then proceeds to define the conditions and manner in which the sanctions of this nature already imposed may be reimposed. The section is short and the pertinent paragraphs read as follows:

III. MILITARY ASPECTS. Contingent Sanctions and Guarantees: If political guarantees and penalties intended to ensure the execution of the plan proposed are considered desirable, they fall outside the Committee's jurisdiction.

Questions of military occupation are also not within our terms of reference.

It is however our duty to point out clearly that our forecasts are based on the assumption that economic activity will be unhampered and unaffected by any foreign organization other than the controls. herein provided. Consequently, our plan is based upon the assumption that existing measures, in so far as they hamper that activity, will be withdrawn or sufficiently modified so soon as Germany has put into execution the plan recommended, and that they will not be re-imposed except in the case of flagrant failure to fulfil the conditions accepted by common agreement. In case of such failure it is plainly for the creditor Governments, acting with the consciousness of joint trusteeship for the financial interests of themselves and of others who will have advanced money upon the lines of the plan, then to determine the nature of sanctions to be applied and the method of their rapid and effective application.12

It will be noted first that Paragraph 18 refers to sanctions in case of "voluntary default" by Germany, while Section III refers to them in case of "flagrant failure" to fulfil accepted conditions. This difference of terminology was the subject of discussion in the British Parliament on August 5, 1924, and Prime Minister MacDonald there gave an interpretation of the word "flagrant," which, it is reported,13 was accepted by the "Council of Fourteen" (Allied Premiers and Ministers) at London on August 7th, but the interpretation does not appear in the published documents. Mr. MacDonald's definition, given to the House of Commons on August 5th, was as follows:

The default which is a serious one, and which comes before the Reparation Commission, is a large general default, a default which cannot be judged to be a mechanical default, a default which it can be alleged and about which evidence can be presented, "This could not have taken place unless there was a conspiracy in high places to throw off obligations undertaken in August, 1924, by the German Government to put this report into operation." 14

The London agreement then provides, in case a default has been declared in accordance with the conditions previously specified, that

14 This wording, which appears in the London Times of Aug. 9, p. 10, is slightly different from the report of Mr. MacDonald's statement in the House of Commons published in the Times of Aug. 6, p. 6, column 4.

The signatory governments, acting with the consciousness of joint trusteeship for the financial interests of themselves and of the persons who advance money upon the lines of the said plan, will confer at once on the nature of the sanctions to be applied and on the method of their rapid and effective application.

It will now be observed that while this article follows generally the wording of the last half of the third paragraph of Section III of the Dawes Report, it contains a very material and important modification. Section III seems to contemplate that any sanctions to be imposed upon Germany will be determined by the creditor governments acting jointly, but the London agreement changes this provision to read so that the creditor governments are obligated only to confer as to the nature of the sanctions.

In the Inter-Allied stage of the London Conference the possible effect upon the loan to Germany, recommended by the Dawes Report, of a declaration of default by the Reparation Commission was used as an argument for taking the power of declaring defaults out of the hands of the commission. The situation was thus stated by Mr. MacDonald in the House of Commons on August 4th: "On the British and American markets confidence in the Reparation Commission as a judicial body for declaring default has been completely forfeited, and we were informed that so long as it could destroy the economy and credit of Germany by a declaration of default which, as a matter of fact, might not exist, the security for the loan would be of so little value that the loan would not be subscribed." 15

When the possibilities of this buga-boo as a political lever had been exhausted 16 it was a simple matter for the Allied Governments to agree, as they did in the agreement under analysis, that in case sanctions are imposed, priority would be given to the service of the loan, not only as regards the resources pledged to its service, but as to resources which may arise from the imposition of sanctions, and that any dispute arising under the agreement between the signatories regarding the imposition of sanctions and the security for the loan are to be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The agreement finally reserves to the signatory governments all of their existing rights under the Treaty of Versailles, unless otherwise stipulated. The military, as distinct from the economic and fiscal, evacuation of the Ruhr was considered by the Allies to be outside the scope of the London

15 London Times, Aug. 5, 1924, p. 4.

16 The alleged interference in the negotiations of the so-called "international bankers," was greatly resented in France, and Mr. MacDonald in this connection made the following statement on the occasion above referred to: "I may take this opportunity of expressing my regret that it has been so often stated that the difficulties we encountered in this part of our work were created by bankers and financiers. They confined themselves to advising as to the state of mind of the investing public, and guided us against coming to agreements that would fail to produce the loan required. We are all much indebted to them for the information and help they gave us."

