nation would lose sight of. The obvious inference is, of course, that the canal shall not be used by a belligerent who is an enemy of the United States. This peculiar position of the United States in respect of the Panama Canal from the point of view of fact, finds a close parallelism in the advantageous situation that Great Britain holds in relation to the Suez Canal. In theory, all British enemies are entitled to pass through Suez. But matters are different in practice, for it would mean utter ruin to the belligerent vessels of a nation at war with Great Britain if they attempted to use the canal whilst the latter power holds impregnable positions at the approaches of the route. Gibraltar, Malta, and Bab-el- Mandeb are to the British cause what the locks in Panama would be to the United States.

"Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary, and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be affected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents."

"No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, or munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in

"Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service."

"Prizes shall be subjected in all respects to the same rules as the vessels of war of belligerents."

"In time of war belligerent powers shall not disembark nor embark within the canal and its ports of access, either troops, munitions, or materials of war.

1 This provision can hardly be said to be essential to neutralisation. Besides, the right to station vessels of war is partly admitted by the provision itself.

(The Hay-Pauncefote treaty is silent on this point.)

"The high contracting parties undertake to bring the present treaty to the knowledge of the states which have not signed it, inviting them to accede to it." 1

There are still other provisions in the Convention of Constantinople, but they are practically of no interest in this connection. They deal with the measures that Turkey and Egypt might take in case it should become necessary to defend the canal or the Ottoman possessions situated in the eastern coast of the Red Sea. They will be dealt with in the next chapter.

After noticing the numerous and important characteristics of the analogy existing between the Suez and Panama Canals, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that their position in law will be exactly the same.

1 It should be noticed at once that an article similar to this had been included in the original treaty signed by Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote, February 5, 1900, but it was struck out by the Senate. In the treaty entered into by the same plenipotentiaries in the following year, the article did not appear (cp. Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. iii. pp. 210 and 211). Much significance should not be attached to the omission of any such provision, for it must be kept in mind that the United States have persistently objected to allowing European powers to meddle in American affairs. They permitted England to do so, but they were forced by the special circumstances which have been noticed in the course of this essay.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FORTIFICATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL.1

THE status of neutralisation, as has been seen, carries with it certain consequences, some of which are well defined by International Law. These are dependent for their existence, like the principal notion itself, upon treaty stipulations, and therefore no doubt should exist with regard to them, if the conventional agreements are clear and devoid of ambiguities. But there may be also some other conceptions that are deemed, rightly or wrongly, to be the necessary effects of the theory of neutralisation, about which no certainty can exist, owing to the fact that this branch of law is comparatively modern and has not yet been fully developed; or be e the international documents from which they silent upon the subject, or not free from obscurity. When notions belong to the arena o of the international jurist sho sides of the controversy, and a the difficulty from general p

1 See, eg, George W. Davies, "For the American Journal of International L H. S. Knapp, "The Real Status of the Neutralisation," in The American Journal of pp. 314 et. seq.

consideration the tendencies of the development of the law. The question as to whether a neutralised region may or may not be fortified remains yet in the field of speculation. It is intended in this chapter to deal with the subject in a general manner, and then discuss it more specifically in connection with the Panama Canal. Owing to the special circumstances of the case, which have already been noted, the answer to our inquiry is necessarily obscure and cannot be laid down with dogmatic precision.

The question as to how far, or to what extent, if at all, the notion of neutralisation would be affected by the fact that the thing neutralised is fortified, would seem to resolve itself into the following: Is the erection of fortifications repugnant to the nonbelligerent idea that forms the essential characteristic of neutralisation? Or, in other words, how do the general principles of the law, the practice of nations, or the opinion of writers deal with this question?

The notion of neutralisation, as has been pointed out, has been made to serve various ends. There is one point, however, that is common to all. It is the freedom from the belligerent character that they may normally have. Thus the state, person, or thing neutralised is entitled to enjoy the benefit of peace, but, on the other hand, is burdened with the corresponding obligation of not taking part in a war. It is clear that the non-belligerent idea is the essential characteristic of the notion. But, obviously enough, the right of self-defence is reserved; this is a primordial right that the province of law cannot suppress or suspend. Law cannot discourage self-help, for