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up to December 31, 1918, at control prices, you give us the option to forward to you similar goods to the same amount in value in each of the five consecutive years commencing on January 1 after the termination of the war, monthly deliveries at our option at our current prices at the times of the various deliveries." The Co-operative Society did not sign the agreement, and no preserves were supplied by the respondents to the Society.

Par. 1 of the Food (Conditions of Sale) Order, 1917: "Except under the authority of the Food Controller no person shall, in connection with a sale or proposed sale of any article of food, impose or attempt to impose any condition relating to the purchase of any other article."

The justices were of opinion that the order contemplated a sale of an article different in kind to that proposed to be sold, and they therefore dismissed the information.

Snagge for the appellant contended that the words "any other article" included an article of the same kind as that which was the subject of a sale or a proposed sale.

Eustace Hills for the respondents contended (1) that the justices had rightly construed the order, and (2) that there was no evidence of a sale or a proposed sale. The agreement did not impose on the respondents any obligation to sell, but merely gave them an option to do so.

which, in accordance with the terms of the contracts, were referred to arbitrators appointed by the Liverpool General Brokers' Association, who made an award in favour of the sellers. The buyers appealed to the appeal committee of the Association, who made an award, dated August 15, 1918, par. 7 of which was as follows: "We were requested by both parties to make our award in alternative form, viz., firstly, in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court, pursuant to s. 7 (b) of the Arbitration Act, 1889; and secondly, and in the alternative, in the form of a final and conclusive award, the intention of all parties being that either party shall have the option of taking the opinion of the Court upon the questions of law arising upon our award so stated in the form of a special case if they shall so desire, and of such their desire shall give notice to the other party within the times and subject to the conditions hereinafter set out, but that if neither party shall desire to do so the award shall be, and be treated as, a final and conclusive award immediately enforceable by action or otherwise without previous recourse to the Court."

Par. 9: "If either party shall desire to take the opinion of the Court upon the questions of law arising upon our award stated in the form of a special case and of such their desire shall, before October 12, 1918, give to the other party notice in writing, and shall, before October 26, 1918, set down the award for argument before the Court as a special

THE COURT (Darling, Avory and Salter JJ.) allowed the case then, subject to the opinion of the Court, we make appeal.

DARLING J. said that the order did not mean that the other article must be different in kind. For the purposes of this order one lot of preserves was a different article from another lot of preserves. With regard to the second point, the respondents' letter and the agreement taken together showed that there had been, in connection with a proposed sale of preserves in 1918, an attempt to impose a condition with regard to another article-namely, consignments of preserves in subsequent years.

Solicitor for appellant: E. P. Lickfold.

our award in the form of a special case. . . ."

The appeal committee then stated in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court the facts, contentions and their findings.

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Par. 11: "If . the notice appointed in paragraph 9 hereof shall not be duly given by either party, or if neither party shall duly set down the award for argument before the Court as a special case within the time or times respectively in that behalf in the said paragraph appointed, then and in such case they awarded in favour of the sellers.

The buyers did not give notice before October 12, 1918, of their intention to take the opinion of the Court upon the award stated in the form of a special case. Some days after that date they wrote to the sellers asking them to consent to

Solicitors for respondents: Lloyd & Co., for J. Hetheringthe time being extended for the giving of notice, but the ton, Wigton.

K. B. D.

F. O. R.

sellers refused to consent. Thereupon, and before October 26, the buyers set down the special case for argument.

J. H. Layton for the sellers took the preliminary objection that as notice had not been given before October 12 of the buyers' intention to take the opinion of the Court upon the award stated in the form of a special case, the award had Dec. 13. become final and conclusive, and there was nothing for the Court to deal with. The condition imposing a time limit was within the competency of the arbitrators, and was reasonable: In re Olympia Oil & Cake Co. and MacAndrew Moreland & Co., [1918] W. N. 272; [1918] 2 K. B. 771.

*J. L. LYON & Co., LIMITED v. HADDOCK, PARKER & Co. Arbitration-Award-Alternative form-Award in form of special case-Limited time for giving notice of intention to take opinion of Court.

Award set down in the special paper.