Conference, but the German delegates placed this question at the head of their agenda for discussion. It was taken up in separate negotiations between the French, Belgian and German plenipotentiaries, and the result embodied in an exchange of notes on August 16th in which France and Belgium agreed, if the London agreements are carried out in good faith by Germany, to proceed to the military evacuation of the Ruhr within a maximum period of one year from the date of the agreements. As an earnest of their intention to hasten the evacuation, France and Belgium. decided that the day after the London agreements were signed the military should evacuate the zone between Dortmund and Horde in the Ruhr and territories outside the Ruhr occupied since January 11, 1923. In these notes the German Chancellor maintained the view "that the occupation of German territories beyond the German frontiers fixed by Article 428 of the Treaty of Versailles cannot be recognized as lawful." The British Prime Minister also wrote a letter to the French and Belgian Premiers in which he took note of the agreement with Germany, reiterated the position of the British Government as to the illegality of the occupation of the Ruhr under the Treaty of Versailles, and urged that the evacuation be hastened as much as possible "as, in the opinion of the British Government, the continued occupation may prejudice the working of the Dawes plan, and jeopardize the arrangements agreed to at the London Conference." 17

The principle of arbitration, so generously drawn upon by the conference to reach agreement when other suggestions of settlement failed, was the keynote of the closing speeches of the principal delegates.

"I should like to impress upon the German people," said the British. Prime Minister, "that as the result of this conference we have created a system of arbitration, of examination, of revision, which will enable both them and us to observe the working of the Dawes plan; to watch projects that may be doubtful in their effects and to come together in a sincere desire to rectify mistakes so soon as those mistakes are discovered."

In his reply the French Premier said: "France is happy in seeing that you have accepted to write on the front of the London document this idea of arbitration which we all hope will be generalized in order to substitute for the atrocious rule of war a régime of conventions based upon right and legality."

The American Ambassador concurred with the following statement: "There is one feature of this settlement which I wish to emphasize, and that is the recognition and furtherance of the principles of arbitration for settlement of international disputes. In my opinion, the greatest hope for the peace of the world lies in arbitration and judicial settlement between nations, and I am very glad this conference has contributed so much to forward this plan."

17 The notes exchanged are printed in the London Times, Aug. 18, 1924, p. 16, and Mr. MacDonald's letter is in the Times of Aug. 19, p. 10.

The conference closed with an expression of hope on the part of the German Chancellor that "the principle of arbitration, to which other speakers have referred, may evermore be applied in regulating the relations of the different peoples to each other, and thus help to establish a better adjustment of affairs."

Postscriptum

The contract for the loan of 800,000,000 gold marks to Germany under the Dawes plan was signed at London on October 10, 1924. (New York Times, October 11, 1924.) On October 13, 1924, the Reparation Commission approved a series of decisions to give effect to the terms of the loan and declaring that all conditions attached to the Dawes plan had been complied with and that the plan is now legally binding on Germany (New York Times, October 14, 1924). Subscriptions to the loan were opened on October 14 and it was at once oversubscribed (New York Times, October, 15, 1924).

CITIZENSHIP OF MARRIED WOMEN

BY CYRIL D. HILL

Member of the Bar of the State of Washington

Many recent comments have been made with respect to the wisdom of Congress in passing the Act of September 22, 1922, entitled, "An act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married women," commonly known as the Cable Act, and which granted a form of independent citizenship to women. Among these comments we find the phrase, "probably accidental reasons," and an expressed sentiment that it is "questionable whether the majority of the women of this country really wanted the new law," and similar suggestions. It has been intimated that the law was passed solely as the result of the persuasive efforts of a minority of women. In many instances little cognizance has been taken of the reasons for, and the actual facts involved in, the change.

It is well to reflect upon some of the conditions and circumstances which have really made imperative the reform which occasioned the passage of the act. Just because error is gray with age, is no reason why it should be respected. Nor is novelty a reason why it should be accepted. Was this act an unwarranted innovation? Can it be considered a step towards allowing a woman to take her husband's name in vain?

Every developed system of law has been confronted with the question: To what extent and for what purposes should the law recognize an equality between man and wife? The political aspect of this question is pertinent to the point at issue. Should the wife's political status be identified with that of her husband in personality and citizenship? History tells us that the answer to this question has been determined by the institutions of the times. In looking for the reason as a basis for the particular status of the wife, we need look to the social and political organization of the people. The children of Israel serve as an illustration of the early independent nations and tribes who had prohibitions against intermarriage with aliens. In such a case, there was no opportunity for the woman to acquire citizenship by marriage.

1 42 U. S. Stat. at L. 1021.

2 Sir Robert Younger, in Report of the Select Committee on The Nationality of Married Women (1923), p. 167; Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., "The New Married Women's Citizenship Law," 33 Yale Law Jour. (Dec. 1923), 159,169.

For the purposes of this article it will not be necessary to distinguish between citizen and national, citizenship and nationality. Any confusion in the meaning resulting from the connotation of these words as used on the Continent will thus be avoided. They will be used interchangeably.