reason why this letter of his has been called "one of the most remarkable state papers ever penned."

Lord Granville gave in due time a response to this note. He began by rightly pointing out that "the principles on which the whole argument of the dispatch are founded are, as far as I am aware, novel in International Law." He asserted that the interests of Great Britain in the canal are equal to those of the United States; and with regard to the unexampled development of the United States on the Pacific coast, Lord Granville said that "Her Majesty's Government cannot look upon it in the light of an unexpected event, or suppose that it was not within the view of the statesmen who were parties on either side of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty," and that such a change of conditions could not be accepted as a contention for "vitiating the foundations of an agreement which cannot be supposed to have been concluded without careful thought and deliberation.”1

The two governments entered then into a discussion of the "historical objections" to the treaty, and here it may be safely stated that Mr. Blaine's part was decidedly weak. Lord Granville's acumen scattered the arguments of the United States Secretary of State. It would be unnecessary to continue following the diplomatic wrangle that went on for a considerable time between the Cabinets of London and Washington; for Mr. Frelinghuysen succeeded Mr. Blaine in his post, and it was necessary

1 Note of Lord Granville to Mr. West, January 7, 1882, Compilation of Documents, vol. iii. pp. 1646–1651.

2 See letters of Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, November 29, 1881, and of Lord Granville to Mr. West, January 14, 1882, Compilation of Documents, vol. iii. pp. 1633-1665.

for him, in view of the policy that the administration was bent on pursuing, to take up the American case and answer Lord Granville's dispatches. He found occasion, of course, to refer to "the traditional policy of the United States." But the reasonings on both sides to the dispute really amounted to expressions of opinion, and, as they were diametrically opposed, the controversy drew them further apart. Finally, Her Majesty's Government pointed out that if the Monroe Doctrine had not precluded the President and the Senate from sanctioning the treaty, how was it then that they came at this late date to say that it was opposed to their traditional policy?

The fact is, as we have already stated, that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a potent estoppel to this new policy of the United States in connection with canal communications. It was, in fact, a barricade which must, while in force, prevent them from obtaining an exclusive control over the route. The Monroe Doctrine-in its new form of not only preventing European powers from obtaining control over the New World, but of giving that control to the United States must rest in abeyance until the difficulty was removed. It was not easy for the United States to come to this conclusion, especially as in their own point of view this doctrine was simply the national utterance of the right of self-preservation. But in the matter of the Monroe Doctrine, as applied to the transit question, Great Britain had undoubtedly throughout brought the better argument, and found, at that time at least, no reason whatever to depart from her views.

President Arthur was greatly concerned at the

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French influence at Panama, and hence he attempted to counteract this by the construction of a second canal by way of Nicaragua. Accordingly his administration took the bold step of negotiating a treaty whereby it was provided that the canal should be built by the United States of America and owned by them and the Republic of Nicaragua; and the former power agreed to protect the integrity of the territory of the latter.1 But Cleveland withdrew the treaty from the Senate and it was never ratified. In his message of December 8, 1885, the President says: Maintaining, as I do, the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day which prescribe" (? proscribe)" entangling alliances with foreign states, I do not favour a policy of acquisition of new and distant territory or the incorporation of remote interests with our own. . . . Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world must be for the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by a single power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition. An engagement combining the construction, ownership, and operation of such a work by this government, with an offensive and defensive alliance for its protection, with the foreign state whose responsibilities and rights we should share, is, in my judgment, inconsistent with such dedication to universal and neutral use." 2 President Cleveland in this neat and precise language reverted to the ancient

1 The Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty of December 1, 1884.

2 Message of Cleveland, December 8, 1885, Compilation of Documents, vol. iii. pp. 1761 et seq.

policy of his country of a canal free from any political control; he did not claim any exclusive advantages for his country, and did not feel tempted, therefore, to find fault with the Clayton-Bulwer Convention. His policy showed the prudence obtained from the experience of his immediate predecessors, who, in their desire to develop the Monroe Doctrine as applied to the canal question, had provoked a diplomatic controversy with Great Britain to find themselves only hopelessly defeated.

Generally after a stormy period there comes calm. This was the case with the United States immediately after the era of activity that terminated with the presidency of Mr. Arthur. The subsequent administration showed hardly any interest in the construction of the canal, and with regard to the "entangling alliance" with Great Britain no attempts were made to abrogate it. On the contrary, they found opportunity to cite the convention, showing thereby that they regarded it as still binding.1

1 Cp. Viallate, op. cit. p. 136.

CHAPTER IV.

Уелед

THE CANAL AS A GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE.

THE state of tranquillity or comparative stagnation in the policy of the United States as regards the canal question that came after the administration of President Arthur could not possibly last for long. The gradual development of the desires of the North American Republic to exert a kind of moral supremacy over the other nations of the New World could not be relegated to oblivion. The construction of the canal in itself, without obtaining its political control, would place great economic advantages in the hands of the United States citizens. But now they would not even obtain this, for it was evident that the Panama Canal would not be constructed by the French company. By the year 1888 the finances of the company became seriously embarrassed. Capitalists in the United States saw in this fact an opening for a new undertaking, and gradually they once more brought the question under the consideration of the government.

Moreover, subsequent events, quite apart from the influence brought to bear on public opinion by the commercial classes, forced the question into the field of governmental activity, and the construction of