produce his licence for endorsement was on August 15, 1918, summoned before the said justices for the said offence. The justices held that the offence of which he was convicted on August 1 was not an offence in connection with the driving of a motor car, and that they had therefore no jurisdiction to endorse his licence. They accordingly dismissed the summons. The prosecutor appealed. Purchase for the respondent contended that as the abovementioned order, for the breach of which he was convicted, made it an offence to use any petrol "for any purpose whatsoever" (except so far as expressly authorised), the order had no essential connection with the driving of motor cars, and the mere fact that on the particular occasion when an offence was committed the offender happened to use the petrol for the purpose of driving a motor car did not make the offence one" in connection with the driving of a motor car within the meaning of 8. 4. THE COURT (Darling, Avory and Salter JJ.) held that as the petrol in question was in fact being used in the driving of a motor car for the purpose not expressly authorised by the Order, its use was an offence in connection with the driving of a motor car, and the justices consequently had jurisdiction to endorse the licence. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for appellant: Philbrick & Co. for T. W. Weeding, Kingston. Solicitors for respondent: Engall & Crane. K. B. D. J. F. C. within twenty-four hours of its birth, and continued to do so The appellant appealed to the High Court. Rowland Thomas for the appellant contended that the decision of the Board was bad in law for two reasons:1. Rule D. 5 of the Central Midwives Board Rules, which provides that "All statements in the nature of evidence proposed to be relied on as part of the case against the accused person. . . which cannot be laid before the Board by oral Dec. 17. evidence shall be verified by statutory declaration," was only intended to apply to the preliminary inquiry dealt with by the preceding rule, Rule 4, at which the Board decide whether a prima facie case has been made out. By r. 6, "If the Board decide that such a case has been made out " proceedings for the removal of the midwife's name are to be commenced by sending her notice in writing of the specific charge against her. At the hearing, by r. 10, the accused person . . . shall be entitled to cross-examine any witness appearing against her on matters relevant to the charge," a provision which would be nugatory if the Board were entitled ing as well as at the preliminary inquiry. to admit evidence by statutory declaration at the final hear DAVIES v. CENTRAL MIDWIVES BOARD. Midwives-Proceedings for removal of name from rollEvidence-Statutory declaration-Admissibility of, at trial before Board-Conviction-Suspension of sentence subject to report as to future conduct-Duty of Board to communicate report to accused before acting on it Central Midwives Board Rules-D. rules 5, 10. Appeal from Central Midwives Board under s. 4 of the Midwives Act, 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c. 17). The appellant, Gertrude Davies, a midwife certificated under the said Act, was charged before the Central Midwives Board, on January 10, 1918, with having, while in attendance as a midwife at the confinement of a Mrs. Mary Davies on September 2, 1917, and subsequent days been guilty of negligence in omitting to call in a registered medical practitioner when the child was suffering from discharge from the eyes in breach of r. E. 21 (5) of the Central Midwives Board Rules. At the hearing the Board admitted, amongst other evidence, a statutory declaration by the mother, Mary Davies, to the effect that the child's eyes began to discharge 2. The Board had no jurisdiction to act upon Dr. Rocyn Jones' report without first giving the appellant an opportunity of challenging its accuracy, and subjecting the doctor to cross-examination. Rawlinson K.C. and Theobald Mathew for the Board contended that the rule as to taking evidence by statutory declaration was intended to apply to the final hearing, and that it was not intended to fetter the Board with the ordinary rules of evidence of a court of law. In Stock v. Central Midwives Board, [1915] 3 K. B. 756, a statutory declaration was acted apon without objection. It had been the regular practice since the passing of the Act to receive such declarations. With regard to the other point as to the non-communication of Dr. Rocyn Jones' report to the appellant, the Board were under no obligation to communicate it. They might have removed her name from the roll immediately after hearing, but instead of doing that they postponed sentence, making their ultimate action dependent, not on her conduct in fact, but on the report of her conduct which they were to receive from a medical official in whom they placed complete confidence. The Divisional Court, after hearing the arguments, decided under Order 59, r. 19, of the Supreme Court Rules to