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In its comprehensiveness and detail the proposed code is distinguished from all previous projects which have been formulated by jurists or societies.

In abandoning the illogical distinction between "defended" and "undefended" places as the criterion of the liability to or immunity from aerial bombardment of towns, cities and villages and, by introducing, on the other hand, a distinction between regions which constitute the immediate neighborhood of land operations and those which do not, for the purpose of aerial bombardment, the rules proposed by the commission represent a notable advance upon the existing conventional rules as well as upon those which are found in the projects which have been elaborated by others in the past. Some of the rules proposed by the commission will be criticized for the large discretionary power which they leave to aviators. But, as stated above, it is difficult to see how any rules could be devised which would be entirely free of this objection, if the use of aircraft for purposes of bombardment is permitted at all. The commission made an earnest endeavor to reconcile in a just manner the legitimate rights and interests of belligerents with those of the non-combatant population in particular, and the rights of humanity in general.

No solution yet proposed seems more just or practicable. Considering the rôle which aircraft seems destined to play in the wars of the future and the frightful consequences which its unregulated use will produce, and considering both the paucity and inadequacy of the existing conventional rules, the recommendations of the Commission of Jurists deserve the urgent and serious consideration of the governments to which they are addressed. There is of course no lack of "cynics" who will say that these rules, like all rules for the conduct of war, will be of little value because in the stress of conflict they will be disregarded. But, as Mr. Root remarked, apropos of this argument which he foresaw would be directed against the Washington treaty of February 6, 1922 prohibiting the use of submarines as instruments for the destruction of merchant vessels and the use of gases in warfare, "cynics are always near-sighted, but often and usually the decisive facts lie beyond the range of their vision"." Not all, however, will share entirely his optimism when he adds that "when a rule of action, clear and simple, is based upon the fundamental ideas of humanity and right conduct, and the public opinion of the world has reached a decisive judgment upon it, that rule will be enforced by the greatest power known to human history, the power that is the hope of the world", but all will agree that solemnly ratified rules which the parties admit to be binding, whatever may be their defects, are better than no rules at all, and that there is at least a chance that they may serve to deter belligerents from illegal conduct, which in the absence of rules would be permissible.

71 This JOURNAL, Vol. 16, p. 189.

THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC: A PRODUCT OF INTERVENTION

BY HAROLD SCOTT QUIGLEY

Assistant Professor of Political Science, the University of Minnesota; during 1921-1923 on leave of absence at Tsing Hua College, Peking

The circumstances which led to the creation of the Far Eastern Republic as a new Russian state on terms of such perfect amity with the mother country that it was recognized immediately by her and received her warm financial and diplomatic support run back to the revolutions of 1917 in Russia. In Siberia the March Revolution was heartily welcomed and the Zemstvos took over the government. The bulk of the population was content with the abolition of Tzarism but the minority of communists started a Bolshevistic propaganda which succeeded after the November revolution, due to the energy of the communists, the armed help of Moscow and the apathy of the peasants. There was, however, a second minority composed of supporters of the old régime and its opposition to the organization of a soviet system in Siberia led to civil war.

Neither side had compunctions about its partisans. The ex-convicts who came into the communist camp filled with the single desire for revenge were no worse than the Cossacks who fought with the counter-revolutionary army. On both sides robbery, torture and murder were the natural methods of the desperadoes who joined them to serve their own purposes, methods which the responsible leaders deplored but could not prevent. The sympathies of the peasants and even of many of the wealthier land-owners gradually were driven to the side of the communists by the atrocities of the reactionaries. The latter, under General Horvath, who had the authority over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the Atamans or Headmen, Semenov and Kalmykov, operated along the Mongolian and Manchurian borders, conveniently near to Chinese territory which they used as a refuge and base of operations and supplies. General Rosanov maintained his authority at Vladivostok until January 31, 1920, when the liberal Zemstvo was reinstated by the partisan forces supporting the Soviets. On the whole the Bolsheviki were in control and a sort of government was maintained by local soviets which exercised jurisdiction over as wide a region as their military strength permitted. The authority of the Moscow Government was shadowy and there was no other centralizing agency. Among the soviets organized during this period was one entitled: "The Far Eastern Soviet", which asserted its rule over the greater part of the territory later included within the Far Eastern Republic.

