Disturnal K.C. and Eustace Hills for the defendants. Giveen and Bickmore for the plaintiff. THE COURT (Avory and Lush JJ.) allowed the appeal. The question was whether there was any evidence on which the county court judge could find that there was a special contract within the meaning of s. 6 of the Carriers Act, 1830, which excluded the operation of s. 1. The special contract alleged was a contract under which the defendants insured goods of the plaintiff's over 107. in value against loss or damage in transit. The evidence did not establish any such special contract. The parties were not ad idem. They were dealing with two different classes of article, the plaintiff with an article above the value of 101. and the defendants with an article below that value. The alleged contract was one which the defendants' clerk had no authority to make, and the plaintiff, who was bound by the notice, either knew or ought to have known it. Moreover, the defendants were not estopped from denying that there was any such special contract. The defendants never held out the clerk as authorised to contract on terms other than those specified in the notice. The clerk made no representation to the plaintiff that he was acting or was authorised to act contrary to the terms of the notice or that he was undertaking to have the goods carried at a rate which bore no relation to their value. He was never told that they were over the value of 101. Before estoppel could be relied on it must be shown that all the necessary information was given. If material facts were concealed there could be no estoppel: Whitechurch v. Cavanagh, [1902] A. C. 117, 145; Porter v. Moore, [1904] 2 Ch. 367. Further, here the mistake was caused entirely by the conduct of the plaintiff. Whether or not he knew of the difference between and "company's risk” "owner's risk" contracts, his language would only convey to the clerk that he wished his goods carried at company's risk. Solicitor for appellants: M. C. Tait. Solicitors for respondent: Henry Pumfrey & Son. J. R. K. B. D. Feb. 26. RIPON RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL v. ARMITAGE AND HODGSON. Highway-Repair-Erpenses of extraordinary trafficClaim for less than 2501.-Jurisdiction of High CourtLocomotives Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 29), s. 12, sub-s. 1 (a). Point of law raised on the pleadings. The plaintiffs, the highway authority for their district, sued in the High Court to recover 1821. 18s. 4d., the sum certified by their surveyor as the amount incurred by the | plaintiffs in repairing highways within their area which had been damaged by the defendants' extraordinary traffic. Paragraph 1 of the amended statement of defence was as follows: "It will be objected that no action lies in the High Court in respect of the plaintiffs' claim for 1821. 18s. 4d. Sect. 12, sub-s. 1 (a), of the Locomotives Act, 1898, will be relied upon." An order was made "that the point of law raised in paragraph 1 of the amended defence in this action be set down for trial as a preliminary point of law." Sect. 12, sub-s. 1, of the Locomotives Act, 1898: "Section twenty-three of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878 (which relates to the recovery of expenses of extraordinary traffic), shall be amended as follows: (a) Expenses under that section shall cease to be recoverable in a summary manner, but may be recovered if not exceeding two hundred and fifty pounds in the county court, and if exceeding that sum in the High Court. . . Macmorian K.C. and A. M. Latter for the defendants submitted that the section clearly precluded this action being maintained in the High Court. Disturnal K.C. and Wrottesley for the plaintiffs relied on Chesterfield Rural District Council v. Newton, [1904]1 K. B. 62, as supporting their contention that the action could properly be brought in the High Court. BRAY J. held that the action failed. As the claim was for less than 2501., the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with it. The case of Chesterfield Rural District Council v. Newton (supra) was not an authority in favour of the plaintiffs' contention. NOTICE TO SOLICITORS. With the view of insuring the greatest possible accuracy and rapidity in the various publications connected with the LAW REPORTS the Council will be obliged if the Solicitors to whom application is made by any reporter acting for the Council will as soon as possible after application furnish the necessary papers, together with any information in their power as to the names of the various Solicitors engaged in the case. At the same time, the Council thankfully acknowledge the assistance they have already received from so many members of the Profession in furnishing the papers required to prepare accurate reports. HOUSE OF LORDS. RECORD OF BUSINESS. THURSDAY, March 6. Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia (1913), Ltd., and Others v. Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Company, Ltd. Further heard and adjourned. FRIDAY, March 7. Amalgamated Properties of Rhodesia (1913), Ltd., and Others v. Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Company. Further and fully heard and consideration adjourned sine die. TUESDAY, March 11. Innes or Grant (pauper) v. G. & G. Kynoch (re-argued). Fully heard and consideration adjourned sine die. WEDNESDAY, March 12. North British Railway Company v. James Nimmo & Company, Ltd. Et è contra. Fully heard. Interlocutor of the First Division of the Court of Session in Scotland reversed and interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary restored. Cross-appeal dismissed. Hamilton v. Lord-Adrocate. In part heard and adjourned. County Hotel & Wine Co., Ltd. v. London & North-Western Railway- Agreement Refreshment room Musgrove v. Pandelis and Others, [1919] W. N. 27; [1919] 1 K. B. FRIDAY, March 7. renting. Appeal from the judgment of McCardie J. reported [1918] 2 K. B. 251. On August 1, 1853, the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company, having acquired land for the purposes of a railway station and requisite appurtenances at Carlisle, leased a Musgrove v. Pandelis and Others, [1919] W. N. 27; [1919] 1 K. B. portion of the land for a term of 999 years to one George 314. Appeal from Lush J. Dismissed. Windybank, Samuel & Lawrence v. Duncan. Appeal from Lush MONDAY, March 10. Brown v. The Fulham Small