hear oral evidence. Dr. Rocyn Jones, who made the report relating to the case of Mary Evans' child, was called, and supported the statements in that report. For the appellant the affidavits of Mary Evans and of two other deponents were read contradicting the report, but the Court disbelieved them, and found the facts of the report to be proved. A Dr. Pennant, who was called in to see Mary Davies' child on September 10, was also called as a witness. He stated that on that date he found the child suffering from so advanced a stage of ophthalmia neonatorum that it was evident that the discharge must have been going on for many days. time the plaintiff sent the defendants a cheque for the price and asked for a delivery order. The defendants sent him a delivery order for 125 bags then lying at a certain wharf, and as to the remaining 15 bags wrote to him that they were lying at the defendants' premises ready for delivery, and requested him to remove them at once. The plaintiff did not reply to that letter or take any steps to remove the goods. A month later the 15 bags were stolen from the defendants' premises without any negligence on their part. In an action for damages for nondelivery of the 15 bags the defence was that at the time of the theft the property in the rice had passed to the plaintiff. The county court judge held that though the defendants had appropriated the 15 bags to the contract there was no evidence that that appropriation was assented to by the plaintiff; and accordingly held that the property had not passed, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. E. Dale for the defendants. Dyer for the plaintiff. THE COURT (A. T. Lawrence and Rowlatt JJ.) held that neglect by the buyer to reply promptly to notice of an appropriation made at his request amounted to an assent, and that the property had passed. They accordingly gave judgment for the defendants. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for plaintiff: McKenna & Co. THE COURT (Darling, Avory and Salter JJ.) found, upon Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for appellant: Wrentmore & Son, for Spickett & Sons, Bargoed. Solicitor for Board: Julius Bertram. K. B. D. PIGNATARO v. GILROY. J. F. C. Dec. 18. Fire-Liability for damage by-Defence that fire accidentally began "-Negligence in not checking spread of fire-Metropolitan Building Act, 1774 (14 Geo. 5, c. 78), s. 86. Trial of action before Lush J. The plaintiff was an hotel keeper, and was possessed of a garage with living rooms over it. The defendant housed his motor car in the garage by the permission of the plaintiff. The defendant had in his employment a chauffeur named Counis, who was entirely unskilled in the management of mótor cars, and he sent Counis to clean the car. The car had been pushed back against the wall of the garage, and Counis, wanting to get round to the other side de of goods-Unascertained goods-Appropriation by of the car, and, being unable to move it himself, started the seller-Assent of buyer. Appeal from the Middlesex County Court. The defendants sold to the plaintiff 140 bags of rice, engine for that purpose, when from some unexplained cause the petrol in the carburettor caught fire. Counis ought at once to have turned off the tap of the pipe leading from the petrol tank to the carburettor in order to prevent the fire from spreading, and had he done so the evidence of both sides went to show that the small quantity of petrol in the carburettor would have speedily burnt itself out, and no damage would have been done. But instead of doing so he wasted his time in searching for a cloth, with the result that the fire spread to the petrol tank, and the garage and the rooms over it were burnt with their contents. The judge found that Counis in so neglecting to turn off the tap promptly was guilty of negligence. The defendant relied by way of defence on the Statute 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 86, which provides that no action shall be maintained against any person in whose house, chamber, stable, barn, or other building, or on whose estate any fire shall accidentally." No objection was taken by the plaintiff that the position of the defendant was only that of a licensee, and the argument proceeded on the assumption that the garage was the defendant's garage for the purposes of the Statute. J. B. Matthews K.C. and Moyses for the plaintiff. LUSH J. held that, even assuming that the premises were sufficiently the defendant's premises for the purposes of the Statute, he was not protected by it, and for two reasons: 1. He found as a fact that the fire which broke out in the carburettor was accidental in the sense that it was not the result either of a wilful act or of negligence, but notwithstanding that finding he was of opinion that the fire which caused the damage, even assuming that it could be regarded as having begun in the carburettor, was not "accidental" within the meaning of the Statute. A person who brings upon