The Bolshevik régime in Siberia was interrupted by the Czecho-Slovak

march to the sea.

The Czecho-Slovaks were troops, about 40,000 in number, who had deserted to Russia, prior to the latter's defection, in order to have an opportunity of fighting the cause of their own nationalities against the Central Powers. When that opportunity was lost due to the Soviets' withdrawal from the war the Czecho-Slovaks secured permission to retire from Russian territory via the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. Their retirement was considered a potential danger by the German Government which induced Trotsky to have them disarmed. Partial disarmament led to fighting in which the superior training and discipline of the CzechoSlovaks enabled them to gain rapid successes until, with the support of various groups of counter-revolutionaries, they had won control throughout eastern Russia and western Siberia before the end of June, 1918.

In the lull that followed the victorious progress of the Czecho-Slovaks the "Siberian Government" was created at Omsk with a liberal, Vologodsky, as President and Admiral Kolchak as Minister of War and Marine. Its aim was to provide a satisfactory center around which the bulk of the Siberian population, which was neither Bolshevistic nor Tzaristic, might rally. It allowed Bolshevistic influences to get control, however, and thus an opening was presented for a revolutionary coup d'état, out of which Admiral Kolchak emerged as "Dictator" of Siberia. At first expected to proclaim a program of monarchical restoration and regarded with suspicion by the liberals, Kolchak gradually won general support by a tactful reticence as to his ultimate policy and an effort to deal straightforwardly with all parties opposed to the Bolsheviki. His relation to the Czecho-Slovaks was, however, rather one of dependence than assistance.

The period of foreign intervention, during which the Far Eastern Republic was established, began as early as December 30, 1917, when a Japanese warship entered the harbor of Vladivostok. Its mission was declared to be to protect Japanese in the city and surrounding country from any danger that might arise out of the troubled situation. The arrangement between the United States and the Kerensky Government, signed in the preceding June, as a result of which two hundred American engineers under Col. John F. Stevens had reached Vladivostok in November, had not yet accomplished anything. Great Britain and the United States informed the Vladivostok Zemstvo Board that they saw nothing irregular about Japan's action. Very shortly thereafter another Japanese cruiser, followed by cruisers of Great Britain, the United States and China, appeared in the harbor. Early in April, 1918, the Japanese and the British landed troops in the city.

The story of the Czecho-Slovak army's anabasis through Siberia is now well-known. Late in June, 1918, a part of these hard-fighting troops which had reached Vladivostok overthrew the local military forces in that city, leaving the civil rule in the hands of Zemstvo officials elected under Kerensky. They then sent a force westward to effect a juncture with the remainder of 1 A. Bullard, The Russian Pendulum, Chaps. XX-XXV.

the army, which was still west of Lake Baikal, and to assist its evacuation of Siberia. Their success in these bold moves led directly to the large-scale intervention inaugurated by the United States and participated in, at her invitation, by Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and China, which began in August. The then American Minister to China has pointed out that in the summer of 1918 the war seemed likely to be prolonged indefinitely, that Germany appeared to have Russia under her thumb, that the German and Austrian prisoners in Siberia were regarded as a menace and that the Allies still believed that the great majority of the Russian people needed only to be released from the perils of the Bolshevist power to be brought back into the war. Especially it was felt by the Allies and by the United States that the Czecho-Slovaks must be rescued and that the stores of food and munitions in western and eastern Siberia respectively must be saved from the Germans.2 The lead taken by the United States was more apparent than real. Previous to America's declaration of August 5, 1918, Semenov and Kalmykov had been furnished with large sums for the hiring of mercenaries and with rifles and machine-guns, the responsibility for which was placed upon the Japanese. The inference is obvious that the intervention in force was announced by the United States as her proposal because her skirts were relatively clean and her statements would be least open to suspicion. The assurances of America that she harbored no designs of conquest and that the Powers associated with her in the intervention were acting upon her principles were calculated both to encourage the Russian people to maintain the struggle against Bolshevism and to quiet the alarm of the Siberians for their territory. All the Powers concerned solemnly promised to withdraw their forces when their common objects had been attained. The statement of the United States was most definite as to what these objects were: "to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who were attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance". As later events have testified, the objects which Japan regarded as justifying intervention were more far-reaching than those defined by the United States. Dr. Reinsch has stated that Japan tried for some months prior to intervention to secure America's recognition of her so-called special interests in Siberia but was unsuccessful.

