states readily acquiesce in cases of this nature, provided that such canals should be governed by International Law, for in this way there would be ample assurance that they would be used for the benefit of all the parties interested. This doctrine would be only the application of the juridical maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which, in turn, is derived from a principle of general jurisprudence that goes to show the inadvisability of pushing abstract principle to its logical results, when it is intended to deal with practical problems-summum jus summa injuria.

The fact seems to be that the question is sui generis, and cannot, therefore, be solved by reference to existing notions. The legal position of these artificial canals cannot be ascertained by using analogical arguments. The diplomatic history of the Suez and Panama Canals has amply shown this fact. The negotiations, disagreements, delays, and doubts, all go to prove the veracity of the assertion. But this does not mean, of course, that certain general principles of International Law would be absolutely unavailable in determining the status of these waterways. Primarily it is a matter for special conventions, but the principles to which reference has been made would greatly contribute to decide the question.

It further remains to be noticed in this connection, that it seems obvious that the ultimate status which would be given to waterways of this nature cannot in any way be affected by the fact that the canal is constructed by a government or by private enterprise. That is to say, the public or private nature of the undertaking is by no means a material point in

determining its position in International Law. And the reasons for this fact are not difficult to find. It is of course the individual who first perceives the necessity or the expediency of helping human development. But the activities of the modern state are so varied and complex, and may be traced to such very different sources, that it would be idle to speculate upon them in this connection. It may be pointed out, however, that economical or political reasons may prompt a state to take in hand the accomplishment of a given task without there existing any real difference in its results when the matter is dealt with from a juridical point of view.

The Panama Canal, it is well known, was taken up for construction by the United States as a government enterprise, on account of the generally accepted belief that private capital could not command sufficient resources for the completion of such an enormous work.1

Another point that seems to be equally ineffectual in determining the legal position of the waterway is the fact that the canal is constructed in territory that does not belong to the nation engaged in the opera

1 Mr. Roosevelt summarises thus one of the reasons why the United States undertook the completion of the Panama Canal: "It is not worth while belonging to a big nation unless the big nation is willing when the necessity arises to undertake a big task. . . . When we acquired the right to build the Panama Canal, and entered on the task, there were worthy people who came to me, and said they wondered whether it would pay. I always answered that it was one of the great world works which had to be done; that it was our business as a nation to do it, if we were really to make good our claim to be treated as a great world power; and that as we were unwilling to abandon the claim, no American worth his salt ought to hesitate about performing the task." (Speech of Mr. Roosevelt delivered at the Mansion House, The Times, June 1, 1910.)

tion. If this fact has any importance at all from the international standpoint, it is in showing that the general interest awakened with reference to the question is such that it has attracted foreign activity on account of the national resources being too poor for the magnitude of the work undertaken.

Finally, it may be submitted that the two last facts discussed—that is, the governmental character of the enterprise and the actual carrying out of the plans in foreign territory-may in some way influence the political history of the waterway, but with regard to its legal position they afford no clue, especially when there exist conventional agreements that purport to define its status.

CHAPTER III.

FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO GIVE TO THE PANAMA CANAL AN INTERNATIONAL STATUS.

It has been hinted at, though not expressly stated, that the neutralisation attached to a certain region, when considered apart from conventional agreements, mainly depends on the following three facts:1_

I. The geographical position of the place in question;

II. Its history, and

III. The interest that the world at large may have in it.

It is clear, however, that these questions, which we now consider as separate from each other, are not really so from a different point of view, for one of them may at once depend on, or result from, the others. Thus the geographical position that a certain place occupies may account for its history and for the special interest that mankind takes in it, and the result of this interest may be reflected in the conventional agreements of certain nations. But it will be convenient for our purpose to deal with them separately. The above facts will be discussed in their order.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

It is well known that the canal is being built in the narrowest stretch of land-less than fifty miles wide that connects North and South America. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to enter here into a long description of its geographical. peculiarities in order to emphasise the importance of the route, not only from the economical, but also from the political and strategical standpoints. The canal when terminated will be in the nature of an artificial strait connecting the two great oceans. Its position is such that it will necessarily alter the international thoroughfares.

It is not intended, nor will it be relevant to the subject, to enter here into a detailed and accurate account of the extent to which the Panama Canal will shift the centre of gravity in relation to the world routes, or what will be the advantages that the artificial waterway will have over the natural or actual condition of things. But some remarks on the subject will be germane to the present inquiry. It is obvious that the route between New Zealand and European countries on the Atlantic will be appreciably shortened. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand will be within more easy reach of the ports on the Atlantic coast of the American continent. Thus the new canal will make the travelling distance by sea between New York and Yokohama some 3400 miles less than under present conditions. There will also be a comparatively rapid maritime communication between Europe and the Pacific states of the New