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daughters' marriage settlements. The Public Trustee took out a summons to determine (1) whether each married daughter was entitled to share in the testator's residuary estate notwithstanding that she was unable to perform the condition imposed on her by his will by reason of the settlement which she had executed on her marriage; (2) whether the condition was void, and, if not, to what extent, if any, it was binding on the married daughters; and (3) whether, if the condition was binding on the married daughters, each of them had substantially complied with it by the settlement executed on her marriage. Each of the unmarried daughters was willing to perform the condition imposed by the testator. R. J. Morrison for the plaintiff.

Ashton Cross for the married daughters.

E. Brydges for the son and unmarried daughters.

P. O. LAWRENCE J. held that the condition was a condition subsequent and not a condition precedent, and, applying the principle of In re Park, [1910] 2 Ch. 322, came to the conclusion that the married daughters were exempt from the condition imposed on them by the testator. But if that view

were wrong, his Lordship was of opinion that the only interest, if any, which the married daughters had under their mother's marriage settlement at the date of the testator's death was a life interest restrained from anticipation, and he removed the restraint so that the married daughters might, if so advised, assign their life interests to trustees, who might be the trustees of their marriage settlements.

Solicitors for all parties: Powell, Rogers & Merrick.

K. B. D.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

H. L. F.

ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. KING.

Insurance (Marine)-Policy on cargo-“Warranted free from all consequences of hostilities"-Damage caused by infernal machine placed in ship's hold by a German Evidence of agency for German Government-Liability of insurer.

part of the steamship, and it was followed by a fire, which
burnt a parcel of hides and skins. The hides were insured
by the plaintiffs under a floating policy. They had been duly
declared, and the plaintiffs were bound to pay, and did pay,
a particular average loss. The plaintiffs were reinsured
under the policy dated July 20, 1916, underwritten by the
defendant. They claimed in this action to recover the
defendant's proportion of the loss. The defendant's policy
contained the usual f. c. and s. clause, and the defendant
relied on that clause as an answer to the plaintiffs' claim.
"Warranted free
The material words of the clause were:
from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations,
whether before or after the declaration of war.” The
defendant contended that the fire which burnt the hides was
due to a hostile act and was a consequence of hostilities, and
was thus withdrawn from the policy and within the ex-
ceptions. The learned judge held that the plaintiffs
rightly contended that the word "hostilities " as used in
the clause meant hostile acts by persons acting as the agents
of Sovereign Powers, or of such organised and considerable
forces as were entitled to the dignified name of rebels, as
contrasted with mobs or rioters, and did not cover the act of
a mere private individual acting entirely on his own in-
itiative, however hostile his action might be. The defendant,
on the other hand, contended that Neiworth must be taken
to have been acting as an agent of the German Govern-
ment. Neiworth's house was the resort of German
sailors whose ships were interned at Bahia, he was the
manager of an electrical works, he had no personal end to
gain, and there was no chance of loot. A circular which
purported to be issued to German attachés by a Secret Ser-
vice Division of the German Naval Staff in 1914 ordered the
immediate "mobilisation" of "destructive agents " in ports
where munitions were being loaded for shipment to the
Allies. Those agents were to be chosen from "anarchists
and escaped criminals," who were to arrange, in addition to
explosions, delays, embroilments, and confusions" during
the loading of vessels.

R. A. Wright K.C. and Raeburn for the plaintiffs.
Leck K.C. and Simey for the defendant.

BAILHACHE J. gave judgment for the defendant. In addi-
Dec. 3, 13. tion to the facts set out above, there were notorious facts
of which the defendant contended a judge ought to take
civilian subjects in foreign countries, and they had served
judicial notice. Germany had throughout the war had her
her in a way and to an extent hitherto unexampled. Spying
had been almost universal. Every German spy was,
of course,
an agent of the German Government, and many German
civilians in all grades of society had acted as spies. Germany
had not made war by her men in uniform alone, but by all
her subjects wherever they were to be found-subjects who
were willing to help her by doing such mischief as each in
his particular circumstances was able to compass. Neiworth,
as a manager of electrical works, was peculiarly well able
to construct an infernal machine. British ships wer
special object of German spite, as witness the
submarine warfare, and no service could be m
more in accord with the policy of frightfu
blowing one up. Neiworth had no expre

Action in the commercial list tried before Bailhache J. The action was brought to recover a loss upon a policy of reinsurance dated July 20, 1916, upon (inter alia) goods per s.s. Tennyson from Bahia to New York. In the early morning of February 18, 1916, when the Tennyson was five days out from Bahia on her way to New York, an explosion occurred in her hold. The explosion was due to an infernal machine, which had been placed in the hold at Bahia by a German named Nieworth, aided by an accomplice. The explosion killed three seamen and wrecked the after

