for. A statute requiring non-residents to be taxed in the same manner as residents, would require the tax to be imposed upon the principal at the place where the property is situated.2 f. NON-RESIDENT AND UNSEATED PROPERTY.-Taxes on unimproved and unseated lands of non-residents are usually imposed upon the lands as such, the tax constituting a lien upon the land, but creating no personal charge against the owner.3 It is competent, however, for the legislature to make property taxable to anyone upon whom rests the public duty to pay the taxes, or to see that they are paid. But the personal property of a non-resident is not taxable as such, unless it is employed in business in the taxing district, or has otherwise acquired a fixed situs 1. See Fowler v. Springfield, 64 N. H. 108; Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 204; Lockwood v. Johnson, 106 Ill. 334; Walton v. Westwood, 73 Ill. 125; Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 39 Iowa 56; Hutchinson v. Board of Equalization, 66 Iowa 35; People v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390; People v. Willis, 133 N. Y. 383; People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Redmond v. Rutherford County, 87 N. Car. 122; Merrill. Champagne Lumber Co., 75 Wis. 142. Money of a non-resident in the hands of a resident agent, at the time the assessment is made out, is liable to taxation, even though it is used up and disposed of before the time for the correction of the roll. People v. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. Y. 390. 2. People v. McLean, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 204 3. See Moulton v. Blaisdell, 24 Me. 283; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 418; Rising v. Granger, 1 Mass. 47; Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339; People v. Chenango County, 11 N. Y. 563; McKibbin v. Charlton, 14 Pa. St. 128; Kennedy v. Daily, 6 Watts (Pa.) 269; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 175; Reading v. Finney, 73 Pa. St. 467; Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St. 296; Burd v. Ramsay, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 112; Dewey v. Stratford, 42 N. H. 286; Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Strafford, 51 N. H. 471; People v. Fredericks, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 162; Allen v. Gleason, 4 Day (Conn.) 379; Herriman v. Stowers, 43 Me. 497; Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Me. 100; Dow v. Sudbury, 5 Met. (Mass.) 73; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389; Miller v. Gorman, 38 Pa. St. 309. And see Butler v. Oswego (Supreme Ct.), 10 N. Y. Supp. 768; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Lyon, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 651; Stewart v. Chrysler, 100 N. Y. 382. In Russel v. Werntz, 24 Pa. St. 337, it was held that unseated land assessed is the debtor for taxes, and that it is immaterial in what name it has been assessed, if there is sufficient evidence to show that the land in question was that which was taxed and sold, and that it was at the time unseated. The tax attaches to the whole title, whether taxed to the owner by name or otherwise, or to third persons. Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 166; Fager v. Campbell, 5 Watts (Pa.) 286. 4. National Bank v. Danforth, So Ga. 55. And see Willard v. Blount, II Ired. (N. Car.) 624. A provision that a tax on the personal estate of non-residents may be collected from any property of the person to whom it belongs, does not render the tax invalid. Duer v. Small, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 263. Personal property within the state belonging to a non-resident may be taxed to such owner, notwithstanding his non-residence. People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533. In Maine, unimproved lands may be taxed to an owner residing in another town in the state, and he is liable for the payment of the tax. Oldtown '. Blake, 74 Me. 280. 5. St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258; Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 514; Huckins v. Boston, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 543; Duer v. Small, 17 How. Pr. (U. S. C. C.) 201; Corn v. Cameron, 19 Mo. App. 573. And see People v. Niles, 35 Cal. 282; Goldgart v. People, 106 Ill. 25; Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 137 Mass. 332. Property Employed in Business.-Stock in trade, employed in manufacturing, is taxable, although the firm has not its principal office there. Lee v. Templeton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 579. therein. The question of residence and non-residence, either upon the land or within the district or state, is the usual test as to the character of the tax.2 At least one of the states, however, has placed the distinction between the two classes of taxation upon the question whether the lands are seated or unseated.3 Property employed in banking is property employed in business, and taxable, even though the business is in process of being closed up. McCutcheon v. Rice County, 7 Fed. Rep. 588. 1. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 21. And see People v. Tax Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 224; Arapahoe County v. Cutter, 3 Colo. 350; Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 III. 45; Irvin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 94 Ill. 105; St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258; In re Jefferson's Estate, 35 Minn. 215; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; Finch v. York County, 19 Neb. 50; 56 Am. Rep. 741; Redmond v. Rutherford County, 87 N. Car. 122. It is not necessary that the owner should reside within the state, to render the personal property situated within it liable to taxation. Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395. State bonds which belong to a foreign insurance company, but are deposited in the state as required by law, may be assessed to the company or its resident agent. People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533. 2. See Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339; People v. Chenango County, 11 N. Y. 563; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138. Lands in possession of an occupant cannot be taxed as non-resident lands. Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138. Railroad lands are to be assessed as those of inhabitants, and not as nonresident lands. People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 47. Who are Residents.-Persons having a settled and fixed abode and the intention to remain permanently, at least for a time, for business or other purposes, are residents. Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197; Stinson v. Boston, 125 Mass. 348; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389. All those against whom the taxing power has no jurisdiction to impose a personal charge, are deemed to be nonresidents. Dow v. Sudbury, 5 Met. (Mass.) 73; St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258; Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339; Butler v. Oswego, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 592. Where it is not known to whom a piece of property belongs, it may be taxed as non-resident property. Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 196; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389. See also RESIDENT, vol. 21, p. 122. And see infra, this title, Place of Taxation. Resident and Inhabitant Distinguished.-The terms "resident" and "inhabitant" are not synonymous. The term "inhabitant" implies a more fixed and permanent abode than the term "resident," and frequently imports many privileges and duties which a mere resident could not claim or be subject to. A person may have a home or domicile in one state, and at the same time a residence in another state. Tazewell County v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197. See also INHABITANT, Vol. 10, P. 770. 3. See Hathaway v. Elsbree, 54 Pa. St. 498; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. (Pa.) 175; Kennedy v. Daily, 6 Watts (Pa.) 269; Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St. 296; Reading v. Finney, 73 Pa. St. 467; Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 302. And see also cases hereinafter cited. Seated Lands - Pennsylvania Statutes.-Seated lands are lands which are actually resided upon, cultivated, or occupied. Residence without cultivation or cultivation without residence, or both together, constitute seated lands. Kennedy v. Daily, 6 Watts (Pa.) 269; Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 214; Lackawanna Iron, etc., Co. v. Fales, 55 Pa. St. 99; George v. Messinger, 73 Pa. St. 418; Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 305; Wallace v. Scott, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 248; Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279; Campbell v. Wilson, i Watts (Pa.) 504; Hathaway v. Elsbree, 54 Pa. St. 498. Occupancy is sufficient to constitute the lands seated. Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 305; Lackawanna Iron, etc., Co. v. Fales, 55 Pa. St. 90; Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279; Jackson v. Sassaman, 29 Pa. St. 112; Jackson v. Flesher, 1 Grant (Pa.) 459; Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts (Pa.) 504; Rosenburger v. Schull, 7 Watts (Pa.) 390. A temporary residence for cutting timber will justify the treating of lands VIII. PLACE OF TAXATION-1. In General.-The state may tax only when the subject of the tax is within the jurisdiction, actually, or by contemplation of law; and, speaking generally, but subject to exceptions hereafter noted, it may be said as seated while the possession_continues. Lackawanna Iron, etc., Co. v. Fales, 55 Pa. St. 90. Compare George v. Messinger, 73_Pa. St. 418; Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 214. And see generally, as to a partial use, Watson v. Davidson, 87 Pa. St. 270; Kennedy v. Daily, 6 Watts (Pa.) 269; Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 214; George v. Messinger, 73 Pa. St. 414; Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 303; Green v. Watson, 34 Pa. St. 333. Occupancy of a mere intruder will constitute the lands seated. Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts (Pa.) 504; Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279; Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 305; Milliken v.. Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169. But a permanent use is necessary to enable the trespasser to seat the land. Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 305; Jackson v. Flesher, 1 Grant (Pa.) 459. Occupation of the intruder gives it the character of seated lands only to the extent of the lands claimed by him. Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St. 292. The occupation will be deemed to commence at the moment of entry for the purpose of residence, cultivation, or use. Wallace v. Scott, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 248; Campbell v. Wilson, Watts (Pa.) 54; Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169; George v. Messinger, 73 Pa. St. 418. I Occupation or cultivation of a part fixes the character of the whole tract, if it is sufficient to indicate the intention to seat, even though it lies in two or more political divisions. Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279; Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St. 296; Campbell v. Wilson, I Watts (Pa.) 503; Wilmoth v. Canfield, 76 Pa. St. 150; Fish v. Brown, 5 Watts (Pa.) 441; Jackson v. Flesher, I Grant (Pa.) 459; Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121. Merely clearing a few feet or yards of a tract by an adjoining owner, is not sufficient to take from its character of unseated lands. Fish v. Brown, 5 Watts (Pa.) 441; Shaeffer v. McCabe, 2 Watts (Pa.) 221. See also Forster v. Mc Divit, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 359; Arthurs v. King, 95 Pa. St. 167. But where the entirety of a tract is destroyed, a part may be seated and a 25 C. of L.-9 part left unseated. Jackson v. Sassaman, 29 Pa. St. 106;, Mitchell v. Bratton, 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 451; Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts (Pa.) 503; Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121; Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St. 292; Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. St. 510; Harper v. M'Keehan, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 238. As to what works a severance of the land, see Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279; Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121; Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. St. 510. Seated lands may become unseated by being allowed to fall into their natural state, but to change their character, their abandonment must have been unequivocal. Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374; Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 133; Laird v. Hiester, 24 Pa. St. 452; Owens v. Vanhook, .3 Watts (Pa.) 260; Gibson v. Robbins, 9 Watts (Pa.) 156; Hathaway v. Elsbree, 54 Pa. St. 298; Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121; Negley v. Breading, 32 Pa. St. 325. A mere accidental temporary suspension does not unseat the land. Kennedy v. Daily, 6 Watts (Pa.) 269; Wilson v. Watterson, 4 Pa. St. 214; Harbeson v. Jack, 2 Watts (Pa.) 124; Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Pa. St. 40. Non-payment of taxes upon unseated land, by the owner, is not an abandonment of the land. Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St. 444. An abandonment of part does not prevent the whole from remaining seated. Patterson v. Blackmore, .9 Watts (Pa.) 104. And see Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121. When the only evidence of abandonment consists of the old warrant line, and the acts of the assessor in returning the portion claimed to be abandoned as unseated, it is insufficient, as against the fact that it was used as a part of a larger seated tract, to require its submission to the jury. Altemose v. Hufsmith, 45 Pa. St. 121. 1. Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 262; Berlin Mills Co. v. Wentworth's Location, 60 N. H. 156; Com. v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 147; State Treasurer v. Auditor Gen'l, 46 Mich. 224; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300. 129 that a district or subdivision of the state is bound by the same rule.1 2. Taxes on Real Property-a. IN GENERAL.-The state may tax land within its limits, whether owned by a resident or non-resident, unless such land is within the recognized exceptions, as where it belongs to an Indian tribe or to the federal government. Land is not only to be assessed by the state in which it lies, and by it alone, but it is to be taxed, as a general rule, only in the subdivision of the state in which it is situated,3 whether the subdivision be a county, town,5 school district, or other public corporation.6 This is often expressly provided by statute. If the statute is silent, the law implies that such is the intention of the legislature. It is immaterial whether the land be that of a resident or non-resident,8 an individual or a corporation, foreign or domestic. In regard to the power of a state to allow real property to be taxed in a district other than that in which it lies, 1. Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384; St. 2. Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 210; Edwards v. Beaird, 1 Ill. 70; Newburyport Turnpike Co. v. Upton, 12 Mass. 575; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389. A tax against the land of a non-resident, while it may be a lien on the land, is not a personal charge against the owner, unless he becomes a party to the proceeding for collection, and thus submits to the jurisdiction. Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N: Y. 339. 3. Toby v. Haggerty, 23 Ark. 370; People v. Pearis, 37 Cal. 259; Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; 56 Am. Dec. 497; Hoffman v. Woods, 40 Kan. 382; Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169; Taylor v. Youngs, 48 Mich. 268; Nashua Co. Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 389; Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Strafford, 51 Ñ. H. 455; Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 500; Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St. 260; Hubbard v. Newton, 52 Vt. 346. The right to tax lands situated outside of a taxing district cannot be acquired by prescription. Thus, where a town had exercised jurisdiction for more than twenty years over territory outside of its limits, a tax levied upon this district was held to be void. Ham v. Sawyer, 38 Me. 37. And an agreement between two towns, that one shall not tax the lands of the inhabitants of the other, is invalid. Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. The attachment of a strip of land lying within the territorial limits of a county, to an adjoining county, for judicial purposes, does not render it taxable in the latter county. Yellowstone County v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 10 Mont. 414. The real estate of a corporation may be assessed for the support of public worship in the parish where it is situated. Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; Goodell Mfg. Co. v. Trask, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 514. 4. People v. Pearis, 37 Cal. 259. 5. Van Rensselaer v. Cottrell, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 127. 6. Rowe v. Blakeslee, 11 Conn. 479. 7. See cases in preceding notes. 8. State v. Gray, 29 N. J. L. 380; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Pa. St. 432. are The lands of non- residents taxable in the school district in which they lie. Allen v. Gleason, 4 Day (Conn.) 376; Rowe v. Blakeslee, 11 Conn. 479. 9. The real estate of a foreign corporation is taxable in the township in which it is located. State v. Berry, 52 N. J. L. 308; 19 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 586. New York.-Under the statutes providing for the taxation of corporations, the real property of toll-bridge companies is to be assessed in the town or ward in which it lies. The clause in New York Rev. Stat. 389, § 6, directing assessment in the town ward where the tolls are collected, applies only to personal estate. Hudson River Bridge Co. v. Patterson, 74 N. Y. 365. or there is some conflict. The general rule seems to be that, in the absence of prohibition in the state constitution, such power exists; at least, where the object to be attained would benefit the district taxed, where there is a doubt as to the question in what district the land lies, or where the tract taxed is situated in more than one taxing district. An unorganized district may be annexed to another for taxing purposes. The district in which the land is located at the time of the assessment determines where the tax is to be paid. If the lines are changed subsequent to this time, but prior to the collection of the tax, it is immaterial. The question of place is one of fact. It must be decided by the taxpayer at his peril. If land is wrongfully assessed elsewhere, this 1. In Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385, it was held that the legislature could not authorize a municipal corporation to tax, for its own local purposes, lands lying beyond the corporate limits. See Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), pp. 1598-163; Cooley on Const. Lim. (2d ed.), p. 500. 2. In Conwell v. Connersville, 8 Ind. 358, an act authorizing a town to tax property within 200 yards of the corporation line, was held constitutional, though not discussed by counsel, and the court simply said: "We are not advised that such act is in conflict with the constitution." And in Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 661, it was held that a Virginia act, authorizing a city to tax persons and property for half a mile around and outside of the corporate limits, to pay the interest upon the guaranty by the city of certain railroad stock, was not in violation of the Virginia constitution. In regard to these two cases, Judge Cooley says: "These two, however, may well be deemed doubtful cases. It is certainly difficult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended, whose people have no voice in voting it, in selecting the purposes, or in expending it." Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 160. In Maryland, an act authorizing a city to levy and collect a tax upon property adjacent thereto, for the purpose of defraying the expense of laying out streets within the city, has been held to be constitutional. Brooks v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 265. 3. People v. Wilkerson, 1 Idaho N. S. 619. 4. In Dubuque v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Iowa 196, the court held valid a law which imposed a tax upon the gross earnings of a railroad in lieu of all other taxes, and which apportioned the tax thus levied to the different counties in proportion to the number of miles of road in each. The court, by Rothrock, J., said: "The power of the legislature to fix the situs of property for the purpose of taxation is not confined to personal property alone; it exists as to real property also." The practical effect of this decision was to give to certain localities the equivalent of a tax levied upon property outside of their jurisdiction, and to prevent them from taxing the property of the road which was within their jurisdiction. See also People v. Fredericks, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 150; Taylor v. Secor, 92 U. S. 575. 5. An unorganized county may be attached to another county for revenue purposes, and taxes made payable to the treasurer of the latter county. In that case, a tax sale by the treasurer of the former county would be void. Collins v. Storm, 75 Iowa 36. 6. A road tax on unseated land as sessed and payable by a county to a township, before the division of it, is still payable to the same township, though the land lies in a new township. Barnett Tp. v. Jefferson County, 9 Watts (Pa.) 166. Where an assessment of real estate was made upon the date fixed by statute, and, before the completion of the assessment, that portion of the town in which such real estate was situated was set off to another town, the court held that the owner remained liable, nevertheless, upon the original assessment. Harman v. New Marlborough, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 525. See also Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37. 7. People v. Wilkerson, 1 Idaho N. S. 622. Where, under such a statute, a farm lying in two adjoining towns has been |