for act as a violation of the dignity of Spanish America.1

Shortly afterwards the government of the United States was called upon to interfere, if the necessity should arise, to prevent the importation of troops and munitions of war by Spain across the Isthmus of Panama, for the purpose of carrying on a war with Peru. The necessity for such an interference did not arise; but the Attorney-General, to whom the case was referred for an opinion, held that under the guarantee promised by the United States in the treaty of 1846 such interference would be obligatory. Here we have a clear statement with regard to the interpretation of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama. The meaning attached by the AttorneyGeneral to the term neutral in this connection was simply that the route should not be used by a state when its avowed purpose was to carry on a war.

After the recital of the above facts, it becomes unnecessary to dwell any longer on the question of the extent of the "neutralisation" bestowed on the Isthmus, as provided by the treaty of 1846. According to the views of the United States, this amounted to some kind of protection by means of which freedom of transit to non-belligerents would be ensured. At this comparatively early period of the history of neutralisation, the proper signification of the conception as applied to the thoroughfares of the world had not yet become clear, although there were, even then, sufficient manifestations to show that it

1 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, p. 1150. See also Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1903, p. 119.

was in the course of formation. The laws of war were at that time in a very imperfect condition, and hence it was rightly feared that the mere approach of belligerents to a zone over which peaceful passage was to be maintained, was sufficient in itself to prevent the free transit. Add to this the strange misconception that inevitably resulted from the entirely different meaning of the term when applied to neutralised places over which no free passage is sought to be secured.1

It has been seen that up to the present the policy of the United States has been the construction of the canal by private enterprise and subject to political control by none. They have not sought advantages that would not be accorded in the same manner to other nations. It was partly because at this epoch they had not yet reached such a stage of development as would prompt them to launch projects that would arouse the susceptibilities of the Great Powers, and partly owing to the fact that there was hardly any need for the assertion of an advanced and agressive policy. In concluding the first treaty-which, as has been observed, was entered into without instructions from the Department of State-dealing with the transit between the two oceans, they were satisfied with the understanding that the passage would be for the common enjoyment of all nations.

1 See infra, p. 105, note 1.

CHAPTER II.

THE CLAYTON-BULWER CONVENTION.

THE next important topic in connection with the history of the canal across the Isthmus is the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention. It would not be possible, however, to understand its provisions without noticing first, at least succinctly, the events that led to its negotiation. The endeavours on the part of Great Britain to acquire possessions in Central America can be traced back to the end of

the seventeenth century. A period of British encroachments then began, first on the Spanish colonies, and then on the Central American Republics, the successors of Spain. And by the year 1830 Great Britain may be said to have assumed practical control over the territory of Mosquitia.1 Following the same line of action, the British Superintendent of Belize, a Mr. McDonald, in August of 1841, seized by force San Juan del Norte (Greytown) as part of the Mosquito territory. The action of McDonald and the outrages committed by him were not disavowed by the British ministry, in spite of the protests to Great Britain and the appeals to the world by the Central American States.

1 Travis, The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, p. 31.

Even the United States paid these appeals no particular attention. Such proceedings, on the contrary, only incited Great Britain to take higher grounds than ever in defence of her pretensions. Thus on June 30, 1847, she formally laid claim to the contested territory, and early in 1848 had completely ousted Nicaragua.1 By means of this aggressive stroke Great Britain was placed in a position to lay down the conditions under which the canal would be opened by the Nicaragua route, for one of its termini would necessarily be San Juan. It must be remembered that according to the generally accepted view of the time this was the most feasible communication for the desired waterway.

Great Britain's action could not but arouse a storm of indignation in the United States. Those who were more interested in the construction of the canal as a money-making enterprise saw in the British aggressions a commercial competition. They accordingly spread the news of the unwarranted encroachments, and endeavoured successfully to bring into prominence the Monroe Doctrine. The administration, on the other hand, had not only the pressure of the popular feeling, but perceived also in the British measure a clear and decisive opposition to the policy of the United States of a canal subject to control by none. It is evident that, if the canal

2

1 The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, pp. 37-42.

2 Mr. Buchanan, who was then Secretary of State, sums up the situation thus: "The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her history, of seizing upon every commercial point in the world whenever circumstances have placed it in her power; and now it seemed her evident purpose, by assuming the title of protector over a miserable, degraded,

was to be controlled by a foreign power, the United States would have been practically at the mercy of that state which held the key to the passage. Under these circumstances the Department of State was left no alternative but to take prompt action.

Mr. Hise was therefore sent to Central America in order to investigate the validity of the British claims. His instructions, however, did not empower him to obtain any right in connection with the transit route. In spite of this he concluded, without authority, a treaty with Nicaragua whereby the exclusive right to construct the canal was conferred on the United States or their citizens. The United States were permitted to erect fortifications along the route and at the ports at either end; but, on the other hand, were bound to guarantee the integrity of Nicaragua.1 This convention of course flatly denied the existence of the British claims.

It is important to remember in this connection that the Cabinet of Washington was not in a very satisfactory position. In fact, the nervousness of the Department of State was such that the diplomatic triumph of the United States Minister in Central America could only be regarded as an embarrassment. The Government did not, and in fact could not, desire the exclusive control of the waterway, or

and insignificant tribe of Indians, to acquire an absolute dominion over the vast extent of seacoast in Nicaragua, and to obtain control over the route for a railway and canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans." Letter of instruction to Mr. Elijah Hise, Special Envoy of the United States to Central America, quoted by Keasbey, op. cit. p. 194.

1 Hise-Selva Convention, June 21, 1849. Cp. J. G. Whiteley, "Les Traités Clayton-Bulwer et Hay-Pauncefote," Revue de Droit International, tome iii. seconde série.