III. THE INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE The interest that the world at large has in the subject of a maritime communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific is so patent that there is no need to insist on the question. M. de Lesseps well perceived this fact, and it alone explains his exertions in this connection. He regarded the work of Panama in the same plane as that of Suez; for this reason he conceived the idea of extending to the canal and its approaches the privileges of neutrality. Holland had already launched a project for the construction of this work, and later Bonaparte took steps in the same direction. The question has been more than once raised in England, and although it proved abortive she has never lost sight of the importance of the subject. Her interest is well evidenced by the treaties concluded with the United States and some of the Central American Republics in this respect. She has even been on the verge of war to uphold her contentions in connection with the interoceanic communication. The Latin American States, although always suspicious of the influence that the United States may exert on them, have expressed the interest which they feel in the construction of the canal. At the second International Conference of American States held at Mexico, 1901-2, they unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that this work would be "in the highest sense a work of civilisation, and to the greatest degree beneficial to the development of commerce between the American States and the other countries of the world." The above examination of the principal factors, apart from conventional agreements, clearly demonstrates that the position of the Panama Canal is one that cannot be defined by the mere will of a single nation. The international interests at stake are so many and so important, that it is imperative that in deciding the ultimate status that the canal will be made to assume, account should be taken of this plurality of interests, so that the result achieved should be both equitable and productive of welfare and advancement for mankind. It is, then, on account of the existence of all the different circumstances that have been described, that a formal and solemn treaty has been entered into, by means of which it is intended to devote the Panama Canal to the unrestricted use of all nations at all times. CHAPTER IV. CONVENTIONAL AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR THE THE treaties that exist on the subject have been mentioned more than once, but the validity, strength, and meaning of their provisions have not as yet been subjected to a severe analysis. The preamble of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty states that both Great Britain and the United States are desirous to facilitate the construction of an interoceanic canal, "and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the convention of the 19th of April 1850, commonly called the ClaytonBulwer treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the government of the United States, without impairing the general principle of neutralisation established in Article VIII. of that Convention,1 have for that purpose,” etc. It follows from this, as has been ably remarked,2 that Great Britain and the United States have recognised, first, that a "general principle" of neutralisation has been established by Article VIII. of the 1 The italics are our own. 2 Peter C. Hains, "The Neutralisation of the Panama Canal," American Journal of International Law, April 1909. Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and secondly, that such principle is not impaired by the Hay-Pauncefote Convention. The "general principle" of neutralisation referred to is then contained in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and, as we have already observed,' is to the effect that (a) in case of war between the contracting parties, their vessels traversing the canal shall be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture (Art. II.); (b) the persons employed in making the said canal, and their property used for that object, are to be protected from unjust detention, confiscation, seizure, or any violence whatever (Art. III.); and (c) the contracting parties are bound to protect the canal from interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation, and they 'guarantee the neutrality thereof, so that the said canal may be open and free." We hold that the foregoing provisions go to form the so-called "general principle" of neutralisation spoken of. It is true that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty mentions only Article VIII. of the ClaytonBulwer, and that this article speaks merely of extending the "protection" of the contracting powers to any practicable communication; but the whole tenor of the article clearly shows that its meaning and application cannot be ascertained otherwise than by reference to all the other articles of that treaty. The wording of Article VIII. is such that it leaves no doubt whatever as to what was intended. It begins by saying that "the governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired, in entering into this Convention, to accomplish a par1 See supra, p. 31. 2 The italics are the author's. ticular object, but also to establish a general principle, This "general principle" of neutralisation, then, which is not impaired by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, provides for the freedom of transit, the immunity of the canal from hostilities, and the protection of the works. So far the intention of the contracting parties in 1850 and in 1901 seems to be perfectly clear. The treaty of 1850 is superseded, not abrogated. The provisions that conflict with the new arrangements cease to be of any effect, but those parts in which no conflict occurs are perfectly binding. The main object of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was to do away with the estoppel that had been created by the convention of 1850. It will be remembered that by the latter convention neither of the contracting parties could acquire an exclusive control over the route. The treaty of 1901 provides that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the government of the United States, and thereby removes the objection which arose out of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention. Let us now examine the further internal evidence & |