Dobb (Langdon K.C. with him) for the buyers. The objection was not open on a case set down in the special paper. Under certain contracts made between Haddock, Parker The Court must deal with the special case stated. But even and Co., of Liverpool (hereinafter called "the sellers "), and if the objection could be heard, it was not well founded. The J. L. Lyon and Co., Limited, of London (hereinafter called | Olympia case (supra) did not support the sellers' contention. "the buyers"), for the sale of eucalyptus oil, disputes arose It merely decided that the arbitrators could properly mak

it a condition that the case should be set down within the time specified in order that the matter should be disposed of promptly. The Court there was not considering the question of the necessity for giving notice. That question involved a matter of procedure with which the arbitrators had no power to deal. Compliance with this condition was not essential to ensure promptness of decision. It was bad, and ought to be disregarded as unreasonable. If, however, the condition applied, the Court had power to extend the time for giving notice, and in the particular circumstances should

do so.

Layton replied.

SANKEY J. said he could not accept the buyers' contention that he must adjudicate upon the special case which was before him. He had to see whether a condition precedent to the argument of the special case had been complied with. Admittedly the notice mentioned in par. 9 of the award was not given in time, but the buyers said that the condition requiring notice to be given before October 12 was bad, and ought to be disregarded. That point was not open in this Court. In the Olympia case (supra) which, so far as the matter under discussion was concerned, was identical with the present case, Bankes and Scrutton L.JJ. agreed that

the arbitrators could competently state their award in the way they did. Mr. Dobb contended, however, that the members of the Court of Appeal had not directed their minds to the condition as to giving notice. He did not think that contention sound. The Court of Appeal had before it the same two conditions as were present in this case, and the | award was held good. Mr. Dobb also said that this condition as to giving notice was capricious or at least unreasonable, and should not be given effect to. He could not agree. He thought the Olympia case (supra) decided, or at all events the reasoning involved, that the condition was reasonable. The buyers' first contention therefore failed. The second contention was that the Court had power to extend the time for giving notice. It was unnecessary to decide that. His present view was that he had no power to extend the time, but assuming, without deciding, that he had the power, this was not a case in which he would exercise it in favour of the buyers. The preliminary objection would be sustained. Preliminary objection upheld.

Solicitor for buyers: A. E. Cubison.
Solicitors for sellers: Luya & Williams, Liverpool.

J. S. H.

NOTICE TO SOLICITORS.

With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and rapidity in the various publications connected with the LAW REPORTS the Council will be obliged if the Solicitors to whom application is made by any reporter acting for the Council will as

soon

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WILL.

as possible after application furnish the Legacy to married daughters-Condition—Precedent or Subsequent-Exemption

necessary papers, together with any information in their power as to the names of the various Solicitors engaged in the case. At the same time, the Council

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thankfully acknowledge the assistance they have Judicial Committee of the

already received from so many members of the Profession in furnishing the papers required to

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Privy Council.

Dec. 13.

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Ch. D.

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HIS MAJESTY'S PROCURATOR IN EGYPT, APP.; AND
DEUTSCHES KOHLEN DEPOT GESELLSCHAFT, RESPS.
[AND CROSS-APPEAL.]

Prize

Court-Seizure-Constructive seizure-Tugs and lighters-"Navires de commerce "-" Petite navigation locale"-Suez Canal Convention-Hague Convention, Nos. vi. (1) (2), xI. (3).

Appeal and cross-appeal from a decree of the Prize Court (Egypt).

The respondents were a German company which before the war carried on the business of coaling steamers at Port Said. 17 They owned a large fleet of lighters and the tugs to tow them. Prior to April, 1916, they were carrying on the business under a licence. In that month the Officer Commanding the Forces in Egypt revoked the licence and appointed an official as liquidator of the business. In June, 1916, the Procurator informed the liquidator that he proposed to take proceedings for condemnation of the craft, and that, owing to the difficulty of serving separate units of the fleet, he should ask for an order for substituted service on the liquidator. It was agreed between them that on proceedings being taken the liquidator should continue to hold the craft at the disposal of the Crown and of the Prize Court.

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from leaving within the days of grace, it should be merely detained. By the Hague Convention No. xI., art. 3, "les bateaux exclusivement affectés. . . à des services de petite navigation locale sont exempts de capture . . .”

The Prize Court at Alexandria on September 30, 1916, delivered judgment, holding that the craft did not come within Convention No. XI., art. 3, but that Convention No. 6, arts. 1 and 2, applied. The craft were accordingly ordered to be detained merely. No question was raised at the trial as to the sufficiency of the seizure.

The Procurator appealed daiming condemnation, and the liquidator cross-appealed claiming a release. The appeal first came on for hearing in January. when in the course of the argument their Lordships raised the question whether there had been a seizure of the craft, and the argument was adjourned in order that further evidence on that point might be obtained from Egypt. Lord Parker of Waddington and Sir Samuel Evans, who were members of the Committee, died before the further hearing.