The American, Japanese and other intervening troops which began to enter Siberia in August gave varying degrees of support to Admiral Kolchak, who had become the head of the counter-revolutionary forces. The Bolshevik armies were for a time consistently defeated. The Czecho-Slovaks, who wished to use the intervention as a means to overwhelm the Bolsheviki and reestablish the Eastern Front, were disappointed by American and Japanese P. S. Reinsch, "Japan's Lone Hand", in Asia, Vol. XX, Feb. and Mar. 1920, pp. 164

refusal to consider the project. Compelled to abandon it they made their way back to Vladivostok unassisted and took ship for Europe. The important towns along the Ussuri and Siberian Railways, as far west as Lake Baikal, were occupied by foreign troops. Semenov was left in Chita, Kalmykov in Khabarovsk. In February, 1919, in order to defeat the Japanese party's purpose of monopolizing the management of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, the Inter-Allied Railway Commission was formed, in which the American engineering mission already mentioned was given the control of technical matters. The commission's existence was to terminate, by agreement, when the foreign troops were withdrawn from Siberia.

Kolchak, sometimes aided, sometimes hindered, by his Cossack subordinates, maintained his campaign for the restoration of monarchy in Russia and Siberia for about a year. In June, 1919, the Council of Four at Paris promised him food, munitions, and supplies. Beyond such assistance the general Allied policy was "hands-off", and without military support Kolchak was unable to conquer the country against the guerilla warfare which was demonstrating that he had failed to keep the people's confidence. By December, 1919, he had fallen from power and in the following February he was shot by the Bolsheviki. When it became clear to the intervening Powers not only that their efforts were regarded as gratuitous but that the intervention was so hated by the Siberians that it was driving all classes into the Soviet camp all but Japan withdrew their forces, leaving only sixty Americans to guard the radio station on Russian Island.

Unfortunately, the troops were withdrawn a few months before the last of the Czecho-Slovaks had embarked, making it possible for Japan to maintain the intervention with some apparent justification. Accordingly, she not only continued the occupation but sent additional troops to a total of 50,000, though she had been limited by the original invitation to 7,000. With these added forces and freed from the restraint previously imposed by the co-interventionists, Japan attacked the troops of the Partisans and prevented them from securing the fruits of their victory over Kolchak in the 'C. W. Ackerman, "Japan's Ambitions in Siberia", in Current History, April, 1919, pp. 109-112.

4

♦ The published statements vary concerning the numbers actually despatched to Siberia. The Japanese War Office stated on Jan. 31, 1919, that up to Nov. 1, 1918, a total of 73,400 troops had been sent over but that 13,800 of these were recalled in the succeeding months and that 34,000 more were to be recalled, 20,000 in January and February, 1919. (Current History, Apr. 1919, p. 121.) According to the Statesman's Year Book, 1921, the Japanese forces had been reduced to 39,000 at the end of 1919, but were increased to 50,000 in the spring of 1920. Figures given to the writer by the Japanese Legation at Peking were far smaller than any cited above. In 1921, after the evacuation of Baikalia, reduction again took place. When the order to evacuate the mainland of Siberia was issued Japan had approximately 25,000 men in the Maritime Province. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops were left in Northern Sakhalin. Of the troops of the other Powers, the United States sent 9,000, China 2,000, Great Britain, France and Italy 1,500 each.

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