preponderant influence that it was bound to exert in the destinies of his country.1

It is of paramount importance for our purpose that we should consider the extent of the neutrality that the United States guaranteed according to this treaty, as interpreted by President Polk.

"In enter

ing into the mutual guarantees proposed by the thirtyfifth article of this treaty," thus runs his message, "neither the government of New Granada nor that of the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their resolution to which I have already referred,2 is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a party to this guarantee, it cannot be doubted-indeed it is confidently expected by the government of New Granada —that similar guarantees would be given by Great Britain and France. . . . That either of these governments would embrace the offer cannot be doubted, because there does not appear to be any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage but the guarantee of great commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. The interests of the world at stake are so important that the security of this passage between the two oceans cannot be made to depend upon the

1 The memorandum is given at length in García-Merou, Historia de la diplomacia americana, tomo segundo, pp. 7 et seq.

2 The resolution of the Senate alluded to is the one that we have quoted on p. 13, supra. The fact is, as Polk himself tells us, that he is following no other than the original policy of his country in connection with the subject of a trans-isthmian canal.

wars and revolutions which may arise among different nations." 1

We may pause here for a while to consider the march of events in connection with this subject from the time in which the United States first came to show any interest in trans-isthmian communication up to the moment when the treaty with New Granada was ratified. It is easy to see that Polk completed Clay's policy, for the latter, although fully conscious of the importance of a canal communication and of the benefits that would thereby accrue to his country, did not venture, as has already been pointed out, to sketch out the scheme whereby the security of the route would be guaranteed to all nations. Special circumstances had been gradually influencing the course of events, and thus Polk could do nothing but adopt that line of action, unless he was to let the opportunity slip from his hands, proving thereby a patent lack of statesmanship. He had further the incitement of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, when, a few years before, the President had been requested to enter into negotiations with foreign governments for the effective protection of an isthmian canal. He adhered steadfastly to the view that the passage should be free to all nations, and that the equal enjoyment of it should be guaranteed by all the great commercial powers by means of a stipulation of neutrality. The United States did not, and indeed could not, aspire to the control of the route.

It would be hardly necessary to suggest that there is sufficient justification for the assertion that the 1 Messages of the Presidents, vol. iv. p. 512.

20

THE PANAMA CANAL

United States were perfectly sincere in expressing this view at the time with which we are now dealing. Although the ambition for territorial expansion had already begun, they were not yet bold enough to demand the sole and entire control of such an

important passage. On the other hand, no decisive steps had been taken by European powers so as to incite competition. It is true that from time to time a kind of theoretical interest in canal projects across the American Isthmus had been shown on the part of some of these states, but no practical measures had as yet been taken that would give foundation to the belief of a successful enterprise. As evidence of the sincerity of the United States that the passage should be free to all, it may be stated here that in a dispatch of December 14, 1849, to Mr. Lawrence, the American Minister at London, the Department of State requests him to co-operate with the Minister of New Granada in obtaining from the British Government a guarantee of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, similar to that contained in the treaty concluded by the United States with that republic.1 Such a step on the part of the United States would conclusively show that in fact they had not sought any exclusive advantages in signing the treaty referred to, in the event of the canal being opened across that part of the territory; for it is clear that if one of the European powers accepted the burden of guaranteeing the neutrality, it would

1 Mr. Clayton to Mr. Lawrence; Sullivan and Cromwell, Compilation of Executive Documents and Diplomatic Correspondence relative to a Trans-Isthmian Canal, vol. i. p. 529. This work will be hereafter referred to as Compilation of Documents.

also claim the corresponding advantages secured by the United States in their treaty with New Granada.

Before noticing in this connection the subsequent events that radically altered the attitude of the United States towards the canal question, one should observe how the Department of State has interpreted the clause relative to the neutrality of the Isthmus, as contained in the treaty of 1846. Herein we shall incidentally notice another relaxation of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States have, it is true, gradually and effectively developed the policy advanced by their ablest and earliest statesmen, but in the course of this progressive evolution they have receded, on more than one occasion, from that original position. This result may, of course, be due to the changes of opinion that necessarily influence the conduct of the government, or to some unavoidable difficulties that the administration finds impossible to gauge in a manner different from that which, by means of a compromise, does away with the lofty idealism of the absolute principle. There is no reason for surprise, therefore, if we find these deviations from their traditional policy. Consistency has never been the golden rule of governments.

In the year 1862, in the course of one of those insurrectionary movements that unfortunately have been so common in what is now called Colombia, General Mosquera, the leader of the revolution, sent an armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama. Señor Herrán, Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, invoked the aid of the United States in accordance with the provision of the treaty of 1846. In con

sequence, an American naval commander was instructed "to take care to protect and guarantee at all hazards and at whatever cost, the safety of the railroad transit across the Isthmus of Panama." But as Señor Herrán insisted that the security of the transit could not be adequately ensured by the presence of a mere naval force, and that New Granada was entitled to the special aid of a land force to be sent by the United States, the Department of State sought an understanding with Great Britain and France as to whether any proceedings taken by the United States would meet with their assent and acquiescence. It was further intended to discover whether these two countries would co-operate with the United States in a joint occupation of the Isthmus of Panama. It so happened that the British and French Governments did not see any ground for such an interference, and thus the matter was dropped, and New Granada was left alone to extricate herself from her own difficulties.1 At this time the very integrity of the United States was threatened, and Seward, just as Clayton had done a few years before, in order to save, as he thought, the administration, felt that the best plan was to depart from the policy of his predecessors. This invitation from the United States themselves to European powers in order to effect a joint occupation in the New World was such a patent disregard of the Monroe Doctrine, for which all Latin America had had great reverence and trust, that Mexico, whose independence was then endangered by the coalition of Great Britain, France, and Spain, protested against this uncalled

1 Compilation of Documents, vol. ii. pp. 1147 et seq.