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Appeal from a judgment of the Prize Court (England) : [1916] P. 230.

A neutral firm carrying on business in Ecuador claimed 4,000 bags of cocoa which had been seized as prize on board the British steamship Palm Branch at Liverpool. The goods at the date of the seizure were the property of the claimants, and were insured against war risk through German agents. The underwriters as to about 973 per cent. of the risk were Germans. The German underwriters, before the claim was made, paid the claimants as for a total loss. Correspondence then took place between the claimants and the German agents, which showed that the claimants admitted that the property had passed to the underwriters who had paid, and that the present claim was made on behalf of the underwriters under an indemnity as to costs.

The President (Sir Samuel Evans), on July 31, 1916, disOct. 21, 22. Sir Gordon Hewart S.-G. and G. T. Simonds missed the claim, and, the goods having been sold, condemned

for the Crown.

Sir Eric Richards K.C. and Balloch for the liquidator. Dec. 13. THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE (Lord Sumner, Lord Parmoor and Lord Wrenbury) allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

LORD SUMNER, in delivering the judgment, said that their Lordships were of opinion that a sufficient seizure had been arranged by consent. Having regard to the nature of the seizure there clearly had been no breach of the Suez Canal Convention. But in any case the company could not have

availed itself of a breach of that Convention for the reasons

given in The Sudmark, [1917] A. C. 620; also because the German Empire, in conjunction with their allies, had before the seizure committed belligerent acts in the Canal. With regard to the Hague Convention No. XI., art. 3, it was difficult to describe either the craft or the navigation in which they were engaged as small; they were an indispensable adjunct to the most important ocean voyages. Whatever were the precise limits of that article, it did not, in their Lordships' opinion, include the craft in question. Nor did the Hague Convention No. vI., arts. 1 and 2, apply. Those articles contemplated a ship, commercially engaged upon a voyage, being at the outbreak of war in a port of loading, call or discharge, and being restrained by force majeure from availing itself of the days of grace. Here the craft were used only at Port Said, and they were not detained by force majeure. It was therefore unnecessary to consider whether they were "navires ог navires de commerce." The licence to continue the business had been revoked, and the principle followed in Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffit, [1915] 1 Ch. 58, 61, could not thereafter be invoked for the protection of the craft. The appeal should be allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed.

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Solicitor for Crown: Treasury Solicitor.

Solicitors for liquidator: Botterell & Roche.

the proceeds.

The claimants appealed.

October 17, 18. MacKinnon K.C. and C. R. Dunlop for the appellants.

Sir Gordon Hewart S.-G. and Hubert Hull for the Crown. Dec. 13. THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE (Lord Sumner, Lord Wrenbury, Lord Sterndale and Sir Arthur Channell), in a judgment delivered by Sir Arthur Channell, said that their Lordships entirely agreed with the late President's reasons for dismissing the claim. On the view taken of the facts it was unnecessary to discuss the difficult questions which would commonly arise upon a claim by underwriters, such as whether a right of property had passed which the Prize Court could recognise, or merely a contractual right which it could not. The condemnation of the goods, however, gave rise to some difficulty, since at the date of the seizure they were not enemy property. The Crown had, upon their Lordships' suggestion, consented to the decree for condemnation being set aside, the money being directed to remain in the Prize Court until further order. Their Lordships did not decide that the condemnation was wrong. It would be open to the Crown, after issuing a fresh writ, or otherwise, to apply for condemnation of the proceeds. It would also be open to any British or neutral underwriters, or reinsurers, to put forward such claims as they might be advised, and the appellants could claim such part of the money as in no case would have gone to the enemy underwriters. The decree dismissing the claim was accordingly affirmed, the condemnation being set aside upon the above-mentioned terms.

Solicitors for appellants: Stokes & Stokes.
Solicitor for Crown: Treasury Solicitor.

A. M. T.

A. M. T.

J. C.

THE STIGSTAD.

Dec. 16.

Prize Court-Neutral ship-Retaliatory Order in Council of
March 11, 1915–Validity—Inconvenience to neutrals.
Appeal from a judgment of the Prize Court (England):
[1916] P. T23.

bigh Court of Justice.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

The appellants were managers of the Norwegian steamship Stigstad. That vessel left a Norwegian port on April 10, 1915, with a cargo of iron ore briquettes for carriage to Rotterdam, to be there transhipped into Rhine barges for P. O. Lawrence J. purchasers in Germany. She was stopped off the Orkneys by H.M.S. Inconstant, and ordered to Middlesbrough to discharge. The discharge began on May 1 and terminated on May 15, 1915.