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was no evidence that he saw the instructions in the circular, although they were obviously meant to be widely circulated. Nor was there any evidence of any subsequent ratification. The word "agent" in this connection was not limited to the strictness to which the words agent and principal were used in business transactions. A man was acting in such a case as this as the agent of his Government when, knowing that the settled and concerted policy of that Government was to avail itself of the efforts of all its subjects, whether naval, military or civilian, to destroy enemy life and property as occasion offered, he used such opportunity as presented itself in furtherance of that policy. It surely would be so if in this case Neiworth had given such information to a German submarine as enabled it to torpedo the Tennyson. It was not the less so if, having the means, he pursued the surer and simpler course of blowing her up himself. The result was that the defendant had made out his case, and the action failed.

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initial defect existed it was cured by the confirmation at the meeting of May 22.

Public Health Act, 1875, s. 253: "Proceedings for the recovery of any penalty under this Act shall not, except as in this Act is expressly provided, he had or taken by any person other than by a party aggrieved, or by the local authority of the district in which the offence is committed without the consent in writing of the Attorney-General." Sect. 259: "Any local authority may appear before any court, or in any legal proceeding by their clerk, or by any officer or member authorised generally or in respect of any special proceeding by resolution of such authority, and their clerk, or any officer or member so authorised shall be at liberty to institute and carry on any proceeding which the local authority is authorised to institute and carry on under this Act."

The justices were of opinion that the respondent as an officer of the Council had authority to institute the proceedings, and that if not the confirmation at the subsequent meeting cured any defect. They held that the carcase was on May 17, 1918, in the possession of the appellants and deposited on the appellants' premises for the purpose of preparation for sale, and was intended for the food of man, and was unsound, and they adjudged the appellants to pay a penalty of 201.

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of communication between the passengers and the servants of the company provided on a certain train on the Great Western Railway.

The respondents, while travelling as påssengers in a train on the Great Western Railway, interfered with the means of communication provided by the railway company between the passengers and the servants of the company in charge of the train. The train did not travel more than 20 miles without stopping; it was billed in the company's time bills to start from Oswestry to run to Wrexham, and no further, stopping at all intermediate stations, none of which are more than five miles apart.

Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, s. 22: "After the first day of April, 1869, every company shall provide, and maintain in good working order, in every train worked by it which carries passengers, and travels more than 20 miles without stopping, such efficient means of communication between the passengers and the servants of the company in charge of the train as the Board of Trade may approve.

Any passenger who makes use of the said means of communication without reasonable and sufficient cause shall be liable for each offence to a penalty not exceeding 51."

The justices, being of opinion that s. 22 did not apply to the train in question, inasmuch as it did not travel more than 20 miles without stopping, dismissed the information. Schiller K.C. and Bartley for the appellant.

The respondents were not represented.

THE COURT (Darling, Avory and Salter JJ.) held that an offence was committed under the section by any passenger who made use of the means of communication without reasonable and sufficient cause, irrespective of the distance which the train travelled without stopping. Appeal allowed.

Solicitor for appellant: L. B. Page.

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NOTICE TO SOLICITORS.

With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and rapidity in the various publications connected with the Law REPORTS the Council will be obliged if the Solicitors to whom application is made by any reporter acting for the Council will as

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Damage by fire caused by war, bombardment, military or usurped power "-Rebellion in Ireland-Warfare between forces of the Crown and usurped power Bombardment by Crown forces-Fire caused therebyDamage to insured premises—Liability of insurer MAINTENANCE.

af maintained action

MARRIAGE.

Evidence-British colony-Marriage according to rites of Church of England-Entry in register of parish church by priest-in-charge

as possible after application furnish the Action for damages-Competency-Special damage-Success necessary papers, together with any information in their power as to the names of the various Solicitors engaged in the case. At the same time, the Council thankfully acknowledge the assistance they have already received from so many members of the Profession in furnishing the papers required to Street lighting-Negligence-Metropolis Management Act, prepare accurate reports.

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METROPOLIS.

1855 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), ss. 108, 130

MIDWIVES.

Proceedings for removal of name from roll-EvidenceStatutory declaration-Admissibility of, at trial before Board-Conviction-Suspension of sentence subject to report as to future conduct-Duty of Board to communicate report to accused before acting on it-Central Midwives Board Rules-D. rules 5, 10

MOTOR CAR.

