moreover, the system of posts in independent territory carries with it this vital defect that they require troops of the Imperial army to garrison them. The Frontier Force is insufficient for the duty. This signifies that the most critical positions are held by troops, officers and men, who are ignorant of the country

and cannot even speak the language of the people whom they must conciliate unless they wish to be attacked and besieged. The Samána and Kuram posts are now garrisoned by the 36th Sikhs, a downcountry battalion, absolutely unfitted for the work.

This article has dealt more especially with the management of the independent tribes, and I have only incidentally touched on the question of Chitral, as the policy of that occupation rests on different grounds than that of worrying the tribes on our immediate borders into hostility. If it be asserted that it is necessary to occupy Chitral to close an important road to India from Russian attack, the argument is intelligible, though I personally deny the possibility of any attack in that direction, and believe that the distinguished Generals I have just named agree with me. But this question I have before discussed at length in this Review, and all that is necessary to note now is the charge of breach of faith in constructing a military road to Chitral when it was distinctly proclaimed that the Government of India had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct might force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes. An apologist of the Indian Government has endeavoured, in the Times of the 9th of September, to refute this charge, and it is certainly desirable to do so, for to this particular action the irritation and suspicion of the tribes seem to be partly due. But his simple sophistries, which may be acceptable to the House of Commons, do not count for much with the wild mountaineers. If a military road, supported by military posts, and held by tribal levies paid from the British treasury, is made and maintained in independent territory, that will be considered by the tribes to be occupation, whatever any apologist may say, and it is difficult to assert that they are wrong. Nor is he more happy in dealing with the occupation of Chitral, which he declares to be no more annexed than Zanzibar. This may be so; but to the ordinary eye, unclouded by official cobwebs, Zanzibar seems as much British territory as the Isle of Wight, and its Sultan a puppet whom we create or depose at pleasure.

The policy of the future may be discussed in detail in a later article, and I would only note, in conclusion, the lines it may conveniently follow. It is impossible to restore the past system, giving back the Frontier Force to the local Government, and allowing it the effective control of all trans-border affairs. This being so, it will probably be advisable to carry out Lord Lytton's proposal, which was premature when made, and was successfully resisted by the Punjab Government, of removing the frontier districts from the charge of the Lieutenant-Governor and placing them under a Chief Commissioner. The Lieutenant-Governor, without the local troops and shorn of political power, cannot do justice to the frontier, and the ever-growing complexity of the civil administration of a rapidly

progressing province leaves him no sufficient leisure for the mastery of frontier affairs. But it is a sine quâ non that the Chief Commissioner be a civilian, and not, as proposed by Lord Lytton, a military man. By this I do not mean to exclude military civilians, trained from youth in administrative work, and many of whom, Abbott, Becher, James, Edwardes, Lake and Sandeman have performed the most splendid service. But a man trained systematically in civil duties, knowing intimately the people and the language, is essential to prevent the frontier districts falling from the high standard of civilisation which they have already attained. Το nominate a General Officer as Lord Warden of the Marches would be to intensify the evils of the existing system. What is needed is a strong civil administrator whose professional instinct would be in favour of peace and not of war, and who would be content to follow the firm and friendly policy towards the tribes which was pursued with success by Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab: Lord Lawrence, Sir Robert Montgomery, Sir Donald McLeod, Sir Henry Durand, Sir Henry Davies and Sir Robert Egerton. He would be the full receptacle of local knowledge, on which the Viceroy and the Foreign Office could safely draw, instead of, as at present, remaining the unconscious instruments of a military clique which is most unwisely endeavouring to deal with the country beyond our border as Russia dealt with Circassia. For in the armed independence of the frontier tribes is one of the surest defences of India. We do not require military roads through independent territory to facilitate the march of an invading army, nor a cowed and disarmed population which could do nothing to resist its advance. Even our relations with Afghanistan are facilitated by the existence of the independent region between it and India. I do not believe in buffer States; but between a highly civilised Government like that of British India and one in a far lower stage of social and political development it is of the highest advantage to have a fringe of tribes owning allegiance to neither, but, like all members of the human family, susceptible to kindly influences, and relying, as in past times they undoubtedly relied, on the generosity and fair dealing of the Indian Government.

LEFEL GRIFFIN.