The appellants claimed in the Prize Court (1) freight, (2) compensation for detention, (3) expenses consequent upon the seizure and discharge.

The ship had been required to discharge at Middlesbrough under an Order in Council of March 11, 1915, known as the Retaliatory Order. The terms of that Order appear from the report at [1916] p. 123, the preamble at p. 128, and arts. 3 and 5 at pp. 126, 127.

The President (Sir Samuel Evans), by his judgment, upheld the validity of the Order and dismissed the claim for demurrage and expenses. He had allowed the appellants freight out of the proceeds of sale of the discharged cargo, in proceedings against the cargo.

Oct. 15, 16. appellants.

In re GROVE.

THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE V. DIXON.

Dec. 13.

Will-Legacy to married daughters-Condition-Precedent or Subsequent Exemption.

The testator died on September 23, 1918, and by his will, made in 1911, gave his residuary estate to the Public Trustee, upon trust to sell, convert and invest, and to hold the investments upon trust for his two sons and five daughters (naming them) equally, and the testator settled the share of each daughter upon trust for such daughter for life, and whilst married without power of anticipation, but with power (with the exception of his daughters Mabel and Edith) to appoint by deed or will, the income after her death to her husband during his life, and, after the decease of such daughter and subject to any such appointment, in trust for the issue of such daughter as she should by deed or will, notwithstanding trust for her children who being sons attained the age of twenty-one years, or being daughters attained that age or

R. A. Wright K.C. and Balloch for the coverture, appoint, and in default of such appointment in

Sir Frederick Smith A.-G., Sir Gordon Hewart S.-G., married, and, if no such child, then upon such trusts as such MacKinnon K.C. and Hubert Hull for the Crown.

Dec. 16. THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE (Lord Sumner, Lord Parmoor, Lord Wrenbury, Lord Sterndale and Sir Arthur Channell) dismissed the appeal.

LORD SUMNER, in delivering the judgment, said that the claims under appeal were for damages. The Order did not provide for damages being paid, and if the Order were valid they could not be claimed. He referred to the judgment of the Board in The Zamova, [1916] 2 A. C. 77 at pp. 95, 98, to the effect (1) that as held in The Fox (Edw. 311), where just cause for retaliation exists, neutrals may be required to submit to inconveniences, and (2) that the recitals were conclusive as to the existence of a case for reprisals, the Court having to determine whether the means adopted by the Order were unlawful as entailing inconvenience unreasonable in the circumstances. These principles, he said, were sound and inevitable. Applying them to the circumstances of the case, their Lordships were of opinion that the Order did not inflict hardship, excessive either in kind or in degree, upon neutral commerce, and that accordingly the Order was valid. Of the later Order in Council of February 16, 1917, their Lordships said nothing, since The Leonara, [1918] P. 182, to which it was material, was under appeal to the Board. The present appeal should be dismissed.

Solicitors for appellants: Botterell & Roche.
Solicitor for Crown: Treasury Solicitor.

A. M. T.

daughter (other than Mabel and Edith) should by deed or will appoint, and in default of any such appointment then in trust for his other children equally; and the testator declared that the said residuary bequest to his daughters was conditional upon their transferring to trustees, within three months of his death, their respective interests under their mother's marriage settlement to be held upon the same trusts

as

were thereinbefore declared respecting his residuary estate, and that in the event of any daughter failing or refusing to execute such transfer, her share in his residuary estate should "therefrom cease,' ," and his trustee should hold her share for his son and such of his daughters as should execute such transfer. By the mother's marriage settlement, made in 1862, her personal estate was settled upon trusts for her and the testator for life, and after the death of the survivor of them for their children who being sons attained twenty-one and being daughters attained that age or married. The mother died in 1879. The son and five daughters all attained twenty-one in the lifetime of the testator. Three of the daughters, viz., Norah, Mabel and Edith, married with the concurrence of the testator and before the date of his will, and each of them on her marriage settled her reversionary share and interest under her mother's marriage settlement upon usual trusts, which, however, differed from the trusts of the testator's residuary estate in that the husband took a life interest if he survived his wife, and had a power of appointment amongst the issue of his marriage, and there was also a difference in the ultimate trust in default of issue. The testator was a party to two of the

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