premises a highly inflammable substance such as petrol, which is likely to do serious damage if it catches fire, in the event of its causing a fire cannot be heard to say that that fire was "accidental" for the purposes of the Statute, even though he was not negligent in the user of it. 2. The "fire" referred to in the Statute is a conflagration, and begins only at the point of time when the flames get out of control. The "fire" in this case began when the petrol tank and the rest of the car caught fire, and, as the efficient cause of the fire in that sense was not the initial fire in the carburettor, but the negligence of Counis in allowing the petrol to ocntinue to flow into it, it was BROWNING V. BROWNING. Marriage-Evidence-British colony-Marriage according to rites of Church of England-Entry in register of parish church by priest-in-charge. Wife's petition for judicial separation. The wife gave evidence that the marriage took place in Bulawayo in the parish church of St. John Baptist according to the rites of the Church of England. The only evidence produced in confirmation was a copy of an entry in the register of marriages solemnised in that church by the priestin-charge who officiated. The copy was certified to be correct by the Archdeacon of Matabeleland. No expert evidence of the validity of the marriage or sufficiency of the certificate was called. Grazebrook for the petitioner cited Ward v. Dey, (1846) 1 Rob. E. 759, as an authority that the register of the celebration in a British colony of a marriage according to the rites of the Church of England was sufficient evidence of the marriage and its validity. LORD COLERIDGE J. said he had no difficulty in accepting the evidence; he thought the case cited and Wallace v. Wallace, (1896) 74 L. T. 253, a case before Barnes J. relating to a marriage in Ireland, were sufficient authority for that course. Solicitors: Robinson, Wilkins & Thacker. J. R. B. NOTICE TO SOLICITORS. With the view of insuring the greatest possible DIVORCE. Practice Damages-Juries Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. LUNACY. 23), accuracy and rapidity in the various publications Mortgage of freeholds-Vesting order-Survivar of joint connected with the Law REPORTS the Council will be obliged if the Solicitors to whom application is made by any reporter acting for the Council will as tenant mortgagees, a person of unsound mind not so found-"Being also a trustee "-Payment off-Reconveyance-Application in Chancery Division-Reconveyance by next friend of mortgagee-Lunacy Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 40), s. 1 VENDOR AND PURCHASER. PAGE Sale by mortgagee " Realise any security"—Omission by mortgagee to apply for leave of Court-Damages— Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 78), s. 1 WAR. Restrictions-Landlord and tenant-Increase of rent since the war-Notice-Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 97), s. 1, sub-s. 1 (iv.) and (vi.) HOUSE OF LORDS. 36 32 35 34 JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. RECORD OF BUSINESS. THURSDAY, January 16. The Turul (Prize Court, New South Wales). Appeal by the The Hamborn (Prize Court, England). Claimants' appeal. FRIDAY, January 17. The Hamborn. Concluded. Cur. adv. vult. The Barenfels and The Gutenfels (Prize Court, Egypti. Claimants' appeals dismissed; form of order varied by consent. land). Claimants' appeal. Part heard. FRIDAY, January 17. In re Arkadius Gunsbourg. Ex parte The Trustee v. Sophocles Comery v. The New Bucknall Colliery Co., Ltd. Appeal from Dowling v. Great Eastern Railway Co. Appeal from City of MONDAY, January 20. Dowling v. Great Eastern Railway Co. Appeal from City of Horner v. Wandsworth, Wimbledon & Epsom Gas Co. Appeal Vickers, Ltd. v. Cars. Appeal from Barrow-in-Furness County Ford v. Gilbertson & Co., Ltd. Appeal from Neath County The Prins der Nederlanden and The Riju (Prize Court, Eng- Baynton (an infant) by his father v. Manganese Bronze & MONDAY, January 20. DIVISION 1. The Prins der Nederlanden and The Rijn. In the matter of a Petition of Right by De Keyser's Royal MONDAY, January 20. DIVISION 2. Gannabhattula Venkamma v. Gannabhattula Ven- Shepherd v. Robinson. Appeal from order of Darling J kataratnamma. Further heard and adjourned. COURT OF APPEAL. RECORD OF BUSINESS. THURSDAY, January 16. Dismissed. Port of London Authority v. Assessment Committee of Orsett Union and Others. Appeal from judgment of the Divisional Court. Part heard. TUESDAY, January 21. John Wyatt v. A. J. Antoine. Appeal from Salter J. Part heard. WEDNESDAY, January 22. Wyatt v. Antoine. Appeal from Salter J. Allowed. The English Coaling Co. v. W. J. Tatem, Ltd. Appeal from The Hare Spinning Co., Ltd., v. Leigh and Others. Appeal Woods v. Faraday and Others. Appeal from Bailhache J. Part from Deputy V.-C. of Lancaster Palatine Court. Allowed. Comery v. The New Bucknall Colliery Co., Ltd. Appeal from heard. Woods and Others v. Faraday and Others. Appeal from Bailhache J. Part heard. |