Arms, Ltd. Appeal from Windybank, Samuel & Lawrence v. Duncan. Appeal from Lush TUESDAY, March 11. Windybank, Samuel & Lawrence v. Duncan. Appeal from Lush Head, his executors and limited assigns for the erection of a hotel thereon. The lease contained a covenant by the railway company "that the tenant or occupier of the said hotel shall have the option of renting the refreshment rooms of the said station at the rent and subject to the rules and regulations to be from time to time fixed by the committee for the management of the Carlisle Joint Station in preference to any other party, it being the intention and wish of the said parties hereto that the same person shall have the option of occupying the said hotel and refreshment rooms." This lease ultimately became vested in the plaintiff company, who also obtained a lease for 21 years of the refreshment rooms which expired in 1881, after which they held the Alfred J. Smith, Ltd. v. Capt. H. V. Simpson, R.N. Appeal refreshment rooms as yearly tenants until the notice to from Bailhache J. Part beard. WEDNESDAY, March 12. determine their tenancy was given as hereinafter stated. In 1879 the defendants succeeded to all the contracts, rights, powers, duties and liabilities of the Lancaster and Carlisle Alfred J. Smith, Ltd. v. Capt. H. V. Simpson, R.N. Appeal Railway Company. On March 24, 1916, the defendants served from Bailhache J. Part heard. Societe Francaise de la Viscose and Others v. Providence on the plaintiffs a six months' notice to quit the refreshment representatives an assignment of "all that the benefit, right, title and interest (if any) now remaining outstanding or otherwise vested of and in the railway obligations in them or any or either of them," and commenced this action on November 2, 1916, claiming a declaration that upon the true construction of the lease of 1853 the defendants were under an obligation to put and keep the occupier of the plaintiffs' botel at the Carlisle Station in occupation of the refreshment rooms of that station for the time being used by the defendants upon the terms of paying therefor a fair market rent. McCardie J. held that the option clause in the lease of 1853 was ultra vires and void for uncertainty. He therefore gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. Langdon K.C. and Eustace Hills for the appellants. Disturnal K.C., Underhill and Barrington-Ward for the respondents were not called on. THE COURT (Bankes, Warrington and Duke L.JJ.) held that the true meaning and effect of the option clause was that if and when the railway company were minded to offer the refreshment rooms at a rent to anyone, the occupier of the hotel should have the option of taking them at that rent; but that if the railway company themselves undertook the supply of refreshments, the option clause did not apply. The appellants were therefore not entitled to the declaration they claimed, and the appeal was dismissed. Solicitors for appellants: James & James, for Clutterbuck, Trecenen & Steele, Carlisle. Solicitor for respondents: M. C. Tait. W. H. G. off the tap of the pipe connecting the carburettor with the petrol tank no damage would have been done. But he neglected to do this; the fire spread to the body of the car; and the garage and the plaintiff's rooms over it were burnt with their contents. The learned judge found as a fact that the fire which broke out in the carburettor was accidental in the sense that it was not the result either of a wilful act or of negligence, but he found that Coumis was guilty of negligence in omitting to turn off the tap promptly. The defendant relied on s. 86 of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act, 1774, which provides that "no action . . . shall be maintained . . . against any person in whose house, stable, barn, or other building, or on whose estate any fire shall accidentally begin." ... Lush J. gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. Hawke K.C. and Zeffertt for the appellant. J. B. Matthews K.C. and Moyses for the respondent were not called on. THE COURT (Bankes, Warrington and Duke L.JJ.), affirming the judgment of Lush J., held (1) that the statute did not protect a person who, within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330, brought upon his land a dangerous agency likely to do damage if not controlled; (2) that the fire which caused the damage was not that which took place within the carburettor and which might easily have been checked, but was the fire which spread to the motor car itself and finally enveloped the garage and the respondent's rooms, and that fire did not begin accidentally, but as the result of Coumis's negligence. The appeal was therefore dismissed. Solicitor for appellant: Howard Lawrance. W. H. G. C. A. MUSGROVE v. PANDELIS. March 6, 7. High Court of Justice. Younger J. CHANCERY DIVISION. Nov. 6, 1918; Mar. 10, 1919. PATENT CASTINGS SYNDICATE, Ltd. v. ETHERINGTON. Company-Manager's remuneration-Agreement Commission on "net profits"-Deduction of Excess Profits Duty-Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 89), Part III., ss. 35, 40, 45-Finance Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 24). By an agreement of October 30, 1916, the defendant was appointed works manager of the business of the plaintiff company at a salary, and he was also to receive at the end YOUNGER J., in a considered judgment, following Peterof each business year of the company a further sum, by way son J. in Collins v. Sedgwick, [1917] 1 Ch. 179, and in In re of commission, of a percentage upon the "net profits" for Condran, Condran v. Stark, [1917] 1 Ch. 639, and differing the year. There was a provision that the certificate of the from Rowlatt J. in Thomas v. Hamlyn & Co., [1917] 1 K. B. company's auditor should be conclusive as to what consti-27, Eve J. in William Hollins & Co., Ltd. v. Paget, [1917] tuted net profits at the end of any such business year. The1 Ch. 187, and Neville J. in S. J. & E. Fellows, Ltd. v. question was raised by originating summons whether "net profits" ought to be ascertained after deducting, or without deducting, any excess profits duty payable by the company. C. J. Mathew K.C. and J. M. Gorer for the plaintiffs. Corker, [1918] 1 Ch. 9, held that the commission ought to be calculated after deduction of excess profits duty. Solicitors: Makrell, Maton, Godlee & Quincey; John B. & F. Purchase, A. L. |