Use of petrol for purpose not authorised by Motor Spirit (Consolidation) and Gas Restriction Order, 1918Conviction-Endorsement of licence-" Offence in connection with the driving of a motor car"-Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36), s. 4

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H. L. (E.)

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Divorce

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K. B. D.

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Fidence of accomplice-Corroboration-Silence of accused when charged

EMERGENCY LEGISLATION.

Osim for sum due-Specially indorsed writ-Sum claimed
as due on contract made after war-Judgment in de-
fault of appearance-Right of defendant to show debt
dze on contract made before war-Courts (Emergency)
Powers) Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 78), s. 1 -
Fed-Tea-Selling below minimum prices-Tea (Retail
Prices) Order, 1918, art. 2, 5-New Ministries and Secre-
taries Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 68), s. 4-Defence of the
Realm Regulations, 2 F.

No. 3-1919.

PAGE

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RECORD OF BUSINESS.

COURT I.

MONDAY, January 13.

In the matter of the Registered Trade Mark, No. 357,844, of the New Atlas Rubber Co., Ltd. and In the matter of the Trade Marks Act, 1905. Application by Rubber Heel Manufacturing Co. for security for costs of appeal. Security ordered.

H. J. Lederer v. Van Oppen & Co., Ltd. Application for leave to appeal notwithstanding time limit had expired. Refused. Oldhams, Ltd. v. Michaels. Appeal from Lush J. Struck out. John Charles & Son v. Cory. Appeal from Lush J. Allowed. Shepherd v. Robinson. Appeal from Darling J. Stands over for week.

In the matter of an Arbitration between Boks & Co. and Peters, Rushton & Co., Ltd. Appeal from Lush J. Part heard.

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TUESDAY, January 14.

House of Lords.

Dec. 12.

BANK LINE, LIMITED, APPS.; ARTHUR CAPEL & Co., RESPS.

Boynton v. Chamley. Application for judgment or new trial. Ship--Time charterparty-Frustration of object-RequisiAppeal allowed; judgment entered for defendant.

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tion by Government.

Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal reversing a judgment of Rowlatt J.

arrests

The appellants were the owners of the steamship Quito, which the respondents, by a charterparty dated in February, 1915, had chartered for a period of twelve months from the time the vessel should be placed at the disposal of the charterers ready to load at a coal port in the United Kingdom as ordered by the charterers, and the charterparty included the usual exception of and restraint of princes, rulers and peoples. By clause 26 the steamer was to be delivered under the charterparty not before April 1, 1915, and should the steamer not have been delivered by April 30 the charterers were to have the option of cancelling; and "should it be proved that the steamer, through unforeseen circumstances, cannot be delivered by the cancelling date, charterers, if required, shall, within 48 hours after receiving notice thereof. declare whether they cancel or will take delivery of the steamer." Clause 31: "Charterers to have option of cancelling this charterparty should steamer be commandeered by Government during this charter." The ship was not ready by the cancelling date, but the respondents did not exercise their option of cancelling, and were not called upon to say whether they would cancel or not. The ship went into dry dock at Hull to prepare for entering upon service under the charterparty, and, while there, was, on May 11, requisitioned by the Government. Efforts were made to obtain her release but without success, and a correspondence ensued betwee the parties with a view to keeping the charterparty on foot but without any result, and early in June the correspondenc lapsed.

In August the appellants accepted an offer to purchas the Quito, subject to their procuring her release from th

Levy v. Grosvenor Garage (Bournemouth), Ltd. Motion to set aside judgment of Special Referee.' Part heard, and requisition, and on September 2 the Government release the ship upon the appellants' replacing her by another and the sale was effected. On September 3 the responden called on the appellants to deliver the ship, and, upon th Braybrooks v. Whaley. Appeal from Spalding County Court. refusal of the latter to do so, brought an action against the Part heard.

stands over for information from Referee. Macklin v. Newbury Sanitary Steam Laundry Co. Appela from Barnet County Court. Dismissed.

WEDNESDAY, January 15.

Bourgois & Co. v. Kabalkin. Motion to set aside or remit
award. Award set aside.

Bridges v. Chambers. Appeal from Barnsley County Court.
Allowed.

Cox, McEuen & Co. v. Clark. Motion to set aside award.
Part heard.

for damages for breach of charterparty.

The appellants alleged that the requisition by the Govern ment put an end to the charterparty as from the date of suc requisitioning.

Rowlatt J. held that the appellants were entitled to decla the charter at an end.

The Court of Appeal (Pickford and Warrington L.JJ

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