to assert is, that there was no conspiracy in France corresponding with the disembarkation at Cannes. The Grand Marshal Bertrand, the preux chevalier of Europe, gave his word and honour to an English gentleman only yesterday, that no such conspiracy existed; and that three weeks before their quitting Elba not the least idea was entertained of the design. The Emperor himself, whose assurance you may receive with suspicion, told Mr. S as much, in a conversation he had with him in the garden of the Elysée, and, on being complimented on the performance of this, the greatest of all his actions, he said, "No, it was easier than you think; my only merit was making a good guess as to the actual situation of France." I have been assured from one of the persons concerned in the affair, that even the movement of D'Erlon and Lefebvre Desnouettes was originally contrived independently of the landing at Cannes, although the coincidence of time made it subsidiary to that effort. The original scheme was to create an insurrection among the troops. Desnouettes was to have galloped through Paris at the head of a regiment of cavalry, proclaiming the republic and the downfal of the Bourbons, who were to have been arrested, and, in case of resistance, destroyed. It is certain that many thousand papers were distributed at the beginning of March, stating that the king would fall, and

the republic be established; even a date was fixed for this great event, the 16th of March. You will recollect, that during the last Christmas, there was an apprehension of some treasonable designs, and that the guards were doubled in Paris. With these movements Napoleon could have no connection. Indeed, I know that he heard the first account of them from an English gentleman, a friend of mine, at Elba. It is currently reported here, that the Emperor has complained to Fouché, that the revolutionary spirit in France, being prematurely brought to a head, obliged him to take advantage of the general feeling three months sooner than he should have wished, and whilst the armies of the allies were still in a position to recommence operations against France. In England, Marshal Soult is supposed to have been deeply concerned, and to have assisted materially in the plot. I learn here that, on the contrary, that officer had some scheme for his own aggrandisement; and that he took no pains to diminish the discontents of the soldiery, who, he was in hopes, might be induced, in case of actual insurrection, to make choice of a general so well known as himself. It is certain, that he has not as yet been received at the Emperor's court, although it is thought that he is finally to have some great employ. The manner in which he was treated during the last days of the king's

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reign, notwithstanding that it throws suspicion on his intentions, is sufficient to shew that nothing could be decidedly proved against him.

The treason of Marshal Ney was not in consequence of any preconcerted scheme. The marshal, when he left Louis, had not any intention of betraying him; nor did he adopt the line of conduct so justly condemned, until he found the troops at Lons le Saulnier had determined upon joining the Emperor: when they were ordered by him on the parade to march against Napoleon, they replied by shouts of laughter and cries of vive l'Empereur. Nevertheless, the marshal had actually made every disposition for a movement against his ancient master.* He was weak enough not to do the only thing left for an honourable man: instead of returning to Paris with the news, he marched with the revolted army, and has branded his name with an infamy that even the success of his cause has failed to obliterate. He has no ostensible employ at the Emperor's court, excepting a military command; and although he is known to be a very brave man, and has the character of a very weak one, is regarded by all parties as a disreputable acquaintance. In London lan

* I learnt this afterwards on the spot from an Englishman, settled as a commissary at Dole, who received the marshal's orders. This, written long before his trial, has been proved by the detail of that event.

guage "he is cut," and his name and crime have furnished a pun for the Parisian wits, who say of his treachery, "il faut être né pour ça.' Colonel Henry Labedoyere went over with his regiment to Napoleon from the impulse of the moment, and, as I know from the officer of Napoleon's suite who received the first intelligence of his coming, without the least previous intimation being conveyed to the Emperor. In short, I have been unable to learn the time, place, circumstances, or names connected with any conspiracy to favour the landing at Cannes, and I conceive that all suspicion of correspondence with that attempt will be reduced, at last, to the discontent circulated rather freely in certain saloons at Paris, amongst the rela tions and known adherents of the former imperial court. To my mind, the very magnitude of the enterprise, and the facility with which it was executed, which induce some people to look upon the restoration as the effect of a plot laid at Paris, and branching out in a thousand ramifications into the provinces, are presumptive proofs, that when Napoleon quitted the isle of Elba, he was aware that no provision had been made for his reception, and that all he had to trust to was his own activity and resolution, and the unpopularity of the reigning dynasty both with the army and the people. The refusal of the garrison of Antibes to join him

is a sufficient proof that the defection of the other troops, afterwards, was not preconcerted, but merely the effect of a spontaneous preference of their ancient chief to their new master. It is true that the soldiers had preserved their tri-coloured cockade, as also that the violet, at Paris, was afterwards said to be the sign adopted by the partisans of the imperial government. It is no less a fact that Napoleon, in his conversations at Elba, talked vaguely of remounting the throne of France; but these things only prove that a portion of the French nation had a persuasion that the reign of the Bourbon dynasty could not be durable, and that the Emperor indulged the same notion: they do not prove any conspiracy in France, which had for its object to second the landing at Cannes.

I am inclined to believe that, not more than a fortnight previously to the arrival of Napoleon on the coast, some effort had been made, and discovered, to prepare the garrison of Antibes for that event; and that Mr. de Bouthilliers, prefect of the Var, transmitted a communication upon that subject to the Abbé Montesquiou, minister of the interior, who paid no attention to the information. The story was told me in England, and confirmed to me the other day in Flanders, by an English officer, to whom the Duke de Berri had